Fair infinite lotteries

This article discusses how the concept of a fair finite lottery can best be extended to denumerably infinite lotteries. Techniques and ideas from non-standard analysis are brought to bear on the problem

Fair Infinite Lotteries, Qualitative Probability, and Regularity

A number of philosophers have thought that fair lotteries over countably infinite sets of outcomes are conceptually incoherent by virtue of violating Countable Additivity. In this paper, I show that a qualitative analogue of this argument generalizes to an argument against the conceptual coherence of a much wider class of fair infinite lotteries--including continuous uniform distributions. I argue that this result suggests that fair lotteries over countably infinite sets of outcomes are no more conceptually problematic than continuous uniform distributions. Along the way, I provide a novel argument for a weak qualitative, epistemic version of Regularity

Sets and Probability

In this article the idea of random variables over the set theoretic universe is investigated. We explore what it can mean for a random set to have a specific probability of belonging to an antecedently given class of sets

Infinitesimal Probabilities

Non-Archimedean probability functions allow us to combine regularity with perfect additivity. We discuss the philosophical motivation for a particular choice of axioms for a non-Archimedean probability theory and answer some philosophical objections that have been raised against infinitesimal probabilities in general.publishe

Uniquely determined uniform probability on the natural numbers

In this paper, we address the problem of constructing a uniform probability measure on $\mathbb{N}$. Of course, this is not possible within the bounds of the Kolmogorov axioms and we have to violate at least one axiom. We define a probability measure as a finitely additive measure assigning probability $1$ to the whole space, on a domain which is closed under complements and finite disjoint unions. We introduce and motivate a notion of uniformity which we call weak thinnability, which is strictly stronger than extension of natural density. We construct a weakly thinnable probability measure and we show that on its domain, which contains sets without natural density, probability is uniquely determined by weak thinnability. In this sense, we can assign uniform probabilities in a canonical way. We generalize this result to uniform probability measures on other metric spaces, including $\mathbb{R}^n$.Comment: We added a discussion of coherent probability measures and some explanation regarding the operator we study. We changed the title to a more descriptive one. Further, we tidied up the proofs and corrected and simplified some minor issue

Surreal Decisions

Although expected utility theory has proven a fruitful and elegant theory in the finite realm, attempts to generalize it to infinite values have resulted in many paradoxes. In this paper, we argue that the use of John Conway's surreal numbers shall provide a firm mathematical foundation for transfinite decision theory. To that end, we prove a surreal representation theorem and show that our surreal decision theory respects dominance reasoning even in the case of infinite values. We then bring our theory to bear on one of the more venerable decision problems in the literature: Pascal's Wager. Analyzing the wager showcases our theory's virtues and advantages. To that end, we analyze two objections against the wager: Mixed Strategies and Many Gods. After formulating the two objections in the framework of surreal utilities and probabilities, our theory correctly predicts that (1) the pure Pascalian strategy beats all mixed strategies, and (2) what one should do in a Pascalian decision problem depends on what one's credence function is like. Our analysis therefore suggests that although Pascal's Wager is mathematically coherent, it does not deliver what it purports to, a rationally compelling argument that people should lead a religious life regardless of how confident they are in theism and its alternatives

Comparative Infinite Lottery Logic

As an application of his Material Theory of Induction, Norton (2018; manuscript) argues that the correct inductive logic for a fair infinite lottery, and also for evaluating eternal inflation multiverse models, is radically different from standard probability theory. This is due to a requirement of label independence. It follows, Norton argues, that finite additivity fails, and any two sets of outcomes with the same cardinality and co-cardinality have the same chance. This makes the logic useless for evaluating multiverse models based on self-locating chances, so Norton claims that we should despair of such attempts. However, his negative results depend on a certain reification of chance, consisting in the treatment of inductive support as the value of a function, a value not itself affected by relabeling. Here we define a purely comparative infinite lottery logic, where there are no primitive chances but only a relation of ‘at most as likely’ and its derivatives. This logic satisfies both label independence and a comparative version of additivity as well as several other desirable properties, and it draws finer distinctions between events than Norton’s. Consequently, it yields better advice about choosing between sets of lottery tickets than Norton’s, but it does not appear to be any more helpful for evaluating multiverse models. Hence, the limitations of Norton’s logic are not entirely due to the failure of additivity, nor to the fact that all infinite, co-infinite sets of outcomes have the same chance, but to a more fundamental problem: We have no well- motivated way of comparing disjoint infinite sets

Primitive Conditional Probabilities, Subset Relations and Comparative Regularity

Rational agents seem more confident in any possible event than in an impossible event. But if rational credences are real-valued, then there are some possible events that are assigned 0 credence nonetheless. How do we differentiate these events from impossible events then when we order events? de Finetti (1975), Hájek (2012) and Easwaran (2014) suggest that when ordering events, conditional credences and subset relations are as relevant as unconditional credences. I present a counterexample to all their proposals in this paper. While their proposals order possible and impossible events correctly, they deliver the wrong verdict for disjoint possible events assigned equal positive credence