Special Signature Schemes and Key Agreement Protocols

This thesis is divided into two distinct parts. The first part of the thesis explores various deniable signature schemes and their applications. Such schemes do not bind a unique public key to a message, but rather specify a set of entities that could have created the signature, so each entity involved in the signature can deny having generated it. The main deniable signature schemes we examine are ring signature schemes. Ring signatures can be used to construct designated verifier signature schemes, which are closely related to designated verifier proof systems. We provide previously lacking formal definitions and security models for designated verifier proofs and signatures and examine their relationship to undeniable signature schemes. Ring signature schemes also have applications in the context of fair exchange of signatures. We introduce the notion of concurrent signatures, which can be constructed using ring signatures, and which provide a "near solution" to the problem of fair exchange. Concurrent signatures are more efficient than traditional solutions for fair exchange at the cost of some of the security guaranteed by traditional solutions. The second part of the thesis is concerned with the security of two-party key agreement protocols. It has traditionally been difficult to prove that a key agreement protocol satisfies a formal definition of security. A modular approach to constructing provably secure key agreement protocols was proposed, but the approach generally results in less efficient protocols. We examine the relationships between various well-known models of security and introduce a modular approach to the construction of proofs of security for key agreement protocols in such security models. Our approach simplifies the proof process, enabling us to provide proofs of security for several efficient key agreement protocols in the literature that were previously unproven

On Security Notions for Verifiable Encrypted Signature

First we revisit three - BGLS, MBGLS and GZZ verifiably encrypted signature schemes[2,3,6].We find that they are all not strong unforgeable.We remark that the notion of existential unforgeable is not sufficient for fair exchange protocols in most circumstances.So we propose three new - NBGLS, MBGLS and NGZZ verifiably encrypted signature schemes which are strong unforgeable. Also we reconsider other two - ZSS and CA verifiably encrypted signature schemes[4,8], we find that they both cannot resist replacing public key attack. So we strongly suggest that strong unforgeable for verifiably encrypted signature maybe a better notion than existential unforgeable and checking adjudicator knowing its private key is a necessary step for secure verifiably encrypted signature scheme

Bitcoin Transaction Malleability and MtGox

In Bitcoin, transaction malleability describes the fact that the signatures that prove the ownership of bitcoins being transferred in a transaction do not provide any integrity guarantee for the signatures themselves. This allows an attacker to mount a malleability attack in which it intercepts, modifies, and rebroadcasts a transaction, causing the transaction issuer to believe that the original transaction was not confirmed. In February 2014 MtGox, once the largest Bitcoin exchange, closed and filed for bankruptcy claiming that attackers used malleability attacks to drain its accounts. In this work we use traces of the Bitcoin network for over a year preceding the filing to show that, while the problem is real, there was no widespread use of malleability attacks before the closure of MtGox

An Elliptic Curve-based Signcryption Scheme with Forward Secrecy

An elliptic curve-based signcryption scheme is introduced in this paper that effectively combines the functionalities of digital signature and encryption, and decreases the computational costs and communication overheads in comparison with the traditional signature-then-encryption schemes. It simultaneously provides the attributes of message confidentiality, authentication, integrity, unforgeability, non-repudiation, public verifiability, and forward secrecy of message confidentiality. Since it is based on elliptic curves and can use any fast and secure symmetric algorithm for encrypting messages, it has great advantages to be used for security establishments in store-and-forward applications and when dealing with resource-constrained devices.Comment: 13 Pages, 5 Figures, 2 Table

Dynamic and Public Evaluation Using Accurate Cloud Data in Imbalance

Customers of cloud services lose control over their data, making it more difficult to ensure its safety. New methods such as "provable data ownership" and "proofs of irretrievability" have been created as a solution to this problem; however, they are designed to audit static archive material and hence do not take data dynamics into consideration. As an added complication, the threat models used by these schemes often assume the data owner to be trustworthy and focus on identifying a hostile cloud service provider, even if the latter might be the source of any harmful action. Thus, there should be a public auditing mechanism that takes data dynamics into account and uses fair means to settle disputes. Specifically, we develop an index switcher to effectively handle data dynamics by doing away with the limitation of index use in tag computation imposed by conventional methods. We create new extensions to existing threat models and use the signature exchange idea to design fair arbitration mechanisms for resolving future disputes, all with the goal of ensuring that no one may participate in unfair activity without being discovered. Our approach seems secure, according to the security analysis, and the performance evaluation indicates that the extra work required for data dynamics and conflict resolution is not insurmountable

Proof-of-Prestige: A Useful Work Reward System for Unverifiable Tasks

As cryptographic tokens and altcoins are increasingly being built to serve as utility tokens, the notion of useful work consensus protocols, as opposed to number-crunching PoW consensus, is becoming ever more important. In such contexts, users get rewards from the network after they have carried out some specific task useful for the network. While in some cases the proof of some utility or service can be proved, the majority of tasks are impossible to verify. In order to deal with such cases, we design Proof-of-Prestige (PoP) - a reward system that can run on top of Proof-of-Stake blockchains. PoP introduces prestige which is a volatile resource and, in contrast to coins, regenerates over time. Prestige can be gained by performing useful work, spent when benefiting from services and directly translates to users minting power. PoP is resistant against Sybil and Collude attacks and can be used to reward workers for completing unverifiable tasks, while keeping the system free for the end-users. We use two exemplar use-cases to showcase the usefulness of PoP and we build a simulator to assess the cryptoeconomic behaviour of the system in terms of prestige transfer between nodes.Comment: 2019 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC 2019

Instantaneous Decentralized Poker

We present efficient protocols for amortized secure multiparty computation with penalties and secure cash distribution, of which poker is a prime example. Our protocols have an initial phase where the parties interact with a cryptocurrency network, that then enables them to interact only among themselves over the course of playing many poker games in which money changes hands. The high efficiency of our protocols is achieved by harnessing the power of stateful contracts. Compared to the limited expressive power of Bitcoin scripts, stateful contracts enable richer forms of interaction between standard secure computation and a cryptocurrency. We formalize the stateful contract model and the security notions that our protocols accomplish, and provide proofs using the simulation paradigm. Moreover, we provide a reference implementation in Ethereum/Solidity for the stateful contracts that our protocols are based on. We also adopt our off-chain cash distribution protocols to the special case of stateful duplex micropayment channels, which are of independent interest. In comparison to Bitcoin based payment channels, our duplex channel implementation is more efficient and has additional features