Artificial Stupidity

Artificial intelligence is everywhere. And yet, the experts tell us, it is not yet actually anywhere. This is because we are yet to achieve artificial general intelligence, or artificially intelligent systems that are capable of thinking for themselves and adapting to their circumstances. Instead, all the AI hype—and it is constant—concerns narrower, weaker forms of artificial intelligence, which are confined to performing specific, narrow tasks. The promise of true artificial general intelligence thus remains elusive. Artificial stupidity reigns supreme. What is the best set of policies to achieve more general, stronger forms of artificial intelligence? Surprisingly, scholars have paid little attention to this question. Scholars have spent considerable time assessing a number of important legal questions relating to artificial intelligence, including privacy, bias, tort, and intellectual property issues. But little effort has been devoted to exploring what set of policies is best suited to helping artificial intelligence developers achieve greater levels of innovation. And examining such issues is not some niche exercise, because artificial intelligence has already or soon will affect every sector of society. Hence, the question goes to the heart of future technological innovation policy more broadly. This Article examines this question by exploring how well intellectual property rights promote innovation in artificial intelligence. I focus on intellectual property rights because they are often viewed as the most important piece of United States innovation policy. Overall, I argue that intellectual property rights, particularly patents, are ill-suited to promote more radical forms of artificial intelligence innovation. And even the intellectual property types that are a better fit for artificial intelligence innovators, such as trade secrecy, come with problems of their own. In fact, the poor fit of patents in particular may contribute to heavy industry consolidation in the AI field, and heavy consolidation in an industry is typically associated with lower than ideal levels of innovation. I conclude by arguing, however, that neither strengthening AI patent rights nor looking to other forms of law, such as antitrust, holds much promise in achieving more general forms of artificial intelligence. Instead, as with many earlier radical innovations, significant government backing, coupled with an engaged entrepreneurial sector, is at least one key to avoiding enduring artificial stupidity

Stupidity in the Age of Reason

The Age of Reason was marked by a decline in the theological basis of knowledge due to a rise of scientific explanations of natural phenomena trends which reflected the application of reason to philosophy astronomy where it was most effective and biology However during this era the political life of nations continued to be shaped by power while the cognitive life of people continued to be shaped by religion tradition and emotion which combined to make this period as unreasonable as any othe

Mass differentiated reading skills instruction in high school

Thesis (M.Ed.)--Boston University N.B.: Page 3 Misnumbered

The Fall of Hong Kong: The Condon Report

David Macri recently defended his PhD thesis “Hong Kong in the Sino–Japanese War: The Logistics of Collective Security in South China, 1935–1941” at the University of Hong Kong. The thesis raises new and important questions about the strategic background to the events of late 1941. Dr. Macri is also interested in operational and tactical issues and this report from the US National Archives is of special interest to Canadians. The author, Major Reynolds Condon, was an American assistant military attaché in Hong Kong who witnessed the battle before being released back to the US. His report, while not always factually correct, helps shed some light on aspects of the battle for which he was an eyewitness

Synchronous Online Philosophy Courses: An Experiment in Progress

There are two main ways to teach a course online: synchronously or asynchronously. In an asynchronous course, students can log on at their convenience and do the course work. In a synchronous course, there is a requirement that all students be online at specific times, to allow for a shared course environment. In this article, the author discusses the strengths and weaknesses of synchronous online learning for the teaching of undergraduate philosophy courses. The author discusses specific strategies and technologies he uses in the teaching of online philosophy courses. In particular, the author discusses how he uses videoconferencing to create a classroom-like environment in an online class

Accelerating AI

Recently, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become a subject of major media interest. For instance, last May the New York Times devoted an article to the prospect of the time at which AI equals and then surpasses human intelligence. The article speculated on the dangers that such an event and its “strong AI” might bring. Then in July, the Times discussed computer-driven warfare. Various experts expressed concern about the growing power of computers, particularly as they become the basis for new weapons, such as the predator drones that the United States now uses to kill terrorists. These articles encapsulate the twin fears about AI that may impel regulation in this area—the existential dread of machines that become uncontrollable by humans and the political anxiety about machines’ destructive power on a revolutionized battlefield. Both fears are overblown. The existential fear is based on the mistaken notion that strong artificial intelligence will necessarily reflect human malevolence. The military fear rests on the mistaken notion that computer-driven weaponry will necessarily worsen, rather than temper, human malevolence. In any event, given the centrality of increases in computer power to military technology, it would be impossible to regulate research into AI without empowering the worst nations on earth

Accelerating AI

Recently, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become a subject of major media interest. For instance, last May the New York Times devoted an article to the prospect of the time at which AI equals and then surpasses human intelligence. The article speculated on the dangers that such an event and its “strong AI” might bring. Then in July, the Times discussed computer-driven warfare. Various experts expressed concern about the growing power of computers, particularly as they become the basis for new weapons, such as the predator drones that the United States now uses to kill terrorists. These articles encapsulate the twin fears about AI that may impel regulation in this area—the existential dread of machines that become uncontrollable by humans and the political anxiety about machines’ destructive power on a revolutionized battlefield. Both fears are overblown. The existential fear is based on the mistaken notion that strong artificial intelligence will necessarily reflect human malevolence. The military fear rests on the mistaken notion that computer-driven weaponry will necessarily worsen, rather than temper, human malevolence. In any event, given the centrality of increases in computer power to military technology, it would be impossible to regulate research into AI without empowering the worst nations on earth

Hannah Arendt as a Theorist of International Criminal Law

This paper examines Hannah Arendt\u27s contributions as a theorist of international criminal law. It draws mostly on Eichmann in Jerusalem, particularly its epilogue, but also on Arendt\u27s correspondence, her writings from the 1940s on Jewish politics, and portions of The Human Condition and her essays. The paper focuses on four issues: (1) Arendt\u27s conception of international crimes as universal offenses against humanity, and the implications she draws for theories of criminal jurisdiction; (2) her performative theory of group identity as acts of political affiliation and disaffiliation, from which follows a radically different account of the crime of genocide than that of Raphael Lemkin; (3) the banality of evil, and its relation to legal conceptions of mens rea; and (4) her ultimately inconclusive assessment of law\u27s capacity to confront the radically unprecedented crimes of regimes that are themselves criminal, and which systematically invert the values necessary to distinguish legal rules from exceptions. The essay was written for a symposium on women and international criminal law in honor of Judge Patricia Wald

From Data to Wisdom: The Progression of Computational Learning in Text Mining

The DIKW hierarchy has long been a standard framework with which researchers can differentiate between levels of what they see and know. However much of the research conducted explores the nuances and precise divisions between each hierarchy level and assumes that the user will know how to use them. We plan to restrict our study to textual Web documents and propose a framework extension to the DIKW hierarchy that encompasses acquisition, delivery and prediction elements. We feel that such an extension can help better define each level of the DIKW hierarchy into discrete units that can be applied to the content contained within the Internet