7 research outputs found
Signer-Anonymous Designated-Verifier Redactable Signatures for Cloud-Based Data Sharing
Redactable signature schemes allow to black out predefined parts of a signed message without affecting the validity of the signature, and are therefore an important building block in privacy-enhancing cryptography. However, a second look shows, that for many practical applications, they cannot be used in their vanilla form. On the one hand, already the identity of the signer may often reveal sensitive information to the receiver of a redacted message; on the other hand, if data leaks or is sold, everyone getting hold of (redacted versions of) a signed message will be convinced of its authenticity.
We overcome these issues by providing a definitional framework and practically efficient instantiations of so called signer-anonymous designated-verifier redactable signatures (AD-RS). As a byproduct we also obtain the first group redactable signatures, which may be of independent interest. AD-RS are motivated by a real world use-case in the field of health care and complement existing health information sharing platforms with additional important privacy features. Moreover, our results are not limited to the proposed application, but can also be directly applied to various other contexts such as notary authorities or e-government services
Practical Strongly Invisible and Strongly Accountable Sanitizable Signatures
Sanitizable signatures are a variant of digital signatures where a designated party (the sanitizer) can
update admissible parts of a signed message. At PKC’17, Camenisch et al. introduced the notion of invisible
sanitizable signatures that hides from an outsider which parts of a message are admissible. Their security definition of
invisibility, however, does not consider dishonest signers. Along the same lines, their signer-accountability definition
does not prevent the signer from falsely accusing the sanitizer of having issued a signature on a sanitized message
by exploiting the malleability of the signature itself. Both issues may limit the usefulness of their scheme in certain
applications.
We revise their definitional framework, and present a new construction eliminating these shortcomings. In contrast
to Camenisch et al.’s construction, ours requires only standard building blocks instead of chameleon hashes with
ephemeral trapdoors. This makes this, now even stronger, primitive more attractive for practical use. We underpin
the practical efficiency of our scheme by concrete benchmarks of a prototype implementation
Highly-Efficient Fully-Anonymous Dynamic Group Signatures
Group signatures are a central tool in privacy-enhancing cryptography, which allow members of a group to anonymously produce signatures on behalf of the group. Consequently, they are an attractive means to implement privacy-friendly authentication mechanisms. Ideally, group signatures are dynamic and thus allow to dynamically and concurrently enroll new members to a group. For such schemes, Bellare et al. (CT-RSA\u2705) proposed the currently strongest security model (BSZ model). This model, in particular, ensures desirable anonymity guarantees. Given the prevalence of the resource asymmetry in current computing scenarios, i.e., a multitude of (highly) resource-constrained devices are communicating with powerful (cloud-powered) services, it is of utmost importance to have group signatures that are highly-efficient and can be deployed in such scenarios. Satisfying these requirements in particular means that the signing (client) operations are lightweight.
We propose a novel, generic approach to construct dynamic group signature schemes, being provably secure in the BSZ model and particularly suitable for resource-constrained devices. Our results are interesting for various reasons: We can prove our construction secure without requiring random oracles. Moreover, when opting for an instantiation in the random oracle model (ROM) the so obtained scheme is extremely efficient and outperforms the fastest constructions providing anonymity in the BSZ model - which also rely on the ROM - known to date. Regarding constructions providing a weaker anonymity notion than BSZ, we surprisingly outperform the popular short BBS group signature scheme (CRYPTO\u2704; also proven secure in the ROM) and thereby even obtain shorter signatures. We provide a rigorous comparison with existing schemes that highlights the benefits of our scheme. On a more theoretical side, we provide the first construction following the without encryption paradigm introduced by Bichsel et al. (SCN\u2710) in the strong BSZ model
Protean Signature Schemes
We introduce the notion of Protean Signature schemes. This novel type of signature scheme allows to
remove and edit signer-chosen parts of signed messages by a semi-trusted third party simultaneously. In existing
work, one is either allowed to remove or edit parts of signed messages, but not both at the same time. Which and
how parts of the signed messages can be modified is chosen by the signer. Thus, our new primitive generalizes both
redactable (Steinfeld et al., ICISC \u2701, Johnson et al., CT-RSA \u2702 & Brzuska et al., ACNS\u2710) and sanitizable
signatures schemes (Ateniese et al., ESORICS \u2705 & Brzuska et al., PKC\u2709). We showcase a scenario where either
primitive alone is not sufficient. Our provably secure construction (offering both strong notions of transparency and
invisibility) makes only black-box access to sanitizable and redactable signature schemes, which can be considered
standard tools nowadays. Finally, we have implemented our scheme; Our evaluation shows that the performance is
reasonable
Chameleon-Hashes with Dual Long-Term Trapdoors and Their Applications
A chameleon-hash behaves likes a standard collision-resistant hash function for outsiders. If, however, a trapdoor is known, arbitrary collisions can be found. Chameleon-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors (CHET; Camenisch et al., PKC ’17) allow prohibiting that the holder of the long-term trapdoor can find collisions by introducing a second, ephemeral, trapdoor. However, this ephemeral trapdoor is required to be chosen freshly for each hash. We extend these ideas and introduce the notion of chameleon-hashes with dual long-term trapdoors (CHDLTT). Here, the second trapdoor is not chosen freshly for each new hash; Rather, the hashing party can decide if it wants to generate a fresh second trapdoor or use an existing one. This primitive generalizes CHETs, extends their applicability and enables some appealing new use-cases, including three-party sanitizable signatures, group-level selectively revocable signatures and break-the-glass signatures. We present two provably secure constructions and an implementation which demonstrates that this extended primitive is efficient enough for use in practice
Efficient Sanitizable Signatures Without Random Oracles
Sanitizable signatures, introduced by Ateniese et al. (ESORICS \u2705), allow the signer to delegate the sanitization right of signed messages. The sanitizer can modify the message and update the signature accordingly, so that the sanitized part of the message is kept private. For a stronger protection of sensitive information, it is desirable that no one can link sanitized message-signature pairs of the same document. This idea was formalized by Brzuska et al. (PKC \u2710) as unlinkability, which was followed up recently by Fleischhacker et al. (PKC \u2716). Unfortunately, the existing generic constructions of sanitizable signatures, unlinkable or not, are based on building blocks with specially crafted features of which efficient (standard model) instantiations are absent. Basing on existing primitives or a conceptually simple primitive is more desirable.
In this work, we present two such generic constructions, leading to efficient instantiations in the standard model. The first one is based on rerandomizable tagging, a new primitive which may find independent interests. It captures the core accountability mechanism of sanitizable signatures. The second one is based on accountable ring signatures (CARDIS \u2704, ESORICS \u2715). As an intermediate result, we propose the first accountable ring signature scheme in the standard model