Towards a theory of deception

This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent�s strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the Fundamental Attribution Er- ror. It is applied to a bargaining problem, thereby revealing a deceptive tactic that is hard to explain in the full rationality paradigm

A Note on Parameterised Knowledge Operations in Temporal Logic

We consider modeling the conception of knowledge in terms of temporal logic. The study of knowledge logical operations is originated around 1962 by representation of knowledge and belief using modalities. Nowadays, it is very good established area. However, we would like to look to it from a bit another point of view, our paper models knowledge in terms of linear temporal logic with {\em past}. We consider various versions of logical knowledge operations which may be defined in this framework. Technically, semantics, language and temporal knowledge logics based on our approach are constructed. Deciding algorithms are suggested, unification in terms of this approach is commented. This paper does not offer strong new technical outputs, instead we suggest new approach to conception of knowledge (in terms of time).Comment: 10 page

Getting Over the Magical Hump: Placement Decisions and Emotional Survival for Child Welfare Workers

This paper explores the crown wardship process from the perspective of the child welfare worker. It is based on a qualitative analysis of interviews with child welfare workers who have been involved in the process of identifying children for crown wardship, in giving chances to mothers to demonstrate parenting ability, and finally, in negotiating and formalizing crown wardship agreements. The paper also explores how workers construct identities which allow them to cope with the emotional strains of this work

A theory of deception.

This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent's strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the fundamental attribution error. It is applied to a bargaining problem, thereby revealing a deceptive tactic that is hard to explain in the full rationality paradigm.belief manipulation; deception; Bargaining Theory;

How "Doing Business" jeopardizes institutional reform

Simplifying business formalization and eliminating outdated formalities is often a good way of improving the institutional environment for firms. Unfortunately, the World Bank’s "Doing Business" project is harming such policies by promoting a reform agenda that gives them priority even in countries lacking functional business registers, so that the reformed registers keep producing valueless information, but faster. Its methodology also promotes biased measurements that impede proper consideration of the essential tradeoffs in the design of formalization institutions. If "Doing Business" is to stop jeopardizing its true objectives and contribute positively to scientific progress, institutional reform and economic development, then its aims, governance and methodology need to change.Starting business, doing business, informal economy, company registers