Bounding Rationality by Discounting Time

Consider a game where Alice generates an integer and Bob wins if he can factor that integer. Traditional game theory tells us that Bob will always win this game even though in practice Alice will win given our usual assumptions about the hardness of factoring. We define a new notion of bounded rationality, where the payoffs of players are discounted by the computation time they take to produce their actions. We use this notion to give a direct correspondence between the existence of equilibria where Alice has a winning strategy and the hardness of factoring. Namely, under a natural assumption on the discount rates, there is an equilibriumwhere Alice has a winning strategy iff there is a linear-time samplable distribution with respect to which Factoring is hard on average. We also give general results for discounted games over countable action spaces, including showing that any game with bounded and computable payoffs has an equilibrium in our model, even if each player is allowed a countable number of actions. It follows, for example, that the Largest Integer game has an equilibrium in our model though it has no Nash equilibria or epsilon-Nash equilibria.Comment: To appear in Proceedings of The First Symposium on Innovations in Computer Scienc

Automated Game Design Learning

While general game playing is an active field of research, the learning of game design has tended to be either a secondary goal of such research or it has been solely the domain of humans. We propose a field of research, Automated Game Design Learning (AGDL), with the direct purpose of learning game designs directly through interaction with games in the mode that most people experience games: via play. We detail existing work that touches the edges of this field, describe current successful projects in AGDL and the theoretical foundations that enable them, point to promising applications enabled by AGDL, and discuss next steps for this exciting area of study. The key moves of AGDL are to use game programs as the ultimate source of truth about their own design, and to make these design properties available to other systems and avenues of inquiry.Comment: 8 pages, 2 figures. Accepted for CIG 201

Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game

I explore the idea of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion in games. A pair of strategies in finite-automata representation (s(1), s(2)) is a Simple Nash Equilibrium (SINE) if: (1) s(j) is a best-reply to s(i); (2) every automaton for player j, which generates the same path as s(j) (given s(i)), has at least as many states as s(j). I apply SINE to a bilateral concession game and show that it captures an aspect of bargaining behavior: players employ delay tactics in order to justify their concessions. Delay tactics are mutually reinforcing, and this may prevent players from reaching an interior agreement. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved

Learning to Play Games in Extensive Form by Valuation

A valuation for a player in a game in extensive form is an assignment of numeric values to the players moves. The valuation reflects the desirability moves. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the highest valuation. Valuations can also be revised, and hopefully improved, after each play of the game. Here, a very simple valuation revision is considered, in which the moves made in a play are assigned the payoff obtained in the play. We show that by adopting such a learning process a player who has a winning strategy in a win-lose game can almost surely guarantee a win in a repeated game. When a player has more than two payoffs, a more elaborate learning procedure is required. We consider one that associates with each move the average payoff in the rounds in which this move was made. When all players adopt this learning procedure, with some perturbations, then, with probability 1, strategies that are close to subgame perfect equilibrium are played after some time. A single player who adopts this procedure can guarantee only her individually rational payoff

Revisiting Synthesis for One-Counter Automata

We study the (parameter) synthesis problem for one-counter automata with parameters. One-counter automata are obtained by extending classical finite-state automata with a counter whose value can range over non-negative integers and be tested for zero. The updates and tests applicable to the counter can further be made parametric by introducing a set of integer-valued variables called parameters. The synthesis problem for such automata asks whether there exists a valuation of the parameters such that all infinite runs of the automaton satisfy some omega-regular property. Lechner showed that (the complement of) the problem can be encoded in a restricted one-alternation fragment of Presburger arithmetic with divisibility. In this work (i) we argue that said fragment, called AERPADPLUS, is unfortunately undecidable. Nevertheless, by a careful re-encoding of the problem into a decidable restriction of AERPADPLUS, (ii) we prove that the synthesis problem is decidable in general and in N2EXP for several fixed omega-regular properties. Finally, (iii) we give a polynomial-space algorithm for the special case of the problem where parameters can only be used in tests, and not updates, of the counter