Evolutionary Synthesis of Stable Normative Systems

Normative systems are a widely used framework to coordinate interdependent activities in multi-agent systems. Most research in this area has focused on how to compute normative systems that effectively accomplish a coordination task, as well as additional criteria such as synthesising norms that do not over-regulate a system, and the emergence of norms that remain stable over time. We introduce a framework for the synthesis of stable normative systems that are suffcient and necessary for coordination. Our approach is based on ideas from evolutionary game theory. We simulate multi-agent systems in which useful norms are more likely to prosper than useless norms. We empirically show the effectiveness of our approach in a simulated traffic domain

Evolutionary Synthesis of Stable Normative Systems

Normative systems are a widely used framework to coordi-nate interdependent activities in multi-agent systems. Most research in this area has focused on how to compute norma-tive systems that effectively accomplish a coordination task, as well as additional criteria such as synthesising norms that do not over-regulate a system, and the emergence of norms that remain stable over time. We introduce a framework for the synthesis of stable normative systems that are sufficient and necessary for coordination. Our approach is based on ideas from evolutionary game theory. We simulate multi-agent systems in which useful norms are more likely to prosper than useless norms. We empirically show the effectiveness of our approach in a simulated traffic domain. © Copyright 2017, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.Work funded by the H2020-MSCA-IF project number 707688. Mike Wooldridge was supported by the ERC under Advanced Grant 291528 (“RACE”). Maite López-Sánchez and Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar were supported by projects Collectiveware (TIN2015-66863-C2-1-R, MINECO/FEDER), 2009-SGR-1434, and 2014 SGR 623Peer Reviewe

Evolutionary Synthesis of Stable Normative Systems

Normative systems are a widely used framework to coordinate interdependent activities in multi-agent systems. Most research in this area has focused on how to compute normative systems that effectively accomplish a coordination task, as well as additional criteria such as synthesising norms that do not over-regulate a system, and the emergence of norms that remain stable over time. We introduce a framework for the synthesis of stable normative systems that are suffcient and necessary for coordination. Our approach is based on ideas from evolutionary game theory. We simulate multi-agent systems in which useful norms are more likely to prosper than useless norms. We empirically show the effectiveness of our approach in a simulated traffic domain