Understanding the Cognitive Impact of Emerging Web Technologies: A Research Focus Area for Embodied, Extended and Distributed Approaches to Cognition

Alongside existing research into the social, political and economic impacts of the Web, there is also a need to explore the effects of the Web on our cognitive profile. This is particularly so as the range of interactive opportunities we have with the Web expands under the influence of a range of emerging technologies. Embodied, extended and distributed approaches to cognition are relevant to understanding the potential cognitive impact of these new technologies because of the emphasis they place on extra-neural and extra-corporeal factors in the shaping of our cognitive capabilities at both an individual and collective level. The current paper outlines a number of areas where embodied, extended and distributed approaches to cognition are useful in understanding the impact of emerging Web technologies on future forms of both human and machine intelligence

Spectators’ aesthetic experiences of sound and movement in dance performance

In this paper we present a study of spectators’ aesthetic experiences of sound and movement in live dance performance. A multidisciplinary team comprising a choreographer, neuroscientists and qualitative researchers investigated the effects of different sound scores on dance spectators. What would be the impact of auditory stimulation on kinesthetic experience and/or aesthetic appreciation of the dance? What would be the effect of removing music altogether, so that spectators watched dance while hearing only the performers’ breathing and footfalls? We investigated audience experience through qualitative research, using post-performance focus groups, while a separately conducted functional brain imaging (fMRI) study measured the synchrony in brain activity across spectators when they watched dance with sound or breathing only. When audiences watched dance accompanied by music the fMRI data revealed evidence of greater intersubject synchronisation in a brain region consistent with complex auditory processing. The audience research found that some spectators derived pleasure from finding convergences between two complex stimuli (dance and music). The removal of music and the resulting audibility of the performers’ breathing had a significant impact on spectators’ aesthetic experience. The fMRI analysis showed increased synchronisation among observers, suggesting greater influence of the body when interpreting the dance stimuli. The audience research found evidence of similar corporeally focused experience. The paper discusses possible connections between the findings of our different approaches, and considers the implications of this study for interdisciplinary research collaborations between arts and sciences

Mechanisms of embodiment

This paper is a critical review of recent studies demonstrating the mechanism of sensorimotor simulation in different cognitive domains. Empirical studies that specify conditions under which embodiment occurs in different domains will be discussed and evaluated. Examples of relevant domains are language comprehension (Tucker and Ellis, 1998), autobiographical memory (Dijkstra et al., 2007), gestures (Alibali et al., 2014), facial mimicry (Stel and Vonk, 2010), and problem solving (Wiemers et al., 2014). The focus of the review is on supporting claims regarding sensorimotor simulation as well as on factors that modulate dynamic relationships between sensorimotor components in action and cognitive domains, such as expertise (Boschker et al., 2002). This discussion takes place within the context of currently debated issues, specifically the need to specify the underlying mechanisms of embodied representations (Zwaan, 2014; Körner et al., 2015)

Editorial: Embodied cognition over the lifespan. Theoretical issues and implications for applied settings

The editorial introduces The Special Topic on Embodied Cognition over the Lifespan and in Applied Settings. The Topic aimed at gathering evidence on the role of EC in development, adulthood, and aging, and to shed light on the applied fields benefiting from this approach

"He was in no place and no place was in him": Edward Dahlberg's autobiographical fictions as an epistemology of sites

Edward Dahlberg‘s childhood, adolescence and youth, narratively fictionalized in two early autobiographical novels, Bottom Dogs (1930) and Flushing to Calvary (1932) is markedly and recurrently informed by the influence of urban sites and institutional spaces. As the article discusses, a number of these spaces are pivotal to the development of Dahlberg‘s autobiographical character Lorry, and can be productively read in terms of the Foucaldian heterotopia, while other sites, explicitly identified as metropolitan, are marginal to Lorry‘s autobiographical narrative, and yet serve to foreground the protagonist‘s absence from them in relevant ways. Finally, other spaces may epitomize a predominantly artificial nature, functioning as simulacra of experiences that Lorry undergoes but needs to cast out. Drawing on theoretical tenets related to space, site and place, as set out by Foucault, Baudrillard, Lefebvre, and others, in this article I will contend that a situated epistemological approach is essential in fruitfully reading Dahlberg‘s early fictions, and, ultimately, in understanding his quest for space in both biographical and artistic terms.La infancia, adolescencia y juventud de Edward Dahlberg, ficcionalizada a través de sus dos tempranas novelas autobiográficas, Bottom Dogs (1930) y Flushing to Calvary (1932), está muy determinada por la influencia de entornos urbanos y espacios institucionales. Algunos de estos espacios son esenciales para el desarrollo de Lorry, el protagonista autobiográfico de Dahlberg, y pueden ser interpretados en clave de heterotopia Foucaldiana. Otros lugares, expresamente identificados como espacios metropolitanos, marginales a la narrativa autobiográfica centrada en Lorry, resultan, sin embargo, extremadamente significativos para subrayar la ausencia del protagonista de los mismos. Además, otros entornos sirven para encarnar condiciones artificiales, proporcionando simulacros de vivencias que Lorry experimenta pero necesita luego desechar. Partiendo de nociones teóricas relativas a los conceptos de sitio y de espacialidad, desarrolladas por Foucault, Baudrillard y Lefebvre, entre otros, el presente artículo propone un análisis basado en una epistemología de ―situacionalidad‖ que permita una interpretación crítica fructífera de la obra iniciática de Dahlberg, y, en concreto, ilumine su obsesiva búsqueda de espacio(s), tanto en términos biográficos como literarios.Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España) FFI 2015-66767-PXunta de Galicia (Galicia, España) ED431D2017/1

