Duplication of modules facilitates the evolution of functional specialization

The evolution of simulated robots with three different architectures is studied. We compared a non-modular feed forward network, a hardwired modular and a duplication-based modular motor control network. We conclude that both modular architectures outperform the non-modular architecture, both in terms of rate of adaptation as well as the level of adaptation achieved. The main difference between the hardwired and duplication-based modular architectures is that in the latter the modules reached a much higher degree of functional specialization of their motor control units with regard to high level behavioral functions. The hardwired architectures reach the same level of performance, but have a more distributed assignment of functional tasks to the motor control units. We conclude that the mechanism through which functional specialization is achieved is similar to the mechanism proposed for the evolution of duplicated genes. It is found that the duplication of multifunctional modules first leads to a change in the regulation of the module, leading to a differentiation of the functional context in which the module is used. Then the module adapts to the new functional context. After this second step the system is locked into a functionally specialized state. We suggest that functional specialization may be an evolutionary absorption state

Darwin's Rainbow: Evolutionary radiation and the spectrum of consciousness

Evolution is littered with paraphyletic convergences: many roads lead to functional Romes. We propose here another example - an equivalence class structure factoring the broad realm of possible realizations of the Baars Global Workspace consciousness model. The construction suggests many different physiological systems can support rapidly shifting, sometimes highly tunable, temporary assemblages of interacting unconscious cognitive modules. The discovery implies various animal taxa exhibiting behaviors we broadly recognize as conscious are, in fact, simply expressing different forms of the same underlying phenomenon. Mathematically, we find much slower, and even multiple simultaneous, versions of the basic structure can operate over very long timescales, a kind of paraconsciousness often ascribed to group phenomena. The variety of possibilities, a veritable rainbow, suggests minds today may be only a small surviving fraction of ancient evolutionary radiations - bush phylogenies of consciousness and paraconsciousness. Under this scenario, the resulting diversity was subsequently pruned by selection and chance extinction. Though few traces of the radiation may be found in the direct fossil record, exaptations and vestiges are scattered across the living mind. Humans, for instance, display an uncommonly profound synergism between individual consciousness and their embedding cultural heritages, enabling efficient Lamarkian adaptation

Systemic functional adaptedness and domain-general cognition: broadening the scope of evolutionary psychology

Evolutionary Psychology tends to be associated with a massively modular cognitive architecture. On this framework of human cognition, an assembly of specialized information processors called modules developed under selection pressures encountered throughout the phylogenic history of hominids. The coordinated activity of domain-specific modules carries out all the processes of belief fixation, abstract reasoning, and other facets of central cognition. Against the massive modularity thesis, I defend an account of systemic functional adaptedness, according to which non-modular systems emerged because of adaptive problems imposed by the intrinsic physiology of the evolving human brain. The proposed reformulation of evolutionary theorizing draws from neural network models and Cummins’ (1975) account of systemic functions to identify selection pressures that gave rise to non-modular, domain-general mechanisms in cognitive architecture

Lost in translation: Toward a formal model of multilevel, multiscale medicine

For a broad spectrum of low level cognitive regulatory and other biological phenomena, isolation from signal crosstalk between them requires more metabolic free energy than permitting correlation. This allows an evolutionary exaptation leading to dynamic global broadcasts of interacting physiological processes at multiple scales. The argument is similar to the well-studied exaptation of noise to trigger stochastic resonance amplification in physiological subsystems. Not only is the living state characterized by cognition at every scale and level of organization, but by multiple, shifting, tunable, cooperative larger scale broadcasts that link selected subsets of functional modules to address problems. This multilevel dynamical viewpoint has implications for initiatives in translational medicine that have followed the implosive collapse of pharmaceutical industry 'magic bullet' research. In short, failure to respond to the inherently multilevel, multiscale nature of human pathophysiology will doom translational medicine to a similar implosion

Darwinian Domain-Generality: The Role of Evolutionary Psychology in the Modularity Debate

Evolutionary Psychology (EP) tends to be associated with a Massively Modular (MM) cognitive architecture. I argue that EP favors a non-MM cognitive architecture. The main point of dispute is whether central cognition, such as abstract reasoning, exhibits domain-general properties. Partisans of EP argue that domain-specific modules govern central cognition, for it is unclear how the cognitive mind could have evolved domain-generality. In response, I defend a distinction between exogenous and endogenous selection pressures, according to which exogenous pressures tend to select for domain-specificity, whereas the latter, endogenous pressures, select in favor of domain-generality. I draw on models from brain network theory to motivate this distinction, and also to establish that a domain-general, non-MM cognitive architecture is the more parsimonious adaptive solution to endogenous pressures

Cell division and migration in a 'genotype' for neural networks

Much research has been dedicated recently to applying genetic algorithms to populations of neural networks. However, while in real organisms the inherited genotype maps in complex ways into the resulting phenotype, in most of this research the development process that creates the individual phenotype is ignored. In this paper we present a model of neural development which includes cell division and cell migration in addition to axonal growth and branching. This reflects, in a very simplified way, what happens in the ontogeny of real organisms. The development process of our artificial organisms shows successive phases of functional differentiation and specialization. In addition, we find that mutations that affect different phases of development have very different evolutionary consequences. A single change in the early stages of cell division/migration can have huge effects on the phenotype while changes in later stages have usually a less drammatic impact. Sometimes changes that affect the first developental stages may be retained producing sudden changes in evolutionary history