Equilibrium Analysis of Packet Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks - the Static Case (extended version)

In multi-hop wireless networks, every node is expected to forward packets for the benefit of other nodes. Yet, if each node is its own authority, then it may selfishly deny packet forwarding in order to save its own resources. Some researchers have proposed to introduce an incentive mechanism in the network that motivates the nodes to cooperate. In this paper, we address the question of whether such an incentive mechanism is necessary or cooperation between the nodes exists in the absence of it. We define a model in a game theoretic framework and identify the conditions under which cooperative strategies can form an equilibrium. As theproblem is somewhat involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration

Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

Nash Equilibria of Packet Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

In self-organizing ad hoc networks, all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants. As a basic example, nodes have to forward packets for each other in order to enable multi-hop communication. In recent years, incentive mechanisms have been proposed to give nodes incentive to cooperate, especially in packet forwarding. However, the need for these mechanisms was not formally justified. In this paper, we address the problem of whether cooperation can exist without incentive mechanisms. We propose a model based on game theory and graph theory to investigate equilibrium conditions of packet forwarding strategies. We prove theorems about the equilibrium conditions for both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. We perform simulations to estimate the probability that the conditions for a cooperative equilibrium hold in randomly generated network scenarios. As the problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration. We conclude that in static ad hoc networks - where the relationships between the nodes are likely to be stable - cooperation needs to be encouraged. forwarding. However, the need for these mechanisms was not formally justified. In this paper, we address the problem of whether cooperation can exist \emph{without} incentive mechanisms. We propose a model based on game theory and graph theory to investigate equilibrium conditions of packet forwarding strategies. We prove theorems about the equilibrium conditions for both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. We perform simulations to estimate the probability that the conditions for a cooperative equilibrium hold in randomly generated network scenarios. As the problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration. We conclude that in static ad hoc networks -- where the relationships between the nodes are likely to be stable -- cooperation needs to be encouraged

Mitigating Misbehavior In Wireless Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

In a distributed wireless system, multiple network nodes behave cooperatively towards a common goal. Though such assumptions on cooperation are desirable (e.g., controlling the transmit power level, reducing interference for each other, revealing private information, adhering to network policies) for analyzing and modeling, certain nodes belonging to a real-world system have often shown to deviate. These nodes, known as misbehaving nodes, bring more challenges to the design of the wireless network because the unreliable channel makes the actions of the nodes hidden from each other. In this dissertation, we analyze two types of misbehavior, namely, selfish noncooperation and malicious attacking. We apply game theoretic techniques to model the interactions among the nodes in the network. First, we consider a homogeneous unreliable channel and analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions to enforce cooperative packet forwarding among a node pair. We formulate an anti-collusion game and derive the conditions that achieve full cooperation when the non-cooperative nodes collude. In addition, we consider multi-hop communication with a heterogeneous channel model. We refine our game model as a hidden action game with imperfect private monitoring. A state machine based strategy is proposed to reach Nash Equilibrium. The strategy attains cooperative packet forwarding with heterogeneous channel and requires only partial and imperfect information. Furthermore, it also enforces cooperation in multi-hop packet forwarding. To tackle the malicious attacks, we use Bayesian game analysis to show the existence of equilibrium in the detection game and argue that it might not be profitable to isolate the malicious nodes upon detection. We propose the concept of coexistence with malicious nodes by proving the co-existence equilibrium and derive the conditions that achieve the equilibrium. This research is further accomplished by extensive simulation studies. Simulation results illustrate the properties of the games and the derived equilibria. The results validate our design philosophy and clearly indicate that the proposed game theoretic solutions can be effectively used to enforce cooperation and mitigate attacks

Game theoretic approach in routing protocols for wireless mobile ad hoc networks

Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are becoming popular as a means of providing communication among a group of people. Because of self-configuring and self-organizing characteristics, MANETs can be deployed quickly. There is no infrastructure defined in the network, therefore all of the participating nodes relay packets for other nodes and perform routing if necessary. Because of the limitations in wireless transmission range, communication links could be multi-hop. Routing protocol is the most important element of MANET. Routing protocols for MANET can broadly be classified as proactive routing protocol and reactive routing protocol. In proactive routing protocols like Destination Sequence Distance Vector (DSDV), mobile nodes periodically exchange routing information among themselves. Hence proactive routing protocols generate high overhead messages in the network. On the other hand, reactive routing protocols like Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) work on-demand. Hence reactive routing protocols generate fewer number of overhead messages in the network compared to proactive routing protocols. But reactive routing protocols use a global search mechanism called flooding during the route discovery process. By flooding mechanism a source node can discover multiple routes to a destination. Flooding generates a large number of overhead packets in the network and is the root cause of scaling problem of reactive routing protocols. Hierarchical Dynamic Source Routing (HDSR) protocol has been proposed in this dissertation to solve that scaling problem. The DSR protocol has been modified and optimized to implement HDSR protocol. HDSR protocol reduces the flooding problem of reactive routing protocols by introducing hierarchy among nodes. Two game theoretic models, Forwarding Dilemma Game (FDG) and Forwarding Game Routing Protocol (FGRP), is proposed to minimize the \u27flooding\u27 effect by restricting nodes that should participate in route discovery process based on their status. Both FDG and FGRP protocols reduce overhead packet and improve network performances in terms of delay packet delivery ratio and throughput. Both protocols were implemented in AODV and the resulting protocol outperformed AODV in our NS-2 simulations. A thorough connectivity analysis was also performed for FDG and FGRP to ensure that these protocols do not introduce disconnectivity. Surprisingly, both FDG and FGRP showed better connectivity compared to AODV in moderate to high node density networks