A valuation for a player in a game in extensive form is an assignment of
numeric values to the players moves. The valuation reflects the desirability
moves. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the highest
valuation. Valuations can also be revised, and hopefully improved, after each
play of the game. Here, a very simple valuation revision is considered, in
which the moves made in a play are assigned the payoff obtained in the play. We
show that by adopting such a learning process a player who has a winning
strategy in a win-lose game can almost surely guarantee a win in a repeated
game. When a player has more than two payoffs, a more elaborate learning
procedure is required. We consider one that associates with each move the
average payoff in the rounds in which this move was made. When all players
adopt this learning procedure, with some perturbations, then, with probability
1, strategies that are close to subgame perfect equilibrium are played after
some time. A single player who adopts this procedure can guarantee only her
individually rational payoff