3 research outputs found
Bounds for the Nakamura number
The Nakamura number is an appropriate invariant of a simple game to study the
existence of social equilibria and the possibility of cycles. For symmetric
quota games its number can be obtained by an easy formula. For some subclasses
of simple games the corresponding Nakamura number has also been characterized.
However, in general, not much is known about lower and upper bounds depending
of invariants on simple, complete or weighted games. Here, we survey such
results and highlight connections with other game theoretic concepts.Comment: 23 pages, 3 tables; a few more references adde
Bounds for the Nakamura number
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Social choice and welfare. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1164-y.The Nakamura number is an appropriate invariant of a simple game to study the existence of social equilibria and the possibility of cycles. For symmetric (quota) games its number can be obtained by an easy formula. For some subclasses of simple games the corresponding Nakamura number has also been characterized. However, in general, not much is known about lower and upper bounds depending on invariants of simple, complete or weighted games. Here, we survey such results and highlight connections with other game theoretic concepts. © 2018, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
From Arrow to cycles, instability, and chaos by untying alternatives
From remarkably general assumptions, Arrow's Theorem concludes that a social intransitivity must afflict some profile of transitive individual preferences. It need not be a cycle, but all others have ties. If we add a modest tie-limit, we get a chaotic cycle, one comprising all alternatives, and a tight one to boot: a short path connects any two alternatives. For this we need naught but (1) linear preference orderings devoid of infinite ascent, (2) profiles that unanimously order a set of all but two alternatives, and with a slightly fortified tie-limit, (3) profiles that deviate ever so little from singlepeakedness. With a weaker tie-limit but not (2) or (3), we still get a chaotic cycle, not necessarily tight. With an even weaker one, we still get a dominant cycle, not necessarily chaotic (every member beats every outside alternative), and with it global instability (every alternative beaten). That tie-limit is necessary for a cycle of any sort, and for global instability too (which does not require a cycle unless alternatives are finite in number). Earlier Arrovian cycle theorems are quite limited by comparison with these.