28 research outputs found
How to Build Pseudorandom Functions From Public Random Permutations
Pseudorandom functions are traditionally built upon block ciphers, but with the trend of permutation based cryptography, it is a natural question to investigate the design of pseudorandom functions from random permutations. We present a generic study of how to build beyond birthday bound secure pseudorandom functions from public random permutations. We first show that a pseudorandom function based on a single permutation call cannot be secure beyond the birthday bound, where n is the state size of the function. We next consider the Sum of Even-Mansour (SoEM) construction, that instantiates the sum of permutations with the Even-Mansour construction. We prove that SoEM achieves tight -bit security if it is constructed from two independent permutations and two randomly drawn keys. We also demonstrate a birthday bound attack if either the permutations or the keys are identical. Finally, we present the Sum of Key Alternating Ciphers (SoKAC) construction, a translation of Encrypted Davies-Meyer Dual to a public permutation based setting, and show that SoKAC achieves tight -bit security even when a single key is used
Tweaking Even-Mansour Ciphers
We study how to construct efficient tweakable block ciphers in the Random Permutation model, where all parties have access to public random permutation oracles. We propose a construction that combines, more efficiently than by mere black-box composition, the CLRW construction (which turns a traditional block cipher into a tweakable block cipher) of Landecker et al. (CRYPTO 2012) and the iterated Even-Mansour construction (which turns a tuple of public permutations into a traditional block cipher) that has received considerable attention since the work of Bogdanov et al. (EUROCRYPT 2012). More concretely, we introduce the (one-round) tweakable Even-Mansour (TEM) cipher, constructed from a single -bit permutation and a uniform and almost XOR-universal family of hash functions from some tweak space to , and defined as , where is the key, is the tweak, and is the -bit message, as well as its generalization obtained by cascading independently keyed rounds of this construction. Our main result is a security bound up to approximately adversarial queries against adaptive chosen-plaintext and ciphertext distinguishers for the two-round TEM construction, using Patarin\u27s H-coefficients technique. We also provide an analysis based on the coupling technique showing that asymptotically, as the number of rounds grows, the security provided by the -round TEM construction approaches the information-theoretic bound of adversarial queries
Keyed Sum of Permutations: a simpler RP-based PRF
Idealized constructions in cryptography prove the security of a primitive based on the security of another primitive.
The challenge of building a pseudorandom function (PRF) from a random permutation (RP) has only been recently tackled by Chen, Lambooij and Mennink [CRYPTO 2019] who proposed Sum of Even-Mansour (SoEM) with a provable beyond-birthday-bound security.
In this work, we revisit the challenge of building a PRF from an RP.
On the one hand, we describe Keyed Sum of Permutations (KSoP) that achieves the same provable security as SoEM while being strictly simpler since it avoids a key addition but still requires two independent keys and permutations.
On the other hand, we show that it is impossible to further simplify the scheme by deriving the two keys with a simple linear key schedule as it allows a non-trivial birthday-bound key recovery attack.
The birthday-bound attack is mostly information-theoretic, but it can be optimized to run faster than a brute-force attack
Revisiting Key-alternating Feistel Ciphers for Shorter Keys and Multi-user Security
Key-Alternating Feistel (KAF) ciphers, a.k.a. Feistel-2 models, refer to Feistel networks with round functions of the form , where is the (secret) round-key and is a public random function. This model roughly captures the structures of many famous Feistel ciphers, and the most prominent instance is DES.
Existing provable security results on KAF assumed independent round-keys and round functions (ASIACRYPT 2004 & FSE 2014). In this paper, we investigate how to achieve security under simpler and more realistic assumptions: with round-keys derived from a short main-key, and hopefully with identical round functions.
For birthday-type security, we consider 4-round KAF, investigate the minimal conditions on the way to derive the four round-keys, and prove that when such adequately derived keys and the same round function are used, the 4-round KAF is secure up to queries.
For beyond-birthday security, we focus on 6-round KAF. We prove that when the adjacent round-keys are independent, and independent round-functions are used, the 6 round KAF is secure up to queries. To our knowledge, this is the first beyond-birthday security result for KAF without assuming completely independent round-keys.
