Faster Algorithms for Mean-Payoff Parity Games

Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesis of reactive processes. Such games are played over graphs where the vertices are controlled by two adversarial players. We consider graph games where the objective of the first player is the conjunction of a qualitative objective (specified as a parity condition) and a quantitative objective (specified as a meanpayoff condition). There are two variants of the problem, namely, the threshold problem where the quantitative goal is to ensure that the mean-payoff value is above a threshold, and the value problem where the quantitative goal is to ensure the optimal mean-payoff value; in both cases ensuring the qualitative parity objective. The previous best-known algorithms for game graphs with n vertices, m edges, parity objectives with d priorities, and maximal absolute reward value W for mean-payoff objectives, are as follows: O(nd+1 . m . w) for the threshold problem, and O(nd+2 · m · W) for the value problem. Our main contributions are faster algorithms, and the running times of our algorithms are as follows: O(nd-1 · m ·W) for the threshold problem, and O(nd · m · W · log(n · W)) for the value problem. For mean-payoff parity objectives with two priorities, our algorithms match the best-known bounds of the algorithms for mean-payoff games (without conjunction with parity objectives). Our results are relevant in synthesis of reactive systems with both functional requirement (given as a qualitative objective) and performance requirement (given as a quantitative objective)

LIPIcs

Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesis of reactive processes. Such games are played over graphs where the vertices are controlled by two adversarial players. We consider graph games where the objective of the first player is the conjunction of a qualitative objective (specified as a parity condition) and a quantitative objective (specified as a meanpayoff condition). There are two variants of the problem, namely, the threshold problem where the quantitative goal is to ensure that the mean-payoff value is above a threshold, and the value problem where the quantitative goal is to ensure the optimal mean-payoff value; in both cases ensuring the qualitative parity objective. The previous best-known algorithms for game graphs with n vertices, m edges, parity objectives with d priorities, and maximal absolute reward value W for mean-payoff objectives, are as follows: O(nd+1 . m . w) for the threshold problem, and O(nd+2 · m · W) for the value problem. Our main contributions are faster algorithms, and the running times of our algorithms are as follows: O(nd-1 · m ·W) for the threshold problem, and O(nd · m · W · log(n · W)) for the value problem. For mean-payoff parity objectives with two priorities, our algorithms match the best-known bounds of the algorithms for mean-payoff games (without conjunction with parity objectives). Our results are relevant in synthesis of reactive systems with both functional requirement (given as a qualitative objective) and performance requirement (given as a quantitative objective)

A Novel Clustering Algorithm Based on Quantum Games

Enormous successes have been made by quantum algorithms during the last decade. In this paper, we combine the quantum game with the problem of data clustering, and then develop a quantum-game-based clustering algorithm, in which data points in a dataset are considered as players who can make decisions and implement quantum strategies in quantum games. After each round of a quantum game, each player's expected payoff is calculated. Later, he uses a link-removing-and-rewiring (LRR) function to change his neighbors and adjust the strength of links connecting to them in order to maximize his payoff. Further, algorithms are discussed and analyzed in two cases of strategies, two payoff matrixes and two LRR functions. Consequently, the simulation results have demonstrated that data points in datasets are clustered reasonably and efficiently, and the clustering algorithms have fast rates of convergence. Moreover, the comparison with other algorithms also provides an indication of the effectiveness of the proposed approach.Comment: 19 pages, 5 figures, 5 table

Using Strategy Improvement to Stay Alive

We design a novel algorithm for solving Mean-Payoff Games (MPGs). Besides solving an MPG in the usual sense, our algorithm computes more information about the game, information that is important with respect to applications. The weights of the edges of an MPG can be thought of as a gained/consumed energy -- depending on the sign. For each vertex, our algorithm computes the minimum amount of initial energy that is sufficient for player Max to ensure that in a play starting from the vertex, the energy level never goes below zero. Our algorithm is not the first algorithm that computes the minimum sufficient initial energies, but according to our experimental study it is the fastest algorithm that computes them. The reason is that it utilizes the strategy improvement technique which is very efficient in practice

Non-oblivious Strategy Improvement

We study strategy improvement algorithms for mean-payoff and parity games. We describe a structural property of these games, and we show that these structures can affect the behaviour of strategy improvement. We show how awareness of these structures can be used to accelerate strategy improvement algorithms. We call our algorithms non-oblivious because they remember properties of the game that they have discovered in previous iterations. We show that non-oblivious strategy improvement algorithms perform well on examples that are known to be hard for oblivious strategy improvement. Hence, we argue that previous strategy improvement algorithms fail because they ignore the structural properties of the game that they are solving

Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements

I present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities. This is the first non-trivial algorithm for finding all pure-strategy Nash equilibria