Monitoring Processes in Visual Search Enhanced by Professional Experience: The Case of Orange Quality-Control Workers

Visual search tasks have often been used to investigate how cognitive processes change with expertise. Several studies have shown visual experts' advantages in detecting objects related to their expertise. Here, we tried to extend these findings by investigating whether professional search experience could boost top-down monitoring processes involved in visual search, independently of advantages specific to objects of expertise. To this aim, we recruited a group of quality-control workers employed in citrus farms. Given the specific features of this type of job, we expected that the extensive employment of monitoring mechanisms during orange selection could enhance these mechanisms even in search situations in which orange-related expertise is not suitable. To test this hypothesis, we compared performance of our experimental group and of a well-matched control group on a computerized visual search task. In one block the target was an orange (expertise target) while in the other block the target was a Smurfette doll (neutral target). The a priori hypothesis was to find an advantage for quality-controllers in those situations in which monitoring was especially involved, that is, when deciding the presence/absence of the target required a more extensive inspection of the search array. Results were consistent with our hypothesis. Quality-controllers were faster in those conditions that extensively required monitoring processes, specifically, the Smurfette-present and both target-absent conditions. No differences emerged in the orange-present condition, which resulted to mainly rely on bottom-up processes. These results suggest that top-down processes in visual search can be enhanced through immersive real-life experience beyond visual expertise advantages

A literature review of expert problem solving using analogy

We consider software project cost estimation from a problem solving perspective. Taking a cognitive psychological approach, we argue that the algorithmic basis for CBR tools is not representative of human problem solving and this mismatch could account for inconsistent results. We describe the fundamentals of problem solving, focusing on experts solving ill-defined problems. This is supplemented by a systematic literature review of empirical studies of expert problem solving of non-trivial problems. We identified twelve studies. These studies suggest that analogical reasoning plays an important role in problem solving, but that CBR tools do not model this in a biologically plausible way. For example, the ability to induce structure and therefore find deeper analogies is widely seen as the hallmark of an expert. However, CBR tools fail to provide support for this type of reasoning for prediction. We conclude this mismatch between experts’ cognitive processes and software tools contributes to the erratic performance of analogy-based prediction

Designing as Construction of Representations: A Dynamic Viewpoint in Cognitive Design Research

This article presents a cognitively oriented viewpoint on design. It focuses on cognitive, dynamic aspects of real design, i.e., the actual cognitive activity implemented by designers during their work on professional design projects. Rather than conceiving de-signing as problem solving - Simon's symbolic information processing (SIP) approach - or as a reflective practice or some other form of situated activity - the situativity (SIT) approach - we consider that, from a cognitive viewpoint, designing is most appropriately characterised as a construction of representations. After a critical discussion of the SIP and SIT approaches to design, we present our view-point. This presentation concerns the evolving nature of representations regarding levels of abstraction and degrees of precision, the function of external representations, and specific qualities of representation in collective design. Designing is described at three levels: the organisation of the activity, its strategies, and its design-representation construction activities (different ways to generate, trans-form, and evaluate representations). Even if we adopt a "generic design" stance, we claim that design can take different forms depending on the nature of the artefact, and we propose some candidates for dimensions that allow a distinction to be made between these forms of design. We discuss the potential specificity of HCI design, and the lack of cognitive design research occupied with the quality of design. We close our discussion of representational structures and activities by an outline of some directions regarding their functional linkages

Building Machines That Learn and Think Like People

Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has renewed interest in building systems that learn and think like people. Many advances have come from using deep neural networks trained end-to-end in tasks such as object recognition, video games, and board games, achieving performance that equals or even beats humans in some respects. Despite their biological inspiration and performance achievements, these systems differ from human intelligence in crucial ways. We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly human-like learning and thinking machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn, and how they learn it. Specifically, we argue that these machines should (a) build causal models of the world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recognition problems; (b) ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology, to support and enrich the knowledge that is learned; and (c) harness compositionality and learning-to-learn to rapidly acquire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations. We suggest concrete challenges and promising routes towards these goals that can combine the strengths of recent neural network advances with more structured cognitive models.Comment: In press at Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Open call for commentary proposals (until Nov. 22, 2016). https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/information/calls-for-commentary/open-calls-for-commentar

Just how expert are “expert” video-game players? Assessing the experience and expertise of video-game players across “action” video-game genres

Video-game play (particularly “action” video-games) holds exciting promise as an activity that may provide generalized enhancement to a wide range of perceptual and cognitive abilities (for review see Latham et al., 2013a). However, in this article we make the case that to assess accurately the effects of video-game play researchers must better characterize video-game experience and expertise. This requires a more precise and objective assessment of an individual's video-game history and skill level, and making finer distinctions between video-games that fall under the umbrella of “action” games. Failure to consider these factors may partly be responsible for mixed findings (see Boot et al., 2011)

