Abstracts : Policy Research working paper series - numbers 2883 - 2933

This paper contains abstracts of Policy Research Working Paper series, numbers 2883 - 2933.Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance,Poverty Assessment,Governance Indicators,Health Monitoring&Evaluation

The changing tide: Federal support of civilian-sector R and D

The involvement of the Federal government in civilian sector research and development is discussed. Relevant policies are put in an historical perspective. The roles played by industrial research and public funding are reveiwed. Government support of basic an generic research, clientele-oriented applied research, and research with commercial ends is studied. Procurement, anti-trust, and patent policies, all of which affect the climate for private research and development, are examined

TRIAD - Preliminary design of an operational earth resources survey system Final report

Design of operational earth resources survey syste

Societal assessment overview

The decision to proceed with SPS depends on a political determination that commitment of the economic, institutional, and social energies required for its implementation is a worthwhile investment. This determination is national (and international) in scope and is based on knowledge of the environmental and societal impacts of the SPS, its projected economics and technological risks, expressed through the influence of contending segments of society. To assist the decision makers, an assessment of societal issues associated with the SPS was undertaken as part of the Concept Development and Evaluation Program. Results of the assessment are reported. The primary societal assessment objectives are to determine if the societal ramifications of an SPS might significantly impede its development, and to establish an information base regarding these issues. Estimates regarding SPS impacts commensurate with its stage of development and the needs of the decision makers are provided

The political economy of fiscal policy and economic management in oil exporting countries

Despite massive oil rent incomes since the early 1970s, the economic performance of oil-exporting countries-with notable exceptions-is poor. While there is extensive literature on the management of oil resources, analysis of the underlying political determinants of this poor performance is more sparse. Drawing on concepts from the comparative institutionalist tradition in political science, the authors develop a generalized typology of political states that is used in analyzing the political economy of fiscal and economic management in oil-exporting countries with widely differing political systems. In assessing performance, the authors focus on issues of long-term savings, economic stabilization, and efficient use of oil rents. The comparisons of country experiences suggest that countries with strong, mature, democratic traditions have advantages in managing oil rents well because of their ability to reach consensus, their educated and informed electorates, and a high level of transparency that facilitates clear decisions on how to use rents over a long horizon. Yet even these systems, ensuring cautious use of oil income is a continuing struggle. Traditional and modernizing autocracies have also demonstrated their ability to sustain long decision horizons and implement developmental policies. But resistance to transparency and the danger of oil-led spending and expenditure commitments becoming the major legitimizing force behind the state may pose risk to the long-term sustainability of their current development strategies. In contrast, little positive effect can be expected from the politically unstable, predatory autocracies, which typically have very short policy horizons and sometimes the characteristics of"roving bandit"regimes. Factional democracies, with weak political parties and highly personalized politics, present particular challenges because they lack a sufficiently effective political system to create a consensus among strong competing interests. Special attention will be needed to increase transparency and raise public awareness in these countries. And oil rent makes it more difficult to sustain a constituency in favor of sound, longer-run economic management because it weakens incentives for agents to support checks and balances that impinge on their individual plans to appropriate the rents. The country comparisons further demonstrate that technical solutions-such as the establishment of oil stabilization funds and budgetary reforms-to enhance transparency and efficiency in the use of oil rents will not work well unless constituencies can be developed in support of such measures.Economic Theory&Research,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Environmental Economics&Policies,Decentralization,Environmental Economics&Policies,National Governance,Economic Theory&Research,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Energy and Environment

ECONOMICS OF DETECTION AND CONTROL OF INVASIVE SPECIES: WORKSHOP HIGHLIGHTS

Invasive species are species that are not native to an ecosystem, and when introduced into the new ecosystem, they cause economic or environmental damage. Trade is one way in which these species are introduced into new regions, and as trade increases, the introduction of invasive species also rises. The Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies, North Dakota State University, held a workshop on April 30, 2004 in Fargo, ND, titled ?Economics of Detection and Control of Invasive Species? to address these issues. The purpose of this workshop was to present current findings on the subject of invasive species in agricultural trade and to structure the model for an in-depth research project examining this issue. Speakers included experts from the Animal Plant Health Inspection Service and the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and from U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, as well as professors of economics from North Dakota State University and other academic institutions. Discussion included the impact of invasive species on agricultural production and trade, the tools used by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Customs and Border patrol to detect and control incoming species, and the creation of econometric models to capture and explain these processes and to analyze policy issues. This report contains abstracts from the presentations given at the workshop.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

