Ascending Auctions

A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending- bid or a sealed-bid format. The critical distinction between formats is that an ascending auction provides the bidders with information through the process of bidding. This information is a two-edged sword. It may stimulate competition by creating a reliable process of price discovery, by reducing the winner's curse, and by allowing efficient aggregations of items. Alternatively, the information may be used by bidders to establish and enforce collusive outcomes. Ex ante asymmetries and weak competition favor a sealed-bid design. In other cases, an ascending auction is likely to perform better in efficiency and revenue terms. Moreover, information in an ascending auction can be tailored to limit collusion.Auctions; Multiple-Item Auctions, Spectrum Auctions

Using and Abusing Economic Theory

Economic Theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated theory at the expense of elementary theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention is paid to the wider economic context, and to the dangers posed by political pressures. Superficially trivial distinctions between policy proposals may be economically significant, while economically irrelevant distinctions may be politically important. I illustrate with some disastrous government auctions, but also show the value of economic theory.

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the efficiency of the proxy auction. Linear pricing is maintained as long as possible, but then is abandoned in the proxy round to improve efficiency and enhance seller revenues. The approach has many advantages over the simultaneous ascending auction. In particular, the clock-proxy auction has no exposure problem, eliminates incentives for demand reduction, and prevents most collusive bidding strategies.Auctions, Combinatorial Auctions, Market Design, Clock Auctions

E-COMMERCE IN AGRICULTURE: DEVELOPMENT, STRATEGY, AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS

Marketing,

Experimental Economics

This is the first comprehensive treatment of laboratory experiments designed to evaluate economic propositions under carefully controlled conditions. While it acknowledges that laboratory experiments are no panacea, it argues cogently for their effectiveness in selected situations. Covering methodological and procedural issues as well as theory, Experimental Economics is not only a textbook but also a useful introduction to laboratory methods for professional economists. The emphasis is on organizing and evaluating existing results. The book can be used as an anchoring device for a course at either the graduate or advanced undergraduate level. Applications include financial market experiments, oligopoly price competition, auctions, bargaining, provision of public goods, experimental games, and decision making under uncertainty. The book also contains instructions for a variety of laboratory experiments.laboratory experiments, financial markets, price competition, auctions, bargaining, games, decision making, uncertainty

Decentralized Resource Scheduling in Grid/Cloud Computing

In the Grid/Cloud environment, applications or services and resources belong to different organizations with different objectives. Entities in the Grid/Cloud are autonomous and self-interested; however, they are willing to share their resources and services to achieve their individual and collective goals. In such open environment, the scheduling decision is a challenge given the decentralized nature of the environment. Each entity has specific requirements and objectives that need to achieve. In this thesis, we review the Grid/Cloud computing technologies, environment characteristics and structure and indicate the challenges within the resource scheduling. We capture the Grid/Cloud scheduling model based on the complete requirement of the environment. We further create a mapping between the Grid/Cloud scheduling problem and the combinatorial allocation problem and propose an adequate economic-based optimization model based on the characteristic and the structure nature of the Grid/Cloud. By adequacy, we mean that a comprehensive view of required properties of the Grid/Cloud is captured. We utilize the captured properties and propose a bidding language that is expressive where entities have the ability to specify any set of preferences in the Grid/Cloud and simple as entities have the ability to express structured preferences directly. We propose a winner determination model and mechanism that utilizes the proposed bidding language and finds a scheduling solution. Our proposed approach integrates concepts and principles of mechanism design and classical scheduling theory. Furthermore, we argue that in such open environment privacy concerns by nature is part of the requirement in the Grid/Cloud. Hence, any scheduling decision within the Grid/Cloud computing environment is to incorporate the feasibility of privacy protection of an entity. Each entity has specific requirements in terms of scheduling and privacy preferences. We analyze the privacy problem in the Grid/Cloud computing environment and propose an economic based model and solution architecture that provides a scheduling solution given privacy concerns in the Grid/Cloud. Finally, as a demonstration of the applicability of the approach, we apply our solution by integrating with Globus toolkit (a well adopted tool to enable Grid/Cloud computing environment). We also, created simulation experimental results to capture the economic and time efficiency of the proposed solution