Our results hold in the multi-user setting as well, constituting the first non-trivial multi-user provable security results on Feistel ciphers. We finally demonstrate applications of our results on designing key-schedules and instantiating keyed sponge constructions
Semantic Security and Indistinguishability in the Quantum World
At CRYPTO 2013, Boneh and Zhandry initiated the study of quantum-secure
encryption. They proposed first indistinguishability definitions for the
quantum world where the actual indistinguishability only holds for classical
messages, and they provide arguments why it might be hard to achieve a stronger
notion. In this work, we show that stronger notions are achievable, where the
indistinguishability holds for quantum superpositions of messages. We
investigate exhaustively the possibilities and subtle differences in defining
such a quantum indistinguishability notion for symmetric-key encryption
schemes. We justify our stronger definition by showing its equivalence to novel
quantum semantic-security notions that we introduce. Furthermore, we show that
our new security definitions cannot be achieved by a large class of ciphers --
those which are quasi-preserving the message length. On the other hand, we
provide a secure construction based on quantum-resistant pseudorandom
permutations; this construction can be used as a generic transformation for
turning a large class of encryption schemes into quantum indistinguishable and
hence quantum semantically secure ones. Moreover, our construction is the first
completely classical encryption scheme shown to be secure against an even
stronger notion of indistinguishability, which was previously known to be
achievable only by using quantum messages and arbitrary quantum encryption
circuits.Comment: 37 pages, 2 figure
Provable security for lightweight message authentication and encryption
The birthday bound often limits the security of a cryptographic scheme to half of the block size or internal state size.
This implies that cryptographic schemes require a block size or internal state size that is twice the security level, resulting in larger and more resource-intensive designs.
In this thesis, we introduce abstract constructions for message authentication codes and stream ciphers that we demonstrate to be secure beyond the birthday bound.
Our message authentication codes were inspired by previous work, specifically the message authentication code EWCDM by Cogliati and Seurin, as well as the work by Mennink and Neves, which demonstrates easy proofs of security for the sum of permutations and an improved bound for EWCDM.
We enhance the sum of permutations by incorporating a hash value and a nonce in our stateful design, and in our stateless design, we utilize two hash values.
One advantage over EWCDM is that the permutation calls, or block cipher calls, can be parallelized, whereas in EWCDM they must be performed sequentially.
We demonstrate that our constructions provide a security level of 2n/3 bits in the nonce-respecting setting.
Subsequently, this bound was further improved to 3n/4 bits of security.
Additionally, it was later discovered that security degrades gracefully with nonce repetitions, unlike EWCDM, where the security drops to the birthday bound with a single nonce repetition.
Contemporary stream cipher designs aim to minimize the hardware module's resource requirements by incorporating an externally available resource, all while maintaining a high level of security.
The security level is typically measured in relation to the size of the volatile internal state, i.e., the state cells within the cipher's hardware module.
Several designs have been proposed that continuously access the externally available non-volatile secret key during keystream generation.
However, there exists a generic distinguishing attack with birthday bound complexity.
We propose schemes that continuously access the externally available non-volatile initial value.
For all constructions, conventional or contemporary, we provide proofs of security against generic attacks in the random oracle model.
Notably, stream ciphers that use the non-volatile initial value during keystream generation offer security beyond the birthday bound.
Based on these findings, we propose a new stream cipher design called DRACO
Public-Seed Pseudorandom Permutations
A number of cryptographic schemes are built from (keyless) permutations, which are either designed in an ad-hoc fashion or are obtained by fixing the key in a block cipher. Security proofs for these schemes, however, idealize this permutation, i.e., making it random and accessible, as an oracle, to all parties. Finding plausible concrete assumptions on such permutations that guarantee security of the resulting schemes has remained an elusive open question.
This paper initiates the study of standard-model assumptions on permutations -- or more precisely, on families of permutations indexed by a {\em public} seed. We introduce the notion of a {\em public-seed pseudorandom permutation} (psPRP), which is inspired by the UCE notion by Bellare, Hoang, and Keelveedhi (CRYPTO \u2713). It considers a two-stage security game, where only the second stage learns the seed, and the first-stage adversary, known as the source, is restricted to prevent trivial attacks -- the security notion is consequently parameterized by the class of allowable sources. To this end, we define in particular unpredictable and reset-secure sources analogous to similar notions for UCEs.
We first study the relationship between psPRPs and UCEs. To start with, we provide efficient constructions of UCEs from psPRPs for both reset-secure and unpredictable sources, thus showing that most applications of the UCE framework admit instantiations from psPRPs. We also show a converse of this statement, namely that the five-round Feistel construction yields a psPRP for reset-secure sources when the round function is built from UCEs for reset-secure sources, hence making psPRP and UCE equivalent notions for such sources.
In addition to studying such reductions, we suggest generic instantiations of psPRPs from both block ciphers and (keyless) permutations, and analyze them in ideal models. Also, as an application of our notions, we show that a simple modification of a recent highly-efficient garbling scheme by Bellare et al. (S&P \u2713) is secure under our psPRP assumption