32 research outputs found

    Efficient Implementation of Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange from RLWE and Post-Quantum TLS

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    Two post-quantum password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols were proposed at CT-RSA 2017. Following this work, we give much more efficient and portable C++ implementation of these two protocols. We also choose more compact parameters providing 200-bit security. Compared with original implementation, we achieve 21.5x and 18.5x speedup for RLWE-PAK and RLWE-PPK respectively. Compare with quantum-vulnerable J-PAKE protocol, we achieve nearly 8x speedup. We also integrate RLWE-PPK into TLS to construct a post-quantum TLS ciphersuite. This allows simpler key management, mutual authentication and resistant to phishing attack. Benchmark shows that our ciphersuite is indeed practical

    Post-Quantum Secure Remote Password Protocol from RLWE Problem

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    Secure Remote Password (SRP) protocol is an augmented Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol based on discrete logarithm problem (DLP) with various attractive security features. Compared with basic PAKE protocols, SRP does not require server to store user\u27s password and user does not send password to server to authenticate. These features are desirable for secure client-server applications. SRP has gained extensive real-world deployment, including Apple iCloud, 1Password etc. However, with the advent of quantum computer and Shor\u27s algorithm, classic DLP-based public key cryptography algorithms are no longer secure, including SRP. Motivated by importance of SRP and threat from quantum attacks, we propose a RLWE-based SRP protocol (RLWE-SRP) which inherit advantages from SRP and elegant design from RLWE key exchange. We also present parameter choice and efficient portable C++ implementation of RLWE-SRP. Implementation of our 209-bit secure RLWE-SRP is more than 3x faster than 112-bit secure original SRP protocol, 5.5x faster than 80-bit secure J-PAKE and 14x faster than two 184-bit secure RLWE-based PAKE protocols with more desired properties

    Comparison analysis and efficient implementation of reconciliation-based RLWE key exchange protocol

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    Error reconciliation is an important technique for Learning With Error (LWE) and Ring-LWE (RLWE)-based constructions. In this paper, we present a comparison analysis on two error reconciliation-based RLWE key exchange protocols: Ding et al. in 2012 (DING12) and Bos et al. in 2015 (BCNS15). We take them as examples to explain core idea of error reconciliation, building key exchange over RLWE problem, implementation, real-world performance and compare them comprehensively. We also analyse a LWE key exchange ā€œFrodoā€ that uses an improved error reconciliation mechanism in BCNS15. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to present at least 128-bit classic (80-bit quantum) and 256-bit classic (>200-bit quantum) secure parameter choices for DING12 with efficient portable C/C++ implementations. Benchmark shows that our efficient implementation is 11x faster than BCNS15 and one key exchange execution only costs 0.07ms on a 4-year-old middle range CPU. Error reconciliation is 1.57x faster than BCNS15

    Authentication and Key Management Automation in Decentralized Secure Email and Messaging via Low-Entropy Secrets

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    We revisit the problem of entity authentication in decentralized end-to-end encrypted email and secure messaging to propose a practical and self-sustaining cryptographic solution based on password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE). This not only allows users to authenticate each other via shared low-entropy secrets, e.g., memorable words, without a public key infrastructure or a trusted third party, but it also paves the way for automation and a series of cryptographic enhancements; improves security by minimizing the impact of human error and potentially improves usability. First, we study a few vulnerabilities in voice-based out-of-band authentication, in particular a combinatorial attack against lazy users, which we analyze in the context of a secure email solution. Next, we propose solving the problem of secure equality test using PAKE to achieve entity authentication and to establish a shared high-entropy secret key. Our solution lends itself to offline settings, compatible with the inherently asynchronous nature of email and modern messaging systems. The suggested approach enables enhancements in key management such as automated key renewal and future key pair authentications, multi-device synchronization, secure secret storage and retrieval, and the possibility of post-quantum security as well as facilitating forward secrecy and deniability in a primarily symmetric-key setting. We also discuss the use of auditable PAKEs for mitigating a class of online guess and abort attacks in authentication protocols

    Quantum-Safe Protocols and Application in Data Security of Medical Records

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    The use of traditional cryptography based on symmetric keys has been replaced with the revolutionary idea discovered by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 that fundamentally changed communication systems by ensuring a secure transmission of information over an insecure channel. Nowadays public key cryptography is frequently used for authentication in e-commerce, digital signatures and encrypted communication. Most of the public key cryptosystems used in practice are based on integer factorization (the famous RSA cryptosystem proposed by Rivest, Shamir and Adlemann), respectively on the discrete logarithm (in finite curves or elliptic curves). However these systems suffer from two potential drawbacks like efficiency because they must use large keys to maintain security and of course security breach with the advent of the quantum computer as a result of Peter Shor\u27s discovery in 1999 of the polynomial algorithm for solving problems such factorization of integers and discrete logarithm

    Post-quantum key exchange for the TLS protocol from the ring learning with errors problem

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    Lattice-based cryptographic primitives are believed to offer resilience against attacks by quantum computers. We demonstrate the practicality of post-quantum key exchange by constructing ciphersuites for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol that provide key exchange based on the ring learning with errors (R-LWE) problem; we accompany these ciphersuites with a rigorous proof of security. Our approach ties lattice-based key exchange together with traditional authentication using RSA or elliptic curve digital signatures: the post-quantum key exchange provides forward secrecy against future quantum attackers, while authentication can be provided using RSA keys that are issued by today\u27s commercial certificate authorities, smoothing the path to adoption. Our cryptographically secure implementation, aimed at the 128-bit security level, reveals that the performance price when switching from non-quantum-safe key exchange is not too high. With our R-LWE ciphersuites integrated into the OpenSSL library and using the Apache web server on a 2-core desktop computer, we could serve 506 RLWE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 HTTPS connections per second for a 10 KiB payload. Compared to elliptic curve Diffie--Hellman, this means an 8 KiB increased handshake size and a reduction in throughput of only 21%. This demonstrates that provably secure post-quantum key-exchange can already be considered practical