Blockchain-Coordinated Frameworks for Scalable and Secure Supply Chain Networks

Supply chains have progressed through time from being limited to a few regional traders to becoming complicated business networks. As a result, supply chain management systems now rely significantly on the digital revolution for the privacy and security of data. Due to key qualities of blockchain, such as transparency, immutability and decentralization, it has recently gained a lot of interest as a way to solve security, privacy and scalability problems in supply chains. However conventional blockchains are not appropriate for supply chain ecosystems because they are computationally costly, have a limited potential to scale and fail to provide trust. Consequently, due to limitations with a lack of trust and coordination, supply chains tend to fail to foster trust among the network’s participants. Assuring data privacy in a supply chain ecosystem is another challenge. If information is being shared with a large number of participants without establishing data privacy, access control risks arise in the network. Protecting data privacy is a concern when sending corporate data, including locations, manufacturing supplies and demand information. The third challenge in supply chain management is scalability, which continues to be a significant barrier to adoption. As the amount of transactions in a supply chain tends to increase along with the number of nodes in a network. So scalability is essential for blockchain adoption in supply chain networks. This thesis seeks to address the challenges of privacy, scalability and trust by providing frameworks for how to effectively combine blockchains with supply chains. This thesis makes four novel contributions. It first develops a blockchain-based framework with Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) model to assure data privacy by adopting a distributed framework to enable fine grained, dynamic access control management for supply chain management. To solve the data privacy challenge, AccessChain is developed. This proposed AccessChain model has two types of ledgers in the system: local and global. Local ledgers are used to store business contracts between stakeholders and the ABAC model management, whereas the global ledger is used to record transaction data. AccessChain can enable decentralized, fine-grained and dynamic access control management in SCM when combined with the ABAC model and blockchain technology (BCT). The framework enables a systematic approach that advantages the supply chain, and the experiments yield convincing results. Furthermore, the results of performance monitoring shows that AccessChain’s response time with four local ledgers is acceptable, and therefore it provides significantly greater scalability. Next, a framework for reducing the bullwhip effect (BWE) in SCM is proposed. The framework also focuses on combining data visibility with trust. BWE is first observed in SC and then a blockchain architecture design is used to minimize it. Full sharing of demand data has been shown to help improve the robustness of overall performance in a multiechelon SC environment, especially for BWE mitigation and cumulative cost reduction. It is observed that when it comes to providing access to data, information sharing using a blockchain has some obvious benefits in a supply chain. Furthermore, when data sharing is distributed, parties in the supply chain will have fair access to other parties’ data, even though they are farther downstream. Sharing customer demand is important in a supply chain to enhance decision-making, reduce costs and promote the final end product. This work also explores the ability of BCT as a solution in a distributed ledger approach to create a trust-enhanced environment where trust is established so that stakeholders can share their information effectively. To provide visibility and coordination along with a blockchain consensus process, a new consensus algorithm, namely Reputation-based proof-of cooperation (RPoC), is proposed for blockchain-based SCM, which does not involve validators to solve any mathematical puzzle before storing a new block. The RPoC algorithm is an efficient and scalable consensus algorithm that selects the consensus node dynamically and permits a large number of nodes to participate in the consensus process. The algorithm decreases the workload on individual nodes while increasing consensus performance by allocating the transaction verification process to specific nodes. Through extensive theoretical analyses and experimentation, the suitability of the proposed algorithm is well grounded in terms of scalability and efficiency. The thesis concludes with a blockchain-enabled framework that addresses the issue of preserving privacy and security for an open-bid auction system. This work implements a bid management system in a private BC environment to provide a secure bidding scheme. The novelty of this framework derives from an enhanced approach for integrating BC structures by replacing the original chain structure with a tree structure. Throughout the online world, user privacy is a primary concern, because the electronic environment enables the collection of personal data. Hence a suitable cryptographic protocol for an open-bid auction atop BC is proposed. Here the primary aim is to achieve security and privacy with greater efficiency, which largely depends on the effectiveness of the encryption algorithms used by BC. Essentially this work considers Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and a dynamic cryptographic accumulator encryption algorithm to enhance security between auctioneer and bidder. The proposed e-bidding scheme and the findings from this study should foster the further growth of BC strategies