Implementation of a Secure Internet Voting Protocol

Voting is one of the most important activities in a democratic society. In a traditional voting environment voting process sometimes becomes quite inconvenient due to the reluctance of certain voters to visit a polling booth to cast votes besides involving huge social and human resources. The development of computer networks and elaboration of cryptographic techniques facilitate the implementation of electronic voting. In this work we propose a secure electronic voting protocol that is suitable for large scale voting over the Internet. The protocol allows a voter to cast his or her ballot anonymously, by exchanging untraceable yet authentic messages. The e-voting protocol is based on blind signatures and has the properties of anonymity, mobility, efficiency, robustness, authentication, uniqueness, and universal verifiability and coercion-resistant. The proposed protocol encompasses three distinct phases - that of registration phase, voting phase and counting phase involving five parties, the voter, certification centre, authentication server, voting server and a tallying server

Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1

Receipt-Freeness and Coercion Resistance in Remote E-Voting Systems

Abstract: Remote electronic voting (E-voting) is a more convenient and efficient methodology when compared with traditional voting systems. It allows voters to vote for candidates remotely, however, remote E-voting systems have not yet been widely deployed in practical elections due to several potential security issues, such as vote-privacy, robustness and verifiability. Attackers' targets can be either voting machines or voters. In this paper, we mainly focus on three important security properties related to voters: receipt-freeness, vote-selling resistance, and voter-coercion resistance. In such scenarios, voters are willing or forced to cooperate with attackers. We provide a survey of existing remote E-voting systems, to see whether or not they are able to satisfy these three properties to avoid corresponding attacks. Furthermore, we identify and summarise what mechanisms they use in order to satisfy these three security properties

A secure electronic voting scheme

In this paper a new electronic voting scheme is described which guarantees coercion-resistance as well as privacy, eligibility, unreusability and verifiability. The proposed protocol can be implemented in practical environment, since it does not require untappable channel or voting booth, only anonymous channels are applied