160 research outputs found
Approximating n-player behavioural strategy nash equilibria using coevolution
Coevolutionary algorithms are plagued with a set of problems related to intransitivity that make it questionable what the end product of a coevolutionary run can achieve. With the introduction of solution concepts into coevolution, part of the issue was alleviated, however efficiently representing and achieving game theoretic solution concepts is still not a trivial task. In this paper we propose a coevolutionary algorithm that approximates behavioural strategy Nash equilibria in n-player zero sum games, by exploiting the minimax solution concept. In order to support our case we provide a set of experiments in both games of known and unknown equilibria. In the case of known equilibria, we can confirm our algorithm converges to the known solution, while in the case of unknown equilibria we can see a steady progress towards Nash. Copyright 2011 ACM
Survey of Artificial Intelligence for Card Games and Its Application to the Swiss Game Jass
In the last decades we have witnessed the success of applications of
Artificial Intelligence to playing games. In this work we address the
challenging field of games with hidden information and card games in
particular. Jass is a very popular card game in Switzerland and is closely
connected with Swiss culture. To the best of our knowledge, performances of
Artificial Intelligence agents in the game of Jass do not outperform top
players yet. Our contribution to the community is two-fold. First, we provide
an overview of the current state-of-the-art of Artificial Intelligence methods
for card games in general. Second, we discuss their application to the use-case
of the Swiss card game Jass. This paper aims to be an entry point for both
seasoned researchers and new practitioners who want to join in the Jass
challenge
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Opponent modeling and exploitation in poker using evolved recurrent neural networks
As a classic example of imperfect information games, poker, in particular, Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Holdem (HUNL), has been studied extensively in recent years. A number of computer poker agents have been built with increasingly higher quality. While agents based on approximated Nash equilibrium have been successful, they lack the ability to exploit their opponents effectively. In addition, the performance of equilibrium strategies cannot be guaranteed in games with more than two players and multiple Nash equilibria. This dissertation focuses on devising an evolutionary method to discover opponent models based on recurrent neural networks.
A series of computer poker agents called Adaptive System for Hold’Em (ASHE) were evolved for HUNL. ASHE models the opponent explicitly using Pattern Recognition Trees (PRTs) and LSTM estimators. The default and board-texture-based PRTs maintain statistical data on the opponent strategies at different game states. The Opponent Action Rate Estimator predicts the opponent’s moves, and the Hand Range Estimator evaluates the showdown value of ASHE’s hand. Recursive Utility Estimation is used to evaluate the expected utility/reward for each available action.
Experimental results show that (1) ASHE exploits opponents with high to moderate level of exploitability more effectively than Nash-equilibrium-based agents, and (2) ASHE can defeat top-ranking equilibrium-based poker agents. Thus, the dissertation introduces an effective new method to building high-performance computer agents for poker and other imperfect information games. It also provides a promising direction for future research in imperfect information games beyond the equilibrium-based approach.Computer Science
Game theoretic modeling and analysis : A co-evolutionary, agent-based approach
Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPH
A comparative study of game theoretic and evolutionary models for software agents
Most of the existing work in the study of bargaining behaviour uses techniques from game theory. Game theoretic models for bargaining assume that players are perfectly rational and that this rationality in common knowledge. However, the perfect rationality assumption does not hold for real-life bargaining scenarios with humans as players, since results from experimental economics show that humans find their way to the best strategy through trial and error, and not typically by means of rational deliberation. Such players are said to be boundedly rational. In playing a game against an opponent with bounded rationality, the most effective strategy of a player is not the equilibrium strategy but the one that is the best reply to the opponent's strategy. The evolutionary model provides a means for studying the bargaining behaviour of boundedly rational players. This paper provides a comprehensive comparison of the game theoretic and evolutionary approaches to bargaining by examining their assumptions, goals, and limitations. We then study the implications of these differences from the perspective of the software agent developer
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