5 research outputs found
Black-Box Transformations from Passive to Covert Security with Public Verifiability
In the context of secure computation, protocols with security against covert adversaries ensure that any misbehavior by malicious parties will be detected by the honest parties with some constant probability.
As such, these protocols provide better security guarantees than passively secure protocols and, moreover, are easier to construct than protocols with full security against active adversaries.
Protocols that, upon detecting a cheating attempt, allow the honest parties to compute a certificate that enables third parties to verify whether an accused party misbehaved or not are called publicly verifiable.
In this work, we present the first generic compilers for constructing two-party protocols with covert security and public verifiability from protocols with passive security.
We present two separate compilers, which are both fully blackbox in the underlying protocols they use.
Both of them only incur a constant multiplicative factor in terms of bandwidth overhead and a constant additive factor in terms of round complexity on top of the passively secure protocols they use.
The first compiler applies to all two-party protocols that have no private inputs.
This class of protocols covers the important class of preprocessing protocols that are used to setup correlated randomness among parties.
We use our compiler to obtain the first secret-sharing based two-party protocol with covert security and public verifiability.
Notably, the produced protocol achieves public verifiability essentially for free when compared with the best known previous solutions based on secret-sharing that did not provide public verifiability
Our second compiler constructs protocols with covert security and public verifiability for arbitrary functionalities from passively secure protocols.
It uses our first compiler to perform a setup phase, which is independent of the parties\u27 inputs as well as the protocol they would like to execute.
Finally, we show how to extend our techniques to obtain multiparty computation protocols with covert security and public verifiability against arbitrary constant fractions of corruptions
The Price of Low Communication in Secure Multi-Party Computation
Traditional protocols for secure multi-party computation among n parties
communicate at least a linear (in n) number of bits, even when computing very
simple functions. In this work we investigate the feasibility of protocols
with sublinear communication complexity. Concretely, we consider two clients,
one of which may be corrupted, who wish to perform some “small” joint
computation using n servers but without any trusted setup. We show that
enforcing sublinear communication complexity drastically affects the
feasibility bounds on the number of corrupted parties that can be tolerated in
the setting of information-theoretic security.
We provide a complete investigation of security in the presence of semi-honest
adversaries---static and adaptive, with and without erasures---and initiate
the study of security in the presence of malicious adversaries. For
semi-honest static adversaries, our bounds essentially match the corresponding
bounds when there is no communication restriction---i.e., we can tolerate up
to t < (1/2 - \epsilon)n corrupted parties. For the adaptive case, however,
the situation is different. We prove that without erasures
even a small constant fraction of corruptions is intolerable, and---more
surprisingly---when erasures are allowed, we prove that t < (1- \sqrt(0.5)
-\epsilon)n corruptions can be tolerated, which we also show to be essentially
optimal. The latter optimality proof hinges on a new treatment of
probabilistic adversary structures that may be of independent interest. In the
case of active corruptions in the sublinear communication setting, we prove
that static “security with abort” is feasible when t < (1/2 - \epsilon)n,
namely, the bound that is tight for semi-honest security. All of our negative
results in fact rule out protocols with sublinear message complexity
A Hierarchy Theorem for Interactive Proofs of Proximity
The number of rounds, or round complexity, used in an interactive
protocol is a fundamental resource. In this work we consider the
significance of round complexity in the context of Interactive
Proofs of Proximity (IPPs). Roughly speaking, IPPs are interactive proofs in which the verifier runs in sublinear time and is only required to reject inputs that are far from the language.
Our main result is a round hierarchy theorem for IPPs, showing
that the power of IPPs grows with the number of rounds. More
specifically, we show that there exists a gap function
g(r) = Theta(r^2) such that for every constant r geq 1 there exists a language that (1) has a g(r)-round IPP with verification time t=t(n,r) but (2) does not have an r-round IPP with verification time t (or even verification time t\u27=poly(t)).
In fact, we prove a stronger result by exhibiting a single language L such that, for every constant r geq 1, there is an
O(r^2)-round IPP for L with t=n^{O(1/r)} verification time, whereas the verifier in any r-round IPP for L must run in time at least t^{100}. Moreover, we show an IPP for L with a poly-logarithmic number of rounds and only poly-logarithmic erification time, yielding a sub-exponential separation between the power of constant-round IPPs versus general (unbounded round) IPPs.
From our hierarchy theorem we also derive implications to standard
interactive proofs (in which the verifier can run in polynomial
time). Specifically, we show that the round reduction technique of
Babai and Moran (JCSS, 1988) is (almost) optimal among all blackbox transformations, and we show a connection to the algebrization framework of Aaronson and Wigderson (TOCT, 2009)
Efficient Information-Theoretic Multi-Party Computation over Non-Commutative Rings
We construct the first efficient MPC protocol that only requires black-box access to a non-commutative ring . Previous results in the same setting were efficient only either for a constant number of corruptions or when computing branching programs and formulas. Our techniques are based on a generalization of Shamir\u27s secret sharing to non-commutative rings, which we derive from the work on Reed Solomon codes by Quintin, Barbier and Chabot (IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 2013). When the center of the ring contains a set such that , the resulting secret sharing scheme is strongly multiplicative and we can generalize existing constructions over finite fields without much trouble.
Most of our work is devoted to the case where the elements of do not commute with all of , but they just commute with each other. For such rings, the secret sharing scheme cannot be linear ``on both sides and furthermore it is not multiplicative. Nevertheless, we are still able to build MPC protocols with a concretely efficient online phase and black-box access to . As an example we consider the ring , for which when , we obtain protocols that require around less communication and less computation than the state of the art protocol based on Circuit Amortization Friendly Encodings (Dalskov, Lee and Soria-Vazquez, ASIACRYPT 2020).
In this setting with a ``less commutative , our black-box preprocessing phase has a less practical complexity of \poly(n). Due to this, we additionally provide specialized, concretely efficient preprocessing protocols for that exploit the structure of the matrix ring
Doubly Efficient Interactive Proofs over Infinite and Non-Commutative Rings
We introduce the first proof system for layered arithmetic circuits over an arbitrary ring that is (possibly) non-commutative and (possibly) infinite, while only requiring black-box access to its arithmetic and a subset . Our construction only requires limited commutativity and regularity properties from , similar to recent work on efficient information theoretic multi-party computation over non-commutative rings by Escudero and Soria-Vazquez (CRYPTO 2021), but furthermore covering infinite rings.
We achieve our results through a generalization of GKR-style interactive proofs (Goldwasser, Kalai and Rothblum, Journal of the ACM, 2015). When is a subset of the center of , generalizations of the sum-check protocol and other building blocks are not too problematic. The case when the elements of only commute with each other, on the other hand, introduces a series of challenges. In order to overcome those, we need to introduce a new definition of polynomial ring over a non-commutative ring, the notion of left (and right) multi-linear extensions, modify the layer consistency equation and adapt the sum-check protocol.
Despite these changes, our results are compatible with recent developments such as linear time provers. Moreover, for certain rings our construction achieves provers that run in sublinear time in the circuit size. We obtain such result both for known cases, such as matrix and polynomial rings, as well as new ones, such as for some rings resulting from Clifford algebras. Besides efficiency improvements in computation and/or round complexity for several instantiations, the core conclusion of our results is that state of the art doubly efficient interactive proofs do not require much algebraic structure. This enables exact rather than approximate computation over infinite rings as well as agile proof systems, where the black-box choice of the underlying ring can be easily switched through the software life cycle