Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices

CWPE0619 (EPRG0602) Xinmin Hu and Daniel Ralph (Feb 2006) Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of electricity markets with locational marginal prices. Each player faces a bilevel optimization problem that we remodel as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, MPEC. This gives an EPEC, equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. We establish sufficient conditions for existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for this class of bilevel games and give some applications. We show by examples the effect of network transmission limits, i.e. congestion, on existence of equilibria. Then we study, for more general EPECs, the weaker pure strategy concepts of local Nash and Nash stationary equilibria. We model the latter via complementarity problems, CPs. Finally, we present numerical examples of methods that attempt to find local Nash or Nash stationary equilibria of randomly generated electricity market games. The CP solver PATH is found to be rather effective in this context

On System of Generalized Vector Quasiequilibrium Problems with Applications

We introduce a new system of generalized vector quasiequilibrium problems which includes system of vector quasiequilibrium problems, system of vector equilibrium problems, and vector equilibrium problems, and so forth in literature as special cases. We prove the existence of solutions for this system of generalized vector quasi-equilibrium problems. Consequently, we derive some existence results of a solution for the system of generalized quasi-equilibrium problems and the generalized Debreu-type equilibrium problem for both vector-valued functions and scalar-valued functions

On the stability of solution mapping for parametric generalized vector quasiequilibrium problems

AbstractIn this paper, we study the solution stability for a class of parametric generalized vector quasiequilibrium problems. By virtue of the parametric gap function, we obtain a sufficient and necessary condition for the Hausdorff lower semicontinuity of the solution mapping to the parametric generalized vector quasiequilibrium problem. The results presented in this paper generalize and improve some main results of Chen et al. (2010) [34], and Zhong and Huang (2011) [35]

Existence and Duality of Generalized ε-Vector Equilibrium Problems

We consider a generalized ε-vector equilibrium problem which contain vector equilibrium problems and vector variational inequalities as special cases. By using the KKM theorem, we obtain some existence theorems for the generalized ε-vector equilibrium problem. We also investigate the duality of this generalized ε-vector equilibrium problem and discuss the equivalence relation between solutions of primal and dual problems

General equilibrium

Unlike partial equilibrium analysis which study the equilibrium of a particular market under the clause "ceteris paribus" that revenues and prices on the other markets stay approximately unaffected, the ambition of a general equilibrium model is to analyze the simultaneous equilibrium in all markets of a competitive economy. Definition of the abstract model, some of its basic results and insights are presented. The important issues of uniqueness and local uniqueness of equilibrium are sketched ; they are the condition for a predictive power of the theory and its ability to allow for statics comparisons. Finally, we review the main extensions of the general equilibrium model. Besides the natural extensions to infinitely many commodities and to a continuum of agents, some examples show how economic theory can accommodate the main ideas in order to study some contexts which were not thought of by the initial model.Commodity space, price space, exchange economy, production economy, feasible allocations, equilibrium, quasi-equilibrium, Pareto optimum, core, edgeworth equilibrium allocutions, time and uncertainty, continuum economies, non-convexities, public goods, incomplete markets.