Games and enculturation: A cross-cultural analysis of games and values in Austronesia

While most animals play, only humans play games. As animal play serves to teach offspring important life-skills in a safe scenario, human games might, in similar ways, teach important culturally relevant skills. Humans in all cultures play games; however, it is not clear whether variation in the characteristics of games across cultural groups is related to group-level attributes. Here we investigate specifically whether the cooperativeness of games covaries with socio-ecological differences across cultural groups. We hypothesize that cultural groups that engage in frequent inter-group conflict, cooperative sustenance acquisition, or that have less stratified social structures, might more frequently play cooperative games as compared to groups that do not share these characteristics. To test these hypotheses, we gathered data from the ethnographic record on 25 ethnolinguistic groups in the Austronesian language family. We show that cultural groups with higher levels of inter-group conflict and cooperative land-based hunting play cooperative games more frequently than other groups. Additionally, cultural groups with higher levels of intra-group conflict play competitive games more frequently than other groups. These findings indicate that games are not randomly distributed among cultures, but rather relate to the socio-ecological settings of the cultural groups that practice them. We argue that games serve as training grounds for group-specific norms and values and thereby have an important function in enculturation during childhood. Moreover, games might server an important role in the maintenance of cultural diversity.Introduction Children’s play Games Possible drivers of cooperative goal structures - Interdependence in foraging. - Intra- and inter-group conflict. Lack of social stratification Methods - Games - Cultural covariate data - Statistical analyses Results - Descriptive statistics - Cultural variables and goal structures Discussion Conclusio

Coevolutionary optimization of fuzzy logic intelligence for strategic decision support

©2005 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.We present a description and initial results of a computer code that coevolves fuzzy logic rules to play a two-sided zero-sum competitive game. It is based on the TEMPO Military Planning Game that has been used to teach resource allocation to over 20 000 students over the past 40 years. No feasible algorithm for optimal play is known. The coevolved rules, when pitted against human players, usually win the first few competitions. For reasons not yet understood, the evolved rules (found in a symmetrical competition) place little value on information concerning the play of the opponent.Rodney W. Johnson, Michael E. Melich, Zbigniew Michalewicz, and Martin Schmid

“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life

Coevolutionary fuzzy modeling

This thesis presents Fuzzy CoCo, a novel approach for system design, conducive to explaining human decisions. Based on fuzzy logic and coevolutionary computation, Fuzzy CoCo is a methodology for constructing systems able to accurately predict the outcome of a human decision-making process, while providing an understandable explanation of the underlying reasoning. Fuzzy logic provides a formal framework for constructing systems exhibiting both good numeric performance (precision) and linguistic representation (interpretability). From a numeric point of view, fuzzy systems exhibit nonlinear behavior and can handle imprecise and incomplete information. Linguistically, they represent knowledge in the form of rules, a natural way for explaining decision processes. Fuzzy modeling —meaning the construction of fuzzy systems— is an arduous task, demanding the identification of many parameters. This thesis analyses the fuzzy-modeling problem and different approaches to coping with it, focusing on evolutionary fuzzy modeling —the design of fuzzy inference systems using evolutionary algorithms— which constitutes the methodological base of my approach. In order to promote this analysis the parameters of a fuzzy system are classified into four categories: logic, structural, connective, and operational. The central contribution of this work is the use of an advanced evolutionary technique —cooperative coevolution— for dealing with the simultaneous design of connective and operational parameters. Cooperative coevolutionary fuzzy modeling succeeds in overcoming several limitations exhibited by other standard evolutionary approaches: stagnation, convergence to local optima, and computational costliness. Designing interpretable systems is a prime goal of my approach, which I study thoroughly herein. Based on a set of semantic and syntactic criteria, regarding the definition of linguistic concepts and their causal connections, I propose a number of strategies for producing more interpretable fuzzy systems. These strategies are implemented in Fuzzy CoCo, resulting in a modeling methodology providing high numeric precision, while incurring as little a loss of interpretability as possible. After testing Fuzzy CoCo on a benchmark problem —Fisher's Iris data— I successfully apply the algorithm to model the decision processes involved in two breast-cancer diagnostic problems: the WBCD problem and the Catalonia mammography interpretation problem. For the WBCD problem, Fuzzy CoCo produces systems both of high performance and high interpretability, comparable (if not better) than the best systems demonstrated to date. For the Catalonia problem, an evolved high-performance system was embedded within a web-based tool —called COBRA— for aiding radiologists in mammography interpretation. Several aspects of Fuzzy CoCo are thoroughly analyzed to provide a deeper understanding of the method. These analyses show the consistency of the results. They also help derive a stepwise guide to applying Fuzzy CoCo, and a set of qualitative relationships between some of its parameters that facilitate setting up the algorithm. Finally, this work proposes and explores preliminarily two extensions to the method: Island Fuzzy CoCo and Incremental Fuzzy CoCo, which together with the original CoCo constitute a family of coevolutionary fuzzy modeling techniques. The aim of these extensions is to guide the choice of an adequate number of rules for a given problem. While Island Fuzzy CoCo performs an extended search over different problem sizes, Incremental Fuzzy CoCo bases its search power on a mechanism of incremental evolution

