Approximately Stable Matchings with Budget Constraints

This paper considers two-sided matching with budget constraints where one side (firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (worker or doctor). In a standard model, while multiple doctors can be matched to a single hospital, a hospital has a maximum quota: the number of doctors assigned to a hospital cannot exceed a certain limit. In our model, a hospital instead has a fixed budget: the total amount of wages allocated by each hospital to doctors is constrained. With budget constraints, stable matchings may fail to exist and checking for the existence is hard. To deal with the nonexistence of stable matchings, we extend the "matching with contracts" model of Hatfield and Milgrom, so that it handles approximately stable matchings where each of the hospitals' utilities after deviation can increase by factor up to a certain amount. We then propose two novel mechanisms that efficiently return such a stable matching that exactly satisfies the budget constraints. In particular, by sacrificing strategy-proofness, our first mechanism achieves the best possible bound. Furthermore, we find a special case such that a simple mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors, keeping the best possible bound of the general case.Comment: Accepted for the 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI2018). arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1705.0764

Preference Elicitation in Matching Markets Via Interviews: A Study of Offline Benchmarks

The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical (especially in large markets) and agents usually need to go through some costly deliberation process in order to learn their preferences. In this paper we assume that such deliberations are carried out via interviews, where an interview involves a man and a woman, each of whom learns information about the other as a consequence. If everybody interviews everyone else, then clearly agents can fully learn their preferences. But interviews are costly, and we may wish to minimize their use. It is often the case, especially in practical settings, that due to correlation between agents’ preferences, it is unnecessary for all potential interviews to be carried out in order to obtain a stable matching. Thus the problem is to find a good strategy for interviews to be carried out in order to minimize their use, whilst leading to a stable matching. One way to evaluate the performance of an interview strategy is to compare it against a na¨ıve algorithm that conducts all interviews. We argue however that a more meaningful comparison would be against an optimal offline algorithm that has access to agents’ preference orderings under complete information. We show that, unless P=NP, no offline algorithm can compute the optimal interview strategy in polynomial time. If we are additionally aiming for a particular stable matching (perhaps one with certain desirable properties), we provide restricted settings under which efficient optimal offline algorithms exist

Learning Desirable Matchings From Partial Preferences

We study the classic problem of matching $n$ agents to $n$ objects, where the agents have ranked preferences over the objects. We focus on two popular desiderata from the matching literature: Pareto optimality and rank-maximality. Instead of asking the agents to report their complete preferences, our goal is to learn a desirable matching from partial preferences, specifically a matching that is necessarily Pareto optimal (NPO) or necessarily rank-maximal (NRM) under any completion of the partial preferences. We focus on the top-$k$ model in which agents reveal a prefix of their preference rankings. We design efficient algorithms to check if a given matching is NPO or NRM, and to check whether such a matching exists given top-$k$ partial preferences. We also study online algorithms to elicit partial preferences adaptively, and prove bounds on their competitive ratio

Scheduling under Uncertainty: A Query-based Approach

International audienceWe consider a single machine, a set of unit-time jobs, and a set of unit-time errors. We assume that the time-slot at which each error will occur is not known in advance but, for every error, there exists an uncertainty area during which the error will take place. In order to find if the error occurs in a specific time-slot, it is necessary to issue a query to it. In this work, we study two problems: (i) the error-query scheduling problem, whose aim is to reveal enough error-free slots with the minimum number of queries, and (ii) the lexicographic error-query scheduling problem where we seek the earliest error-free slots with the minimum number of queries. We consider both the off-line and the on-line versions of the above problems. In the former, the whole instance and its characteristics are known in advance and we give a polynomial-time algorithm for the error-query scheduling problem. In the latter, the adversary has the power to decide, in an on-line way, the time-slot of appearance for each error. We propose then both lower bounds and algorithms whose competitive ratios asymptotically match these lower bounds