Experimental game theory and its application in sociology and political science

This is an open access special issue distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.The aim of this special issue is to encourage original research that seeks to study sociological or political phenomena using laboratory experiments that are based on game-theoretical benchmarks and, vice versa, that seeks mathematical modeling of game theoretical arguments to inspire experiments in the fields of Sociology and Political Science. We received 14 papers from authors in varies countries all over the world, of which 5 high-quality papers emerged for publication in the special issue after a strict review process. In the first research article of the special issue, G. Bravo, F. Squazzoni, and K. Takács experimentally study whether intermediaries can positively influence cooperation between a trustor and a trustee in an investment or trust game. The second article by L. A. Palacio, A. Cortés-Aguilar, and M. Muñoz-Herrera develops a game theoretical foundation for experimental investigations of the strategic role in games with nonbinding communication. In the third article, L. Corazzini and M. Tyszler employ quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to find out the extent of confusion and efficiency motives of laboratory participants in their decisions to contribute to a public good. The fourth article by S. A. Tulman utilizes QRE (i.e., noisy decision-making) and altruism-motivated players to investigate the “paradox of voter turnout” in a participation game experiment. Finally, in the fifth article B. Kittel, F. Paetzel, and S. Traub present a laboratory study in which they examine the role of the middle class on income distribution within the framework of a contest game.-- Experimental Game Theory and Its Application in Sociology and Political Science, Arthur Schram, Vincent Buskens, Klarita Gërxhani, and Jens Großer - Editorial (2 pages), Article ID 280789 -- The Strategic Role of Nonbinding Communication, Luis A. Palacio, Alexandra Cortés-Aguilar, and Manuel Muñoz-Herrera (11 pages), Article ID 910614 -- Intermediaries in Trust: Indirect Reciprocity, Incentives, and Norms, Giangiacomo Bravo, Flaminio Squazzoni, and Károly Takács (12 pages), Article ID 234528 -- Altruism, Noise, and the Paradox of Voter Turnout: An Experimental Study, Sarah A. Tulman (22 pages), Article ID 972753 -- Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game, Luca Corazzini and Marcelo Tyszler (8 pages), Article ID 961930 -- Competition, Income Distribution, and the Middle Class: An Experimental Study, Bernhard Kittel, Fabian Paetzel, and Stefan Traub (15 pages), Article ID 30391

Experimental game theory and its application in sociology and political science

This is an open access special issue distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.The aim of this special issue is to encourage original research that seeks to study sociological or political phenomena using laboratory experiments that are based on game-theoretical benchmarks and, vice versa, that seeks mathematical modeling of game theoretical arguments to inspire experiments in the fields of Sociology and Political Science. We received 14 papers from authors in varies countries all over the world, of which 5 high-quality papers emerged for publication in the special issue after a strict review process. In the first research article of the special issue, G. Bravo, F. Squazzoni, and K. Takács experimentally study whether intermediaries can positively influence cooperation between a trustor and a trustee in an investment or trust game. The second article by L. A. Palacio, A. Cortés-Aguilar, and M. Muñoz-Herrera develops a game theoretical foundation for experimental investigations of the strategic role in games with nonbinding communication. In the third article, L. Corazzini and M. Tyszler employ quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to find out the extent of confusion and efficiency motives of laboratory participants in their decisions to contribute to a public good. The fourth article by S. A. Tulman utilizes QRE (i.e., noisy decision-making) and altruism-motivated players to investigate the “paradox of voter turnout” in a participation game experiment. Finally, in the fifth article B. Kittel, F. Paetzel, and S. Traub present a laboratory study in which they examine the role of the middle class on income distribution within the framework of a contest game.-- Experimental Game Theory and Its Application in Sociology and Political Science, Arthur Schram, Vincent Buskens, Klarita Gërxhani, and Jens Großer - Editorial (2 pages), Article ID 280789 -- The Strategic Role of Nonbinding Communication, Luis A. Palacio, Alexandra Cortés-Aguilar, and Manuel Muñoz-Herrera (11 pages), Article ID 910614 -- Intermediaries in Trust: Indirect Reciprocity, Incentives, and Norms, Giangiacomo Bravo, Flaminio Squazzoni, and Károly Takács (12 pages), Article ID 234528 -- Altruism, Noise, and the Paradox of Voter Turnout: An Experimental Study, Sarah A. Tulman (22 pages), Article ID 972753 -- Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game, Luca Corazzini and Marcelo Tyszler (8 pages), Article ID 961930 -- Competition, Income Distribution, and the Middle Class: An Experimental Study, Bernhard Kittel, Fabian Paetzel, and Stefan Traub (15 pages), Article ID 30391