    Light the Signal: Optimization of Signal Leakage Attacks against LWE-Based Key Exchange

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    Key exchange protocols from the learning with errors (LWE) problem share many similarities with the Diffieā€“Hellmanā€“Merkle (DHM) protocol, which plays a central role in securing our Internet. Therefore, there has been a long time effort in designing authenticated key exchange directly from LWE to mirror the advantages of DHM-based protocols. In this paper, we revisit signal leakage attacks and show that the severity of these attacks against LWE-based (authenticated) key exchange is still underestimated. In particular, by converting the problem of launching a signal leakage attack into a coding problem, we can significantly reduce the needed number of queries to reveal the secret key. Specifically, for DXL-KE we reduce the queries from 1,266 to only 29, while for DBS-KE, we need only 748 queries, a great improvement over the previous 1,074,434 queries. Moreover, our new view of signals as binary codes enables recognizing vulnerable schemes more easily. As such we completely recover the secret key of a password-based authenticated key exchange scheme by Dabra et al. with only 757 queries and partially reveal the secret used in a two-factor authentication by Wang et al. with only one query. The experimental evaluation supports our theoretical analysis and demonstrates the efficiency and effectiveness of our attacks. Our results caution against underestimating the power of signal leakage attacks as they are applicable even in settings with a very restricted number of interactions between adversary and victim

    Speedy Error Reconciliation

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    Introducing small errors in the lattice-based key exchange protocols, although it is resistant to quantum computing attacks, will cause both parties to only get roughly equal secret values, which brings uncertainty to the negotiation of the key agreement. The role of the error reconciliation mechanism is to eliminate this uncertainty and ensure that both parties can reach a consensus. This paper designs a new error reconciliation mechanism: Speedy Error Reconciliation (SER), which can eļ¬€iciently complete key negotiation while ensuring key correctness and security. SER exploits the properties of the approximate secret values Ļƒ1 and Ļƒ2 shared by the two parties, and simultaneously reconciles the most and least significant bits of the secret value, and a two-bit key can be obtained by one coordination. By sharing g-bit auxiliary information between two entities, SER expands the fault tolerance interval during reconciliation and improves the success rate of consensus. To test the actual performance of SER, we integrate it into key ex- change protocols based on LWE, RLWE, and MLWE, such as Frodo and NewHope. By comparing parameters such as failure rate, security strength, and the number of CPU rounds, we find that SER performs well in various modes, especially in RLWE-based protocol. Since SER doubles the error to reconcile the least significant bit, which in turn leads to a relatively large error in SER; while the RLWE-based key ex- change scheme adopts a polynomial ring and selects a large parameter q, which is very suitable for SER. Compared with Frodo and NewHope, SER improves the reconciliation eļ¬€iciency of the per-bit key by 61.6% and 797.6%, respectively

    Provably Secure Password Authenticated Key Exchange Based on RLWE for the Post-QuantumWorld

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    Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) is a cryptographic scheme with the aim to establish a high-entropy and secret session key over a insecure communications network. \emph{Password}-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) assumes that the parties in play share a simple password, which is cheap and human-memorable and is used to achieve the authentication. PAKEs are practically relevant as these features are extremely appealing in an age where most people access sensitive personal data remotely from more-and-more pervasive hand-held devices. Theoretically, PAKEs allow the secure computation and authentication of a high-entropy piece of data using a low-entropy string as a starting point. In this paper, we apply the recently proposed technique introduced in~\cite{DXX2012} to construct two lattice-based PAKE protocols enjoying a very simple and elegant design that is an parallel extension of the class of Random Oracle Model (ROM)-based protocols \msf{PAK} and \msf{PPK}~\cite{BMP2000,M2002}, but in the lattice-based setting. The new protocol resembling \msf{PAK} is three-pass, and provides \emph{mutual explicit authentication}, while the protocol following the structure of \msf{PPK} is two-pass, and provides \emph{implicit authentication}. Our protocols rely on the Ring-Learning-with-Errors (RLWE) assumption, and exploit the additive structure of the underlying ring. They have a comparable level of efficiency to \msf{PAK} and \msf{PPK}, which makes them highly attractive. We present a preliminary implementation of our protocols to demonstrate that they are both efficient and practical. We believe they are suitable quantum safe replacements for \msf{PAK} and \msf{PPK}

    Flowrider: Fast On-Demand Key Provisioning for Cloud Networks

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    Increasingly fine-grained cloud billing creates incentives to review the software execution footprint in virtual environments. For example, virtual execution environments move towards lower overhead: from virtual machines to containers, unikernels, and serverless cloud computing. However, the execution footprint of security components in virtualized environments has either remained the same or even increased. We present Flowrider, a novel key provisioning mechanism for cloud networks that unlocks scalable use of symmetric keys and significantly reduces the related computational load on network endpoints. We describe the application of Flowrider to common transport security protocols, the results of its formal verification, and its prototype implementation. Our evaluation shows that Florwider uses up to an order of magnitude less CPU to establish a TLS session while preventing by construction some known attacks
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