Knowing Values and Public Inspection

We present a basic dynamic epistemic logic of "knowing the value". Analogous to public announcement in standard DEL, we study "public inspection", a new dynamic operator which updates the agents' knowledge about the values of constants. We provide a sound and strongly complete axiomatization for the single and multi-agent case, making use of the well-known Armstrong axioms for dependencies in databases

Epistemic Logic with Partial Dependency Operator

In this paper, we introduce $\textit{partial}$ dependency modality $\mathcal{D}$ into epistemic logic so as to reason about $\textit{partial}$ dependency relationship in Kripke models. The resulted dependence epistemic logic possesses decent expressivity and beautiful properties. Several interesting examples are provided, which highlight this logic's practical usage. The logic's bisimulation is then discussed, and we give a sound and strongly complete axiomatization for a sub-language of the logic

Bisimulation in Inquisitive Modal Logic

Inquisitive modal logic, InqML, is a generalisation of standard Kripke-style modal logic. In its epistemic incarnation, it extends standard epistemic logic to capture not just the information that agents have, but also the questions that they are interested in. Technically, InqML fits within the family of logics based on team semantics. From a model-theoretic perspective, it takes us a step in the direction of monadic second-order logic, as inquisitive modal operators involve quantification over sets of worlds. We introduce and investigate the natural notion of bisimulation equivalence in the setting of InqML. We compare the expressiveness of InqML and first-order logic, and characterise inquisitive modal logic as the bisimulation invariant fragments of first-order logic over various classes of two-sorted relational structures. These results crucially require non-classical methods in studying bisimulations and first-order expressiveness over non-elementary classes.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825

Tool support for reasoning in display calculi

We present a tool for reasoning in and about propositional sequent calculi. One aim is to support reasoning in calculi that contain a hundred rules or more, so that even relatively small pen and paper derivations become tedious and error prone. As an example, we implement the display calculus D.EAK of dynamic epistemic logic. Second, we provide embeddings of the calculus in the theorem prover Isabelle for formalising proofs about D.EAK. As a case study we show that the solution of the muddy children puzzle is derivable for any number of muddy children. Third, there is a set of meta-tools, that allows us to adapt the tool for a wide variety of user defined calculi

Reducing Validity in Epistemic ATL to Validity in Epistemic CTL

We propose a validity preserving translation from a subset of epistemic Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) to epistemic Computation Tree Logic (CTL). The considered subset of epistemic ATL is known to have the finite model property and decidable model-checking. This entails the decidability of validity but the implied algorithm is unfeasible. Reducing the validity problem to that in a corresponding system of CTL makes the techniques for automated deduction for that logic available for the handling of the apparently more complex system of ATL.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2013, arXiv:1303.007

Extending Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Accommodating Iterated Beliefs And Ramsey Conditionals Within DDL

In this paper we distinguish between various kinds of doxastic theories. One distinction is between informal and formal doxastic theories. AGM-type theories of belief change are of the former kind, while Hintikka’s logic of knowledge and belief is of the latter. Then we distinguish between static theories that study the unchanging beliefs of a certain agent and dynamic theories that investigate not only the constraints that can reasonably be imposed on the doxastic states of a rational agent but also rationality constraints on the changes of doxastic state that may occur in such agents. An additional distinction is that between non-introspective theories and introspective ones. Non-introspective theories investigate agents that have opinions about the external world but no higher-order opinions about their own doxasticnstates. Standard AGM-type theories as well as the currently existing versions of Segerberg’s dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) are non-introspective. Hintikka-style doxastic logic is of course introspective but it is a static theory. Thus, the challenge remains to devise doxastic theories that are both dynamic and introspective. We outline the semantics for truly introspective dynamic doxastic logic, i.e., a dynamic doxastic logic that allows us to describe agents who have both the ability to form higher-order beliefs and to reflect upon and change their minds about their own (higher-order) beliefs. This extension of DDL demands that we give up the Preservation condition on revision. We make some suggestions as to how such a non-preservative revision operation can be constructed. We also consider extending DDL with conditionals satisfying the Ramsey test and show that Gärdenfors’ well-known impossibility result applies to such a framework. Also in this case, Preservation has to be given up