On the Possibility of a Backdoor in the Micali-Schnorr Generator

In this paper, we study both the implications and potential impact of backdoored parameters for two RSA-based pseudorandom number generators: the ISO-standardized Micali-Schnorr generator and a closely related design, the RSA PRG. We observe, contrary to common understanding, that the security of the Micali-Schnorr PRG is not tightly bound to the difficulty of inverting RSA. We show that the Micali-Schnorr construction remains secure even if one replaces RSA with a publicly evaluatable PRG, or a function modeled as an efficiently invertible random permutation. This implies that any cryptographic backdoor must somehow exploit the algebraic structure of RSA, rather than an attacker\u27s ability to invert RSA or the presence of secret keys. We exhibit two such backdoors in related constructions: a family of exploitable parameters for the RSA PRG, and a second vulnerable construction for a finite-field variant of Micali-Schnorr. We also observe that the parameters allowed by the ISO standard are incompletely specified, and allow insecure choices of exponent. Several of our backdoor constructions make use of lattice techniques, in particular multivariate versions of Coppersmith\u27s method for finding small solutions to polynomials modulo integers

Universal homophonic coding

Redundancy in plaintext is a fertile source of attack in any encryption system. Compression before encryption reduces the redundancy in the plaintext, but this does not make a cipher more secure. The cipher text is still susceptible to known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks. The aim of homophonic coding is to convert a plaintext source into a random sequence by randomly mapping each source symbol into one of a set of homophones. Each homophone is then encoded by a source coder after which it can be encrypted with a cryptographic system. The security of homophonic coding falls into the class of unconditionally secure ciphers. The main advantage of homophonic coding over pure source coding is that it provides security both against known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks, whereas source coding merely protects against a ciphertext-only attack. The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the implementation of an adaptive homophonic coder based on an arithmetic coder. This type of homophonic coding is termed universal, as it is not dependent on the source statistics.Computer ScienceM.Sc. (Computer Science