A National Veterans Strategy: The Economic, Social and Security Imperative

This publication details the foundational logic supporting a call to action, related to a broad-based effort to articulate and institutionalize a National Veterans Strategy. We argue that coordinated, "whole-of-government" action toward this end is essential to meet the nation's most important economic, social, and security obligations. Furthermore, we contend that the second Obama administration, working in close collaboration with executive agencies, Congress, and the private sector, is well-positioned to act on what we perceive to be a historic opportunity -- capitalizing on both the foundations of veteran-focused policy and progress enacted over the past decade and the overwhelming public support for returning veterans and military families -- to craft and institutionalize a National Veterans Strategy.Our purpose is to provide a researched and logically-developed case for action that is grounded in this nation's social and cultural traditions and attuned to the practical realities of our contemporary economic and political climate

Carrying a Big Carrot: Linking Multilateral Disarmament and Development Assistance

This article proposes, as a new element of the liberal internationalism that should characterize the post-Cold War world, a simultaneous solution to these three problems. The nations of the world should negotiate a series of multilateral agreements to stop the spread of advanced weaponry, and include in each of them, as an overt incentive for developing states to accept the disarmament and verification obligations, provisions that explicitly require the affluent, developed states to make specified monetary and in-kind transfers to the third world parties. The new regime should also provide stronger-than-customary treaty procedures for clarifying ambiguities, adjudicating claims, and resolving disputes, and should designate one or more multilateral administrative and enforcement agencies dedicated to furthering the agreements. In short, the wealthy countries, which stand to benefit the most from the establishment of a more stable international military environment, should be willing to pay for it. They should provide aid and commercial grants to the developing states that, in turn, should agree to accept significant, verifiable limitations, particularly on high-technology armaments, as an explicit condition for these important financial advantages. While this package approach will not by itself solve all the security difficulties of the next century, it offers the best hope for gaining control over some of them and for channeling our collective energies into productive and mutually beneficial enterprises. The argument of the article is developed in the following six parts. Part I examines the problem of multilateral disarmament, summarizing the progress registered to date and the areas in which more needs to be done. It also demonstrates that the coming decades, even after the ending of the Cold War, will present stark new threats to United States security and world peace, threats that existing arms control institutions and treaty regimes have been unable to anticipate and preempt. Part II addresses the problems of economic development, drawing on the literature describing the importance of judicious foreign assistance in promoting sound economic growth in marginal economies, and assessing the international community\u27s currently inadequate response to this need. It describes the third world\u27s stake in economic development and presents the case for the advanced societies to do more--out of sheer economic and political self-interest, if nothing else. Part III then suggests that future arms control imperatives will present challenges and dangers that are systematically different from those that the world has confronted--and resolved inadequately--in the past. It marshals the evidence for the propositions that the world\u27s current strategies for dampening international conflict through existing types of treaty regimes are already insufficient, and that the trend is worsening. Part IV presents our proposal for a tradeoff, with the developed states frankly buying the arms control they need, and paying for it with guaranteed levels of development assistance that the poor states need. This Part then outlines seven principles that underlie the proposal as a whole and presents some of the nuts and bolts that could make it operational. While the suggestion may seem radical at first blush--legalized bribery or economic imperialism in some eyes--we think it offers a realistic, efficient solution to otherwise intractable global threats. Part V deals with some of the most serious objections that might be raised against our strategy, discussing the morality of the tradeoff, its political acceptability, the precedents for it, and possible alternatives to it. Finally, the Conclusion offers some observations about the proposal as one component in an overdue, more subtle, conceptualization of national security. The author’s thesis is that international agreements linking multilateral disarmament and economic development, though novel and potentially risky, offer the most promising way out of the international community\u27s emerging security impasse. Their program would give both developed and developing states what they need. It would fashion a flexible, enforceable scheme for dealing with the complex fears and incentives that are otherwise unaddressed or confined to under-the-table bargaining. Explicit trading may not seem palatable at first, but equipping future treaties with both positive incentives and negative sanctions, rather than relying exclusively upon negative sanctions alone, could prove to be far more tolerable than any of the alternatives