Pattern and process in metabolic ecology : from biotic interactions to cultural diversity gradients

Many ecological patterns and processes are functions of metabolism (Brown 2004), meaning the acquisition, transformation, and allocation of energy, materials, and information within the bodies of individuals and among members of human and other animal societies. Individual metabolic rate should influence behavior by determining the energy available for action as well as the rate at which the body requires fuel. First, I test a key prediction of the metabolic theory of ecology (MTE), that biotic interaction rates are characteristic functions of temperature. Findings support this prediction and suggest that herbivory, predation, parasitism, parasitoidy, and competition increase exponentially with temperature and that this increase echoes that of individual metabolic rates. Second, I extend a metabolic framework to foraging patterns and space use of traditional human societies. Together with colleagues, I build on Hamilton (2007) to offer a model that formally incorporates hypothesized mechanisms affecting population sizes and densities and territory sizes: temperature, productivity, seasonality, and trophic level (degree of carnivory). We test this model on a dataset of 333 traditional foraging societies using multiple linear regression. Interactions between explanatory variables were important, and the influence of temperature, productivity, and seasonality often depended on trophic level. In addition, coastal productivity allowed marine foragers to disassociate themselves from terrestrial energetic constraints and maintain high population densities, small territory sizes, and thus high levels of cultural diversity. A metabolic perspective is useful for interpreting patterns in large scale human ecology and suggesting underlying mechanisms. Third, I argue for a macroecological approach to human ecology and suggest the value of a metabolic perspective using examples from human foraging ecology, life history, space use, population structure, disease ecology, cultural and linguistic diversity patterns, and industrial and urban systems. The ability of a metabolic framework to inform our understanding of behavior, from the interaction rates of small ectotherms to cultural diversity and urban activity patterns in Homo sapiens, suggests the power and promise of this approach

The Influence of Experimental and Computational Economics: Economics Back to the Future of Social Sciences

Economics has been a most puzzling science, namely since the neoclassical revolution defined the legitimate procedures for theorisation and quantification. Its epistemology has based on farce: decisive tests are not applied on dare predictions. As a consequence, estimation has finally been replaced by simulation, and empirical tests have been substituted by non-disciplined exercises of comparison of models with reality. Furthermore, the core concepts of economics defy the normally accepted semantics and tend to establish meanings of their own. One of the obvious instances is the notion of rationality, which has been generally equated with the apt use of formal logic or the ability to apply econometric estimation as a rule of thumb for daily life. In that sense, rationality is defined devoid of content, as alien to the construction of significance and reference by reason and social communication. The contradictory use of simulacra and automata, by John von Neumann and Herbert Simon, was a response to this escape of economic models from reality, suggesting that markets could be conceived of as complex institutions. But most mainstream economists did not understand or did not accept these novelties, and the empirical inquiry or the realistic representation of the action of agents and of their social interaction remained a minor domain of economics, and was essentially ignored by canonical theorizing. The argument of the current paper is based on a survey and discussion of the twin contributions of experimental and computational economics to these issues. Although mainly arising out of the mainstream, these emergent fields of economics generate challenging heuristics as well as new empirical results that defy orthodoxy. Their contributions both to the definition of the social meanings of rationality and to the definition of a new brand of inductive economics are discussed.

Naturalizing institutions: Evolutionary principles and application on the case of money

In recent extensions of the Darwinian paradigm into economics, the replicator-interactor duality looms large. I propose a strictly naturalistic approach to this duality in the context of the theory of institutions, which means that its use is seen as being always and necessarily dependent on identifying a physical realization. I introduce a general framework for the analysis of institutions, which synthesizes Searle's and Aoki's theories, especially with regard to the role of public representations (signs) in the coordination of actions, and the function of cognitive processes that underly rule-following as a behavioral disposition. This allows to conceive institutions as causal circuits that connect the population-level dynamics of interactions with cognitive phenomena on the individual level. Those cognitive phenomena ultimately root in neuronal structures. So, I draw on a critical restatement of the concept of the meme by Aunger to propose a new conceptualization of the replicator in the context of institutions, namely, the replicator is a causal conjunction between signs and neuronal structures which undergirds the dispositions that generate rule-following actions. Signs, in turn, are outcomes of population-level interactions. I apply this framework on the case of money, analyzing the emotions that go along with the use of money, and presenting a stylized account of the emergence of money in terms of the naturalized Searle-Aoki model. In this view, money is a neuronally anchored metaphor for emotions relating with social exchange and reciprocity. Money as a meme is physically realized in a replicator which is a causal conjunction of money artefacts and money emotions. --Generalized Darwinism,institutions,replicator/interactor,Searle,Aoki,naturalism,memes,emotions,money

