The neural basis of bounded rational behavior

Bounded rational behaviour is commonly observed in experimental games and in real life situations. Neuroeconomics can help to understand the mental processing underlying bounded rationality and out-of-equilibrium behaviour. Here we report results from recent studies on the neural basis of limited steps of reasoning in a competitive setting – the beauty contest game. We use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study the neural correlates of human mental processes in strategic games. We apply a cognitive hierarchy model to classify subject’s choices in the experimental game according to the degree of strategic reasoning so that we can identify the neural substrates of different levels of strategizing. We found a correlation between levels of strategic reasoning and activity in