Cerebellum: an explanation for dystonia?

Dystonia is a movement disorder that is characterized by involuntary muscle contractions, abnormal movements and postures, as well as by non-motor symptoms, and is due to abnormalities in different brain areas. In this article, we focus on the growing number of experimental studies aimed at explaining the pathophysiological role of the cerebellum in dystonia. Lastly, we highlight gaps in current knowledge and issues that future research studies should focus on as well as some of the potential applications of this research avenue. Clarifying the pathophysiological role of cerebellum in dystonia is an important concern given the increasing availability of invasive and non-invasive stimulation techniques and their potential therapeutic role in this condition

Grounding-mechanical explanation

Characterization of a form of explanation involving grounding on the model of mechanistic causal explanation

Reflections on Metaphysical Explanation

The nature of metaphysical explanation is a question that should be constantly on every metaphysician’s mind, and yet it is rare to see explicit statements about the methodological approach that writers take. We tend to just enter the flow of ideas and words in a particular ‘discourse’ and see where it leads us. It is easier that way but can lead us astray. I can’t claim to be a role-model in this respect. I have offered a comment here, a remark there, but plenty room for improvement. However, I have come across quite a few confusions that can be traced to failed understanding of method/approach, and one or two really interesting statements of method. Here I share one such confusion about method, and one interesting view about method

Degree of explanation

Partial explanations are everywhere. That is, explanations citing causes that explain some but not all of an effect are ubiquitous across science, and these in turn rely on the notion of degree of explanation. I argue that current accounts are seriously deficient. In particular, they do not incorporate adequately the way in which a cause’s explanatory importance varies with choice of explanandum. Using influential recent contrastive theories, I develop quantitative definitions that remedy this lacuna, and relate it to existing measures of degree of causation. Among other things, this reveals the precise role here of chance, as well as bearing on the relation between causal explanation and causation itself

Explanation, confirmation, and Hempel's paradox

Hempel’s Converse Consequence Condition (CCC), Entailment Condition (EC), and Special Consequence Condition (SCC) have some prima facie plausibility when taken individually. Hempel, though, shows that they have no plausibility when taken together, for together they entail that E confirms H for any propositions E and H. This is “Hempel’s paradox”. It turns out that Hempel’s argument would fail if one or more of CCC, EC, and SCC were modified in terms of explanation. This opens up the possibility that Hempel’s paradox can be solved by modifying one or more of CCC, EC, and SCC in terms of explanation. I explore this possibility by modifying CCC and SCC in terms of explanation and considering whether CCC and SCC so modified are correct. I also relate that possibility to Inference to the Best Explanation