Cultural Group Selection Plays an Essential Role in Explaining Human Cooperation: A Sketch of the Evidence

Human cooperation is highly unusual. We live in large groups composed mostly of non-relatives. Evolutionists have proposed a number of explanations for this pattern, including cultural group selection and extensions of more general processes such as reciprocity, kin selection, and multi-level selection acting on genes. Evolutionary processes are consilient; they affect several different empirical domains, such as patterns of behavior and the proximal drivers of that behavior. In this target article, we sketch the evidence from five domains that bear on the explanatory adequacy of cultural group selection and competing hypotheses to explain human cooperation. Does cultural transmission constitute an inheritance system that can evolve in a Darwinian fashion? Are the norms that underpin institutions among the cultural traits so transmitted? Do we observe sufficient variation at the level of groups of considerable size for group selection to be a plausible process? Do human groups compete, and do success and failure in competition depend upon cultural variation? Do we observe adaptations for cooperation in humans that most plausibly arose by cultural group selection? If the answer to one of these questions is “no,” then we must look to other hypotheses. We present evidence, including quantitative evidence, that the answer to all of the questions is “yes” and argue that we must take the cultural group selection hypothesis seriously. If culturally transmitted systems of rules (institutions) that limit individual deviance organize cooperation in human societies, then it is not clear that any extant alternative to cultural group selection can be a complete explanation

The survival of the kindest: a theoretical review and empirical investigation of explanations to the evolution of human altruism

Charles Darwin was concerned that his entire theory of evolution by natural selection might be negated by a phenomenon prevalent in a variety of species including humans; namely altruism. If natural selection really favored the survival of the fittest, how could a strategy so irrational as to sacrifice oneself for the well-being of unrelated others survive? A number of scientists have contributed valuable theories to elucidate the �paradox of altruism�. However, in spite of the merits of these theories, there is still dissension about the origins of some particular oddities in the altruistic tendencies of humans, namely why humans act selflessly even when they are unobserved and when they are benefiting a stranger whom they will never meet again. The present doctoral thesis sheds light on answers to the question how human altruism, with all its specific features, could evolve. In the first part, both prominent (e.g., kin selection, reciprocal altruism, etc.) and less recognized theories on the evolution of altruism (e.g., green-beard altruism, the theory of the extended phenotype, etc.) are reviewed. Based on an integrative overview, it is analyzed how much of the altruism puzzle has been solved yet and which specific phenomena are still open to conjecture. With the aim of adding new insights to the issue, the second part of this work presents three empirical studies that investigate in how far prosociality might have been favored (1) by processes of assortation, i.e. the grouping of altruists, and (2) by mating strategies. Indeed, assortation may be invoked as an explanation for the evolution of altruism, if the selfish advantage of egoistic individuals is out-competed by benefits of mutually cooperating altruists. However, to make assortation work as a driver of the evolution of altruism, two prerequisites have to be fulfilled: first, individuals have to be able to distinguish altruists from egoists, and second, altruists have to elect like-minded individuals for mutual cooperation. The first study investigates whether humans are really able to identify altruists based on first impression. To test this, judges watched 20-second silent video clips of unknown target persons and were asked to estimate the behavior of these target persons in a dictator game, which measures prosociality. Estimates were significantly better than chance indicating that humans can identify the altruistic dispositions of unknown persons. The second study investigates whether individuals, in genuine groups, can identify the altruistic tendencies of their daily interaction partners. It further examines whether prosociality influences the formation of friendships in such that individuals assort themselves along the dimension of altruism. Students of six secondary school classes played an anonymous dictator game that functioned as a measure of altruism. Afterwards and unannounced, the students had to estimate their classmates� decisions and did so better than chance. Sociometry revealed that altruists were friends with more altruistic persons than were egoists. The results thus confirm the existence of the two prerequisites for the evolution of altruism through assortation: the predictability of altruistic behavior and the association of altruists. However, although the theory of assortation may explain the evolution of altruism in general, it does not explain the occurrence of inter-individual differences in altruism. The third study deals exactly with this matter. It investigates whether different levels of prosociality might have evolved as a result of different mating strategies, namely inter-individual variations in the propensity to engage in either short-term mating or long-term mating. Specifically, it assumes that prosociality is a necessity for acquiring a long-term partner, especially if an individual has to compensate for deficits in physical attractiveness. To find out whether this idea is true, the study tested whether individuals look out for different levels of prosociality depending on whether they are searching for a short-term mate or a long-term mate. Judges watched short video-clips of target persons and received additional information on the targets� prosociality. Judges were then asked to rate each of the target persons with regard to their desirability as a short-term and long-term mate. While prosociality was a significant predictor for long-term desirability, it was irrelevant when subjects chose a short-term mate. The results suggest that although altruism is costly, at least for some individuals it might be a wretched necessity to obtain access to mates and to reproduce. In the general discussion, the results of all three studies are consolidated. Conclusions are drawn as to the consequences of these findings for the study of human altruism. Finally, directions for future research are presented

