8,677 research outputs found
Making Code Voting Secure against Insider Threats using Unconditionally Secure MIX Schemes and Human PSMT Protocols
Code voting was introduced by Chaum as a solution for using a possibly
infected-by-malware device to cast a vote in an electronic voting application.
Chaum's work on code voting assumed voting codes are physically delivered to
voters using the mail system, implicitly requiring to trust the mail system.
This is not necessarily a valid assumption to make - especially if the mail
system cannot be trusted. When conspiring with the recipient of the cast
ballots, privacy is broken.
It is clear to the public that when it comes to privacy, computers and
"secure" communication over the Internet cannot fully be trusted. This
emphasizes the importance of using: (1) Unconditional security for secure
network communication. (2) Reduce reliance on untrusted computers.
In this paper we explore how to remove the mail system trust assumption in
code voting. We use PSMT protocols (SCN 2012) where with the help of visual
aids, humans can carry out addition correctly with a 99\% degree of
accuracy. We introduce an unconditionally secure MIX based on the combinatorics
of set systems.
Given that end users of our proposed voting scheme construction are humans we
\emph{cannot use} classical Secure Multi Party Computation protocols.
Our solutions are for both single and multi-seat elections achieving:
\begin{enumerate}[i)]
\item An anonymous and perfectly secure communication network secure against
a -bounded passive adversary used to deliver voting,
\item The end step of the protocol can be handled by a human to evade the
threat of malware. \end{enumerate} We do not focus on active adversaries
Quantum protocols for anonymous voting and surveying
We describe quantum protocols for voting and surveying. A key feature of our
schemes is the use of entangled states to ensure that the votes are anonymous
and to allow the votes to be tallied. The entanglement is distributed over
separated sites; the physical inaccessibility of any one site is sufficient to
guarantee the anonymity of the votes. The security of these protocols with
respect to various kinds of attack is discussed. We also discuss classical
schemes and show that our quantum voting protocol represents a N-fold reduction
in computational complexity, where N is the number of voters.Comment: 8 pages. V2 includes the modifications made for the published versio
SHARVOT: secret SHARe-based VOTing on the blockchain
Recently, there has been a growing interest in using online technologies to
design protocols for secure electronic voting. The main challenges include vote
privacy and anonymity, ballot irrevocability and transparency throughout the
vote counting process. The introduction of the blockchain as a basis for
cryptocurrency protocols, provides for the exploitation of the immutability and
transparency properties of these distributed ledgers.
In this paper, we discuss possible uses of the blockchain technology to
implement a secure and fair voting system. In particular, we introduce a secret
share-based voting system on the blockchain, the so-called SHARVOT protocol.
Our solution uses Shamir's Secret Sharing to enable on-chain, i.e. within the
transactions script, votes submission and winning candidate determination. The
protocol is also using a shuffling technique, Circle Shuffle, to de-link voters
from their submissions.Comment: WETSEB'18:IEEE/ACM 1st International Workshop on Emerging Trends in
Software Engineering for Blockchain. 5 pages, 2 figure
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SAnoVs: Secure Anonymous Voting Scheme for clustered ad hoc networks
In this paper we propose a secure anonymous voting scheme (SAnoVS) for re-clustering in the ad-hoc network. SAnoVS extends our previous work of degree-based clustering algorithms by achieving anonymity and confidentiality of the voting procedure applied to select new cluster heads. The security of SAnoVS is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over elliptic curves, the intractability of inverting a one-way hash function and the fact that only neighboring nodes contribute to the generation of a shared secret. Furthermore, we achieve anonymity since our scheme does not require any identification information as we make use of a polynomial equation system combined with pseudo-random coordinates. The security analysis of our scheme is demonstrated with several attacks scenarios.examined with several attack scenarios and experimental results
Privacy-Preserving Electronic Ticket Scheme with Attribute-based Credentials
Electronic tickets (e-tickets) are electronic versions of paper tickets,
which enable users to access intended services and improve services'
efficiency. However, privacy may be a concern of e-ticket users. In this paper,
a privacy-preserving electronic ticket scheme with attribute-based credentials
is proposed to protect users' privacy and facilitate ticketing based on a
user's attributes. Our proposed scheme makes the following contributions: (1)
users can buy different tickets from ticket sellers without releasing their
exact attributes; (2) two tickets of the same user cannot be linked; (3) a
ticket cannot be transferred to another user; (4) a ticket cannot be double
spent; (5) the security of the proposed scheme is formally proven and reduced
to well known (q-strong Diffie-Hellman) complexity assumption; (6) the scheme
has been implemented and its performance empirically evaluated. To the best of
our knowledge, our privacy-preserving attribute-based e-ticket scheme is the
first one providing these five features. Application areas of our scheme
include event or transport tickets where users must convince ticket sellers
that their attributes (e.g. age, profession, location) satisfy the ticket price
policies to buy discounted tickets. More generally, our scheme can be used in
any system where access to services is only dependent on a user's attributes
(or entitlements) but not their identities.Comment: 18pages, 6 figures, 2 table
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