Models of Cognition: Neurological possibility does not indicate neurological plausibility

Many activities in Cognitive Science involve complex computer models and simulations of both theoretical and real entities. Artificial Intelligence and the study of artificial neural nets in particular, are seen as major contributors in the quest for understanding the human mind. Computational models serve as objects of experimentation, and results from these virtual experiments are tacitly included in the framework of empirical science. Cognitive functions, like learning to speak, or discovering syntactical structures in language, have been modeled and these models are the basis for many claims about human cognitive capacities. Artificial neural nets (ANNs) have had some successes in the field of Artificial Intelligence, but the results from experiments with simple ANNs may have little value in explaining cognitive functions. The problem seems to be in relating cognitive concepts that belong in the `top-down' approach to models grounded in the `bottom-up' connectionist methodology. Merging the two fundamentally different paradigms within a single model can obfuscate what is really modeled. When the tools (simple artificial neural networks) to solve the problems (explaining aspects of higher cognitive functions) are mismatched, models with little value in terms of explaining functions of the human mind are produced. The ability to learn functions from data-points makes ANNs very attractive analytical tools. These tools can be developed into valuable models, if the data is adequate and a meaningful interpretation of the data is possible. The problem is, that with appropriate data and labels that fit the desired level of description, almost any function can be modeled. It is my argument that small networks offer a universal framework for modeling any conceivable cognitive theory, so that neurological possibility can be demonstrated easily with relatively simple models. However, a model demonstrating the possibility of implementation of a cognitive function using a distributed methodology, does not necessarily add support to any claims or assumptions that the cognitive function in question, is neurologically plausible

Persons Versus Brains: Biological Intelligence in Human Organisms

I go deep into the biology of the human organism to argue that the psychological features and functions of persons are realized by cellular and molecular parallel distributed processing networks dispersed throughout the whole body. Persons supervene on the computational processes of nervous, endocrine, immune, and genetic networks. Persons do not go with brains

From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness (Part 3)

This third paper locates the synthetic neurorobotics research reviewed in the second paper in terms of themes introduced in the first paper. It begins with biological non-reductionism as understood by Searle. It emphasizes the role of synthetic neurorobotics studies in accessing the dynamic structure essential to consciousness with a focus on system criticality and self, develops a distinction between simulated and formal consciousness based on this emphasis, reviews Tani and colleagues' work in light of this distinction, and ends by forecasting the increasing importance of synthetic neurorobotics studies for cognitive science and philosophy of mind going forward, finally in regards to most- and myth-consciousness

Topology and Computational Performance of Attractor Neural Networks

To explore the relation between network structure and function, we studied the computational performance of Hopfield-type attractor neural nets with regular lattice, random, small-world and scale-free topologies. The random net is the most efficient for storage and retrieval of patterns by the entire network. However, in the scale-free case retrieval errors are not distributed uniformly: the portion of a pattern encoded by the subset of highly connected nodes is more robust and efficiently recognized than the rest of the pattern. The scale-free network thus achieves a very strong partial recognition. Implications for brain function and social dynamics are suggestive.Comment: 2 figures included. Submitted to Phys. Rev. Letter

Networks of Gene Regulation, Neural Development and the Evolution of General Capabilities, Such as Human Empathy

A network of gene regulation organized in a hierarchical and combinatorial manner is crucially involved in the development of the neural network, and has to be considered one of the main substrates of genetic change in its evolution. Though qualitative features may emerge by way of the accumulation of rather unspecific quantitative changes, it is reasonable to assume that at least in some cases specific combinations of regulatory parts of the genome initiated new directions of evolution, leading to novel capabilities of the brain. These notions are applied, in this paper, to the evolution of the capability of cognition-based human empa­thy. It is suggested that it has evolved as a secondary effect of the evolution of strategic thought. Development of strategies depends on abstract representations of one’s own pos­sible future states in one’s own brain to allow assessment of their emotional desirability, but also on the representation and emotional evaluation of possible states of others, allowing anticipation of their behaviour. This is best achieved if representations of others are con­nected to one’s own emotional centres in a manner similar to self-representations. For this reason, the evolution of the human brain is assumed to have established representations with such linkages. No group selection is involved, because the quality of strategic thought affects the fitness of the individual. A secondary effect of this linkage is that both the actual states and the future perspectives of others elicit vicarious emotions, which may contribute to the motivations of altruistic behaviour

TGFβ signaling is associated with changes in inflammatory gene expression and perineuronal net degradation around inhibitory neurons following various neurological insults.

Brain damage due to stroke or traumatic brain injury (TBI), both leading causes of serious long-term disability, often leads to the development of epilepsy. Patients who develop post-injury epilepsy tend to have poor functional outcomes. Emerging evidence highlights a potential role for blood-brain barrier (BBB) dysfunction in the development of post-injury epilepsy. However, common mechanisms underlying the pathological hyperexcitability are largely unknown. Here, we show that comparative transcriptome analyses predict remodeling of extracellular matrix (ECM) as a common response to different types of injuries. ECM-related transcriptional changes were induced by the serum protein albumin via TGFβ signaling in primary astrocytes. In accordance with transcriptional responses, we found persistent degradation of protective ECM structures called perineuronal nets (PNNs) around fast-spiking inhibitory interneurons, in a rat model of TBI as well as in brains of human epileptic patients. Exposure of a naïve brain to albumin was sufficient to induce the transcriptional and translational upregulation of molecules related to ECM remodeling and the persistent breakdown of PNNs around fast-spiking inhibitory interneurons, which was contingent on TGFβ signaling activation. Our findings provide insights on how albumin extravasation that occurs upon BBB dysfunction in various brain injuries can predispose neural circuitry to the development of chronic inhibition deficits