583 research outputs found
Do Goedel's incompleteness theorems set absolute limits on the ability of the brain to express and communicate mental concepts verifiably?
Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth
of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under
any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of
general, scientific, discourse cannot allow its mathematical propositions to be
interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical
truth verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of classical,
Tarskian, truth, and of Goedel's reasoning, under which any formal system of
Peano Arithmetic is verifiably complete. We show how some paradoxical concepts
of Quantum mechanics can be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a
constructive definition of mathematical truth.Comment: 73 pages; this is an updated version of the NQ essay; an HTML version
is available at http://alixcomsi.com/Do_Goedel_incompleteness_theorems.ht
Consequences of a Goedel's misjudgment
The fundamental aim of the paper is to correct an harmful way to interpret a
Goedel's erroneous remark at the Congress of Koenigsberg in 1930. Despite the
Goedel's fault is rather venial, its misreading has produced and continues to
produce dangerous fruits, as to apply the incompleteness Theorems to the full
second-order Arithmetic and to deduce the semantic incompleteness of its
language by these same Theorems. The first three paragraphs are introductory
and serve to define the languages inherently semantic and its properties, to
discuss the consequences of the expression order used in a language and some
question about the semantic completeness: in particular is highlighted the fact
that a non-formal theory may be semantically complete despite using a language
semantically incomplete. Finally, an alternative interpretation of the Goedel's
unfortunate comment is proposed. KEYWORDS: semantic completeness, syntactic
incompleteness, categoricity, arithmetic, second-order languages, paradoxesComment: English version, 19 pages. Fixed and improved terminolog
Review of I Am a Strange Loop by Douglas Hofstadter (2007) (review revised 2019)
Latest Sermon from the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism by Pastor Hofstadter. Like his much more famous (or infamous for its relentless philosophical errors) work Godel, Escher, Bach, it has a superficial plausibility but if one understands that this is rampant scientism which mixes real scientific issues with philosophical ones (i.e., the only real issues are what language games we ought to play) then almost all its interest disappears. I provide a framework for analysis based in evolutionary psychology and the work of Wittgenstein (since updated in my more recent writings).
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
Decidability vs. undecidability. Logico-philosophico-historical remarks
The aim of the paper is to present the decidability problems from a philosophical and historical perspective as well as to indicate basic mathematical and logical results concerning (un)decidability of particular theories and problems
On the philosophical relevance of Gödel's incompleteness theorems
A survey of more philosophical applications of Gödel's incompleteness results
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