Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture

A fully unbundled, regulated network fi?rm of unknown efficiency level can undertake unobservable effort to increase the likelihood of low downstream prices, e.g., by facilitating downstream competition. To incentivize such effort, the regulator can use an incentive scheme paying transfers to the ?firm contingent on realized downstream prices. Alternatively, the regulator can propose to the ?firm to sell the following forward contracts: the fi?rm pays the downstream price to the owners of a contract, but receives the expected value of the contracts when selling them to a competitive fi?nancial market. We compare the two regulatory tools with respect to regulatory capture: if the regulator can be bribed to suppress information on the underlying state of the world (the basic probability of high downstream prices, or the type of the firm), optimal regulation uses forward contracts only.Incentive regulation, regulatory capture, virtual power plants

Money market derivatives and the allocation of liquidity risk in the banking sector

Money markets have two functions, the allocation of liquidity and the processing of information. We develop a model that allows us to evaluate the efficiency of different money market derivatives regarding these two objectives. We assume that due to its size, a large bank receives a more precise signal about the overall liquidity development in the banking sector. In an upcoming liquidity shortage this large bank can exploit its informational advantage in the spot money market by rationing liquidity. Using forward contracts, the large bank can credibly commit not to squeeze small banks in the event of a liquidity shortage. But forward contracts do not provide incentives for the large bank to pass on its information to other banks. In contrast, lines of credit between the large and the small banks ensure that the large bank provides its information to other banks. --Liquidity,money market derivatives,lines of credit,forward contracts,options

Markets and Regulation - Introduction

Electricity Markets, Electricity Sector Reestructuring, Non-Renewable Resources, Forward Contracts, Public Utility Regulation, Benchmarking Regulation

Dynamic Asset Pricing With Non-Redundant Forwards

We consider an incomplete but frictionless financial market in which non-redundant forward contracts contribute to span the uncertainty present in the economy. When such forward contracts are available for trade, some standard results of portfolio and dynamic asset pricing theory must be amended. When the investment opportunity set is driven by K state variables, a (K+4)-mutual fund separation theorem is obtained in lieu of Merton’s classic (K+2)-fund separation. The two additional funds are fully characterized. One fund is a portfolio containing forward contracts only, and the other fund is a portfolio of cash assets and forward contracts that hedges the interest rate risk brought about by the optimal portfolio strategy itself. The latter risk is due to the fact that, when a forward contract is involved, incurred profits or losses that accrue to the investor’s wealth at each instant are locked-in in the forward position up to the contract maturity. Thus discounting these gains or losses back at the current date gives rise to an interest rate risk. A second important result is that the mean-variance efficiency of the market portfolio of cash assets is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the linear relationship between expected return and beta to hold. Finally, the pricing equation for a forward contract is shown to contain an extra term relative to that for a cash asset. We name this term a strategy risk premium. It compensates the investor for the (systematic) risk that stems from his very portfolio strategy

Additive energy forward curves in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework

One of the peculiarities of power and gas markets is the delivery mechanism of forward contracts. The seller of a futures contract commits to deliver, say, power, over a certain period, while the classical forward is a financial agreement settled on a maturity date. Our purpose is to design a Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework for an additive, mean-reverting, multicommodity market consisting of forward contracts of any delivery period. The main assumption is that forward prices can be represented as affine functions of a universal source of randomness. This allows us to completely characterize the models which prevent arbitrage opportunities: this boils down to finding a density between a risk-neutral measure $\mathbb{Q}$, such that the prices of traded assets like forward contracts are true $\mathbb{Q}$-martingales, and the real world probability measure $\mathbb{P}$, under which forward prices are mean-reverting. The Girsanov kernel for such a transformation turns out to be stochastic and unbounded in the diffusion part, while in the jump part the Girsanov kernel must be deterministic and bounded: thus, in this respect, we prove two results on the martingale property of stochastic exponentials. The first allows to validate measure changes made of two components: an Esscher-type density and a Girsanov transform with stochastic and unbounded kernel. The second uses a different approach and works for the case of continuous density. We apply this framework to two models: a generalized Lucia-Schwartz model and a cross-commodity cointegrated market.Comment: 28 page

Spot price modeling and the valuation of electricity forward contracts : the role of demand and capacity.

We propose a model where wholesale electricity prices are explained by two state variables: demand and capacity. We derive analytical expressions to price forward contracts and to calculate the forward premium. We apply our model to the PJM, England and Wales, and Nord Pool markets. Our empirical findings indicate that volatility of demand is seasonal and that the market price of demand risk is also seasonal and positive, both of which exert an upward (seasonal) pressure on the price of forward contracts. We assume that both volatility of capacity and the market price of capacity risk are constant and find that, depending on the market and period under study, it could either exert an upward or downward pressure on forward prices. In all markets we find that the forward premium exhibits a seasonal pattern. During the months of high volatility of demand, forward contracts trade at a premium. During months of low volatility of demand, forwards can either trade at a relatively small premium or, even in some cases, at a discount, i.e. they exhibit a negative forward premiumPower prices; Demand; Capacity; Forward premium; Forward bias; Market price of capacity risk; Market price of demand risk; PJM; England and Wales; Nord pool;

Spot price modeling and the valuation of electricity forward contracts : the role of demand and capacity.

We propose a model where wholesale electricity prices are explained by two state variables: demand and capacity. We derive analytical expressions to price forward contracts and to calculate the forward premium. We apply our model to the PJM, England and Wales, and Nord Pool markets. Our empirical findings indicate that volatility of demand is seasonal and that the market price of demand risk is also seasonal and positive, both of which exert an upward (seasonal) pressure on the price of forward contracts. We assume that both volatility of capacity and the market price of capacity risk are constant and find that, depending on the market and period under study, it could either exert an upward or downward pressure on forward prices. In all markets we find that the forward premium exhibits a seasonal pattern. During the months of high volatility of demand, forward contracts trade at a premium. During months of low volatility of demand, forwards can either trade at a relatively small premium or, even in some cases, at a discount, i.e. they exhibit a negative forward premiumPower prices; Demand; Capacity; Forward premium; Forward bias; Market price of capacity risk; Market price of demand risk; PJM; England and Wales; Nord Pool;

A note on forward contracts in leader-follower games

This note shows that the pro-competitive effect of pre-commitments is robust to Stackelberg-like market structures. Although our results are in line with Allaz and Vila (1993), the two equilibria differ substantially. Sequential interactions foster a monopolization of the contract market and a redistribution of market shares - and hence of profits - towards the follower. Offsetting strategies in the sense of Bain (1949a) can then occur. The use of forward sales to exclude the rival in the output market requires the leader to have a strategic advantage in the contract market, as well as some conditions on the technological structure of the industry.

International Trade, Hedging and the Demand for Forward Contracts

One of the main results of the literature on the effects of uncertainty on trade states that uncertainty should not matter in the presence of well developed forward markets. Empirical studies, however, do not support this result. We derive the demand for forward cover in a small open economy with terms of trade uncertainty. Adopting a standard and more realistic decision structure than the one usually used in this literature, we find that risk averse agents will not buy forwards at an unbiased price. Agents treat forward contracts as an asset rather than as an insurance. This is the reason why, when calibrating the model, only 17% of imports are covered by forwards. --