45,982 research outputs found
RTL2RTL Formal Equivalence: Boosting the Design Confidence
Increasing design complexity driven by feature and performance requirements
and the Time to Market (TTM) constraints force a faster design and validation
closure. This in turn enforces novel ways of identifying and debugging
behavioral inconsistencies early in the design cycle. Addition of incremental
features and timing fixes may alter the legacy design behavior and would
inadvertently result in undesirable bugs. The most common method of verifying
the correctness of the changed design is to run a dynamic regression test suite
before and after the intended changes and compare the results, a method which
is not exhaustive. Modern Formal Verification (FV) techniques involving new
methods of proving Sequential Hardware Equivalence enabled a new set of
solutions for the given problem, with complete coverage guarantee. Formal
Equivalence can be applied for proving functional integrity after design
changes resulting from a wide variety of reasons, ranging from simple pipeline
optimizations to complex logic redistributions. We present here our experience
of successfully applying the RTL to RTL (RTL2RTL) Formal Verification across a
wide spectrum of problems on a Graphics design. The RTL2RTL FV enabled checking
the design sanity in a very short time, thus enabling faster and safer design
churn. The techniques presented in this paper are applicable to any complex
hardware design.Comment: In Proceedings FSFMA 2014, arXiv:1407.195
Trojans in Early Design Steps—An Emerging Threat
Hardware Trojans inserted by malicious foundries
during integrated circuit manufacturing have received substantial
attention in recent years. In this paper, we focus on a different
type of hardware Trojan threats: attacks in the early steps of
design process. We show that third-party intellectual property
cores and CAD tools constitute realistic attack surfaces and that
even system specification can be targeted by adversaries. We
discuss the devastating damage potential of such attacks, the
applicable countermeasures against them and their deficiencies
Learning Concise Models from Long Execution Traces
Abstract models of system-level behaviour have applications in design
exploration, analysis, testing and verification. We describe a new algorithm
for automatically extracting useful models, as automata, from execution traces
of a HW/SW system driven by software exercising a use-case of interest. Our
algorithm leverages modern program synthesis techniques to generate predicates
on automaton edges, succinctly describing system behaviour. It employs trace
segmentation to tackle complexity for long traces. We learn concise models
capturing transaction-level, system-wide behaviour--experimentally
demonstrating the approach using traces from a variety of sources, including
the x86 QEMU virtual platform and the Real-Time Linux kernel
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