A synthesis of the role of media reports and elections in Nigerian democracy

This paper examines the interplay between the media and the elections in Nigeria, and discusses some of the relevant communication models that could assist the media in effectively reporting future elections in the country. This study has employed a historical approach, and argues that since Nigeria attained its political independence in 1960; conducting free and fair elections has been the major political problem in the country. The paper observed that the June 12 1993 Presidential Elections resulted in a stalemate, while the 2007 Elections were flawed with cases of electoral irregularities. Many of the results of the elections that were approved earlier by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) were later cancelled by the Nigerian Judiciary, a confirmation that the elections were rigged as confirmed by most of the internal and the external observers that monitored the elections. As a part of the solutions to the problem of elections in Nigeria, this paper recommends the establishment of an Inter-Party Central Committee (ICPP), made up of the national executives of the registered political parties, to work in collaboration with the media as the committee supports the electoral commission to conduct free and fair elections in the country

Myth, Reality Past and Present, and Judicial Elections

Why do we have judicial elections? A democracy without elections for the legislature and executive (or, in parliamentary systems, for the executive as the leadership of the elected legislators), would be simply inconceivable. But no one would deny that eleven of our states, or many other nations, are democracies even though they do not elect judges. It might follow from that irrefutable, fundamental difference between elections for judges and for other offices, that judicial elections should not-or more to the point, need not-be conducted the same as other elections. Before we soar into debate, let us lay a foundation with elements of fact: first, the historical facts about why we have judicial elections; second, how well or poorly those facts-that is, the very purpose of having judicial elections-have been taken into account by the courts that have stricken efforts to treat judicial elections differently

Do Elections Slow Down Economic Globalization Process in India? It's Politics Stupid!

I investigate whether timing of the elections impact economic globalization process or not in India. In other words, do elections slowdown economic globalization process? The theoretical underpinning is that, policies of economic globalization lead to economic and social hardships in short run but benefit the economy in the long run. The motto behind slowing down the economic globalization process before elections is that it leads to polarization of voters and thus negatively affects the incumbent government. I make use of Axel Dreherís economic globalization index and construct ëinstrumental electoral cycleí to capture the scheduled and midterm election cycle. Using time series data for India for the period 1970 ñ 2006, I find that scheduled elections are associated with slow down in economic globalization, whereas midterm elections are not. Replacing Dreherís economic globalization index with our modified globalization index does not alter the results. I also find that slow down in economic globalization process is responsive to the propinquity to a scheduled election year. Meaning, as incumbent government nears the scheduled elections, economic globalization process keeps slowing down, while this is exactly opposite during the early years of incumbent government in office. These results suggest that elections generate ìelectoral globalization cycleî in developing democratic country like India.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64406/1/wp929.pd

The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections

The belief that elections reduce rent seeking by government officials is widely held, likewise the belief that rent seeking decreases as elections are less subject to corruption. In this paper we develop and test a model in which these beliefs are carefully examined. Our model indicates that, while elections may provide a disincentive for rent seeking, this disincentive (1) need not actually materialise, and (2), is not necessarily correlated with the integrity of the electoral protocol. We next consider the ability of village-level elections in rural China to reduce rent seeking, and the extent to which this ability varies as the elections are more or less corruptible. We find that in practice, even elections that appear quite corruptible provide a strong disincentive to rent seeking. Moreover, our results indicate which types of electoral reform lead to more effective popular oversight of leaders, and which do not.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39988/3/wp602.pd

The 2009 European Election in Italy: National or European?

In June 2009, European citizens voted in the European Parliamentary elections. Despite the relevance of the election, turnout across countries was particularly low. In Italy, too, abstention is growing and this paper aims to explain why. Traditionally, low turnout in European Parliamentary elections is explained by the fact that they are considered second-order elections and, thus, less important than national elections. According to this perspective, national factors are the main cause of lower turnout as compared to national elections. Thus, it is generally considered that low turnout is not related to citizens’ support for the European Union or other European attitudes, such as European identity. In this article, this perspective is questioned and other individual factors are considered. In particular, a number of European attitudes are considered as independent variables together with national factors. The findings show that abstention in European Parliamentary elections in Italy is directly linked to citizens’ disaffection with politics, rather than disaffection with government performance. Furthermore, attitudes toward the European Union integration project play a role only when the level of political involvement is high. Thus, European questions matter and turnout in European Parliamentary elections is driven not only by national-level factors, but also by citizens’ satisfaction with the European Union and sense of European identity

Donor Diversity through Public Matching Funds

New York State is considering a system of public campaign financing for state elections similar to the one New York City uses for municipal elections. In that system, the city puts up six dollars in public matching funds for each of the first $175 that a city resident contributes to a candidate participating in the voluntary program.One of the key purposes of the city's matching fund program is to strengthen the connections between public officials and their constituents by bringing more small donors into the process and making them more important to the candidates' campaigns. A previous paper by the Campaign Finance Institute showed that matching funds heighten the number and role of small donors in city elections and would be likely to do the same at the state level.This joint study by the Brennan Center for Justice and the Campaign Finance Institute tests whether these powerful but anecdotal claims are supported by the available evidence from the most recent state and municipal elections. To do so, we compared donors to candidates in the City Council elections of 2009, where there was a public financing program, to the donors to candidates in the State Assembly elections of 2010, where there was no such program. We compared the City Council and State Assembly races because those electoral districts are similar in size and because doing so allowed us to look at the giving patterns of the same city residents in different elections

Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the U.S. Federal Government

A defining feature of public sector employment is the regular change in elected leadership. Yet, we know little about how elections influence public sector careers. We describe how elections alter policy outputs and disrupt the influence of civil servants over agency decisions. These changes shape the career choices of employees motivated by policy, influence, and wages. Using new Office of Personnel Management data on the careers of millions of federal employees between 1988 and 2011, we evaluate how elections influence employee turnover decisions. We find that presidential elections increase departure rates of career senior employees, particularly in agencies with divergent views relative to the new president and at the start of presidential terms. We also find suggestive evidence that vacancies in high-level positions after elections may induce lower-level executives to stay longer in hopes of advancing. We conclude with implications of our findings for public policy, presidential politics, and public management

Garbled Elections

Majority rules are frequently used to decide whether or not a public good should be provided, but will typically fail to achieve an efficient provision. We provide a worst-case analysis of the majority rule with an optimally chosen majority threshold, assuming that voters have independent private valuations and are exante symmetric (provision cost shares are included in the valuations). We show that if the population is large it can happen that the optimal majority rule is essentially no better than a random provision of the public good. But the optimal majority rule is worst-case asymptotically efficient in the large-population limit if (i) the voters’ expected valuation is bounded away from 0, and (ii) an absolute bound for valuations is known

The Timing of Elections in Federations : A Disciplining Device against Soft Budget Constraints ?

We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints. Specifically, we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse - with synchronized elections, i.e. simultaneous central and regional office terms, or with staggered elections, i.e. terms of office that do not coincide. We find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level as well as welfare.Soft budget constraints, fiscal federalism, elections.