Why not speak like the neighbours : linguistic variation as a social marker

It is obvious to speakers of any language that language changes. The schoolchildren who think Shakespeare wrote in ‘Old English’ are more likely to be dismayed by the difficulty of reading Early Modern English than surprised that Hamlet, or even Bottom, does not speak as they do. Similarly, their parents would probably be taken aback if they found their offspring’s speech and vocabulary to be exact replicas of their own. Why languages change is a matter of less certainty. In a sense, of course, that statement is not quite accurate. A short browse of comments on the website of the BBC’s Voices project reveals that while modern linguists may disagree about the reasons for language change, many non-linguists are quite certain they know why: laziness and sloppiness, encouraged in Britain by the corrupting influence of American and Australian television. It would seem that to most people, linguistic change is far from being a positive thing - an attitude that is even preserved in such words as etymology, from Greek ετυμος ‘true’. As McMahon (1999: 315-6) and Labov (2001: 10-11) note, the notion of linguistic change as primarily a process of decay was prevalent among nineteenth-century linguists. Labov (2001: 4) even uses rather negative language himself (though apparently more out of sympathy for the emotional responses of his subjects than for the classicism of his distant predecessors), dramatically describing the effects of language change as ranging ‘from petty inconveniences to crushing disabilities that can consume years of our lives with unrewarding struggle against hopeless odds.’ He notes that where changes are observed, the reaction is ‘uniformly negative’ and that this, significantly, is in contrast to the attitude of those older people who welcome such innovations as new technologies and music; their applause is never extended to new ways of speaking. Just as the first chapter of most introductory textbooks on syntax stresses the difference between what most people think grammar is (prescriptive) and what linguists mean by it (descriptive), there is a tendency for books that introduce the fundamentals of sociolinguistics or language change to comment on the attitudinal divide described above. What is less often noted, though not unrecognised, is the possibility that this very attitude provides a clue to why language changes. More precisely, there are good reasons for believing that language change is closely connected to social factors such as identity and status. In the desire of the young to distance themselves from their parents, or that of a particular clique, profession, or nation to distinguish itself from another, there is a stimulus to innovation. In the desire to talk like one’s peers, or ‘betters’ (or even, in some cases, one’s ‘inferiors’), there is reason for innovations to be propagated. Of course, if the imitation is not perfect – in cases of hypercorrection, for example - there may even be further innovation, followed by further propagation and so on. In any case, the issue of group membership highlights the relevance of negative attitudes to change. If individual speech patterns are a marker of both membership and non-membership, then they can be threatening, for where they differ from the speaker’s own modes of expression, they imply his exclusion from something. The experience of being excluded by a younger generation of one’s own compatriots is particularly unpleasant – ‘It’s fine for Americans to speak like that; I know I’m not part of that group and I don’t want to be! But when my own children start speaking like them, well….’ There is another side to this. After the 7 July terrorist bombings in London, one of the most disturbing aspects of the situation for many commentators seems to have been the fact that the bombers were British; most tellingly, several commented explicitly on the fact that the bombers and their supporters spoke with Yorkshire accents. It seems relevant to quote Bennett and Royle’s (1999: 40) definition of ‘uncanny’ as ‘those situations when the homely becomes unhomely, when the familiar becomes unfamiliar or the unfamiliar becomes strangely familiar.’ Speech patterns are clearly of the greatest importance in telling outsider from fellow, and where this is undermined, the listener is disturbed. This all raises a further question: why should it be so important to identify individuals as belonging or not belonging to a group; or indeed to assert one’s own membership? It would seem that this serves an evolutionary purpose. As the size of hominin social groups increased beyond the point that individuals could immediately recognise other members of their own group, populations became increasingly at risk from cheats, or free-riders – infiltrators who take advantage of a group’s resources before disappearing without making any contribution to the group themselves. They may even cause sabotage. Identification of such free-riders is crucial, therefore