What does semantic tiling of the cortex tell us about semantics?

Recent use of voxel-wise modeling in cognitive neuroscience suggests that semantic maps tile the cortex. Although this impressive research establishes distributed cortical areas active during the conceptual processing that underlies semantics, it tells us little about the nature of this processing. While mapping concepts between Marr's computational and implementation levels to support neural encoding and decoding, this approach ignores Marr's algorithmic level, central for understanding the mechanisms that implement cognition, in general, and conceptual processing, in particular. Following decades of research in cognitive science and neuroscience, what do we know so far about the representation and processing mechanisms that implement conceptual abilities? Most basically, much is known about the mechanisms associated with: (1) features and frame representations, (2) grounded, abstract, and linguistic representations, (3) knowledge-based inference, (4) concept composition, and (5) conceptual flexibility. Rather than explaining these fundamental representation and processing mechanisms, semantic tiles simply provide a trace of their activity over a relatively short time period within a specific learning context. Establishing the mechanisms that implement conceptual processing in the brain will require more than mapping it to cortical (and sub-cortical) activity, with process models from cognitive science likely to play central roles in specifying the intervening mechanisms. More generally, neuroscience will not achieve its basic goals until it establishes algorithmic-level mechanisms that contribute essential explanations to how the brain works, going beyond simply establishing the brain areas that respond to various task conditions

Memory without content? Radical enactivism and (post)causal theories of memory

Radical enactivism, an increasingly influential approach to cognition in general, has recently been applied to memory in particular, with Hutto and Peeters New directions in the philosophy of memory, Routledge, New York, 2018) providing the first systematic discussion of the implications of the approach for mainstream philosophical theories of memory. Hutto and Peeters argue that radical enactivism, which entails a conception of memory traces as contentless, is fundamentally at odds with current causal and postcausal theories, which remain committed to a conception of traces as contentful: on their view, if radical enactivism is right, then the relevant theories are wrong. Partisans of the theories in question might respond to Hutto and Peeters’ argument in two ways. First, they might challenge radical enactivism itself. Second, they might challenge the conditional claim that, if radical enactivism is right, then their theories are wrong. In this paper, we develop the latter response, arguing that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, radical enactivism in fact aligns neatly with an emerging tendency in the philosophy of memory: radical enactivists and causal and postcausal theorists of memory have begun to converge, for distinct but compatible reasons, on a contentless conception of memory traces

Narrativising Episodic Memory: From Memory Episodes to Micronarratives

In the current literature on Episodic Memory (EM), mental representations are often assumed to stand out as the main view that promises to explain how we experience past personal events. However, proponents of Radical Enactive Cognition (REC) have argued that this view is empirically and theoretically inadequate due to issues with misremembering - failure to recall events in the past accurately - and the Hard Problem of Content (HPC) (Hutto & Myin 2013, 2017). This thesis aims to utilise REC’s already established framework and narrative formulations of memory to provide the tools needed to characterise episodic memory. The thesis turns to Narrativist Accounts (Gallagher 2008, 2003; Gallagher & Hutto 2008; Hutto 2016, Nelson & Fivush 2004; Rudd 2012; Schechtman 1996) and takes notice of the various capacities and requirements needed under these views and how they can serve as a model that can account for EM. However, under a Narrativist Account (NA), episodic memory is always embedded within autobiographical narratives. This raises the question of whether NAs can make room for any kind of episodic memory when conditions such as coherence, temporality and achievement of specific narrative capacities are required. By drawing from research on Dementia, Alzheimer’s, PTSD and Depression, along with non-pathological scenarios, this thesis demonstrates that stronger and moderate narrativist accounts do not provide room for explaining episodic memory. l propose that episodic experiences of the personal past can be seen in a different light when understood as Micronarratives. Micronarratives are marked out by being fixed or resistant to updating while identifying with a particular event in the past, even if it is not in the form of an accurate or true description. l defend that episodic memory, in this view, is not confronted with the same problems and offers a viable alternative