Sherlock Holmes: An expert’s view of expertise

In recent years, there has been an intense research effort to understand the cognitive processes and structures underlying expert behaviour. Work in different fields, including scientific domains, sports, games, and mnemonics, has shown that there are vast differences in perceptual abilities between experts and novices, and that these differences may underpin other cognitive differences in learning, memory, and problem solving. In this article, we evaluate the progress made in the last years through the eyes of an outstanding, albeit fictional, expert: Sherlock Holmes. We first use the Sherlock Holmes character to illustrate expert processes as described by current research and theories. In particular, the role of perception, as well as the nature and influence of expert knowledge, are all present in the description of Conan Doyle’s hero. In the second part of the article, we discuss a number of issues that current research on expertise has barely addressed. These gaps include, for example, several forms of reasoning, the influence of emotions on cognition, and the effect of age on experts’ knowledge and cognitive processes. Thus, although nearly 120 years old, Conan Doyle’s books show remarkable illustrations of expert behaviour, including the coverage of themes that have mostly been overlooked by current research

Visuo-spatial cognition in Williams syndrome: Reviewing and accounting for the strengths and weaknesses in performance

Individuals with Williams syndrome typically show relatively poor visuo-spatial abilities in comparison to stronger verbal skills. However, individuals' level of performance is not consistent across all visuo-spatial tasks. The studies assessing visuo-spatial functioning in Williams syndrome are critically reviewed, in order to provide a clear pattern of the relative difficulty of these tasks. This prompts a possible explanation of the variability in performance seen which focuses on the processing demands of some of these tasks. Individuals with Williams syndrome show an atypical processing style on tests of construction, which does not affect tests of perception

The Paradox of Human Expertise: Why Experts Can Get It Wrong

Expertise is correctly, but one-sidedly, associated with special abilities and enhanced performance. The other side of expertise, however, is surreptitiously hidden. Along with expertise, performance may also be degraded, culminating in a lack of flexibility and error. Expertise is demystified by explaining the brain functions and cognitive architecture involved in being an expert. These information processing mechanisms, the very making of expertise, entail computational trade-offs that sometimes result in paradoxical functional degradation. For example, being an expert entails using schemas, selective attention, chunking information, automaticity, and more reliance on top-down information, all of which allow experts to perform quickly and efficiently; however, these very mechanisms restrict flexibility and control, may cause the experts to miss and ignore important information, introduce tunnel vision and bias, and can cause other effects that degrade performance. Such phenomena are apparent in a wide range of expert domains, from medical professionals and forensic examiners, to military fighter pilots and financial traders

Five seconds or sixty? Presentation time in expert memory

The template theory presented in Gobet and Simon (1996a, 1998) is based on the EPAM theory (Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984; Richman et al., 1995), including the numerical parameters that have been estimated in tests of the latter; and it therefore offers precise predictions for the timing of cognitive processes during the presentation and recall of chess positions. This paper describes the behavior of CHREST, a computer implementation of the template theory, in a task when the presentation time is systematically varied from one second to sixty seconds, on the recall of both game and random positions, and compares the model to human data. As predicted by the model, strong players are better than weak players with both types of positions. Their superiority with random positions is especially clear with long presentation times, but is also present after brief presentation times, although smaller in absolute value. CHREST accounts for the data, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Strong players’ superiority with random positions is explained by the large number of chunks they hold in LTM. Strong players’ high recall percentage with short presentation times is explained by the presence of templates, a special class of chunks. The model is compared to other theories of chess skill, which either cannot account for the superiority of Masters with random positions (models based on high-level descriptions and on levels of processing) or predict too strong a performance of Masters with random positions (long-term working memory)

Experts and Decision Making: First Steps Towards a Unifying Theory of Decision Making in Novices, Intermediates and Experts

Expertise research shows quite ambiguous results on the abilities of experts in judgment and decision making (JDM) classic models cannot account for. This problem becomes even more accentuated if different levels of expertise are considered. We argue that parallel constraint satisfaction models (PCS) might be a useful base to understand the processes underlying expert JDM and the hitherto existing, differentiated results from expertise research. It is outlined how expertise might influence model parameters and mental representations according to PCS. It is discussed how this differential impact of expertise on model parameters relates to empirical results showing quite different courses in the development of expertise; allowing, for example, to predict under which conditions intermediates might outperform experts. Methodological requirements for testing the proposed unifying theory under complex real-world conditions are discussed.Judgment and Decision Making, Expertise, Intermediate Effects, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction, Mental Representation