Determinants of foreign direct investment in Macedonia. Evidence from time series 1994 – 2008

Foreign Direct Investment has been considered as one of the main factors underlying the relative growth rates experienced by the Macedonian Economy. The raising trend of FDI inflow made possible the deep liberalization and transformation of an economy, thus increasing the degree of openness and integration of Macedonian economy into the world markets. In addition, the Macedonian attitude toward European Union (EU) membership has involved a new boost in FDI that would reflect the favorable prospects for the country’s economic future faced with the challenges of the Single European Market. Despite the crucial role played by FDI in the Macedonian economy, the available empirical evidence is rather scant, being in general of a descriptive nature. The aim of this paper is to provide some more robust evidence on the tested hypothesis related allocation over time of gross aggregate FDI inflows in the Macedonian economy. For this purpose, using quarterly data for the period 1994 – 2008 we employed cointegration analysis. This paper applies dynamic econometric methodology empirically to investigate the determinants affecting foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow in MacedoniaForeign Direct Investment, Macedonia, Error Correction Model, Cointegration Analysis.

Prudent Budgetary Policy: Political Economy of Precautionary Taxation

The theory of tax smoothing and determination of public debt with uncertain future national income is extended for prudence. A prudent government deliberately underestimates future national income and the tax base, especially if the variance and persistence of shocks hitting the tax base are large and the tax rate and the unemployment benefit are large. As a precaution the tax rate is set higher and the level of public spending lower. As a result, as income and the tax base turn out to be bigger than budgeted, the minister of finance enjoys windfall revenues and is able to gradually reduce debt and debt service over time. This permits, depending on political preferences, either gradual cuts in the tax rate, gradual increases in government spending or a combination of both. It is easy to allow for government assets as well. Finally, political economy justifications are offered of why it is desirable to appoint a strong and pessimistic minister of finance. In particular, we show that prudence is able to offset the intertemporal spending, tax and debt biases resulting from the common-pool distortions. If the minister of finance and the prime minister are given as many voting rights as the spending ministers combined, the intratemporal common-pool distortions of an excessively large public sector are eliminated as well. A strong and pessimistic minister of finance can thus control the impatient profligacy of squabbling spending ministers. However, if voters care about outcomes on election eve, prudence may be abused for short-run electoral gains. Opportunistic manipulation of election results, however, also dampens the intertemporal common-pool distortions.prudence, pessimism, precautionary taxation, tax smoothing, public debt, income forecasts, public sector assets, common pool, feedback Nash, voting rights, electoral budget cycles, political economy

Prudent Budgetary Policy: Political Economy of Precautionary Taxation

The theory of tax smoothing and determination of public debt with uncertain future national income is extended for prudence. A prudent government deliberately underestimates future national income and the tax base, especially if the variance and persistence of shocks hitting the tax base are large and the tax rate and the unemployment benefit are large. As a precaution the tax rate is set higher and the level of public spending lower. As a result, as income and the tax base turn out to be bigger than budgeted, the minister of finance enjoys windfall revenues and is able to gradually reduce debt and debt service over time. This permits, depending on political preferences, either gradual cuts in the tax rate, gradual increases in government spending or a combination of both. It is easy to allow for government assets as well. Finally, political economy justifications are offered of why it is desirable to appoint a strong and pessimistic minister of finance. In particular, we show that prudence is able to offset the intertemporal spending, tax and debt biases resulting from the common-pool distortions. If the minister of finance and the prime minister are given as many voting rights as the spending ministers combined, the intratemporal common-pool distortions of an excessively large public sector are eliminated as well. A strong and pessimistic minister of finance can thus control the impatient profligacy of squabbling spending ministers. However, if voters care about outcomes on election eve, prudence may be abused for short-run electoral gains. Opportunistic manipulation of election results, however, also dampens the intertemporal common-pool distortions.prudence, pessimism, precautionary taxation, tax smoothing, public debt, income forecasts, public sector assets, common pool, feedback Nash, voting rights, electoral budget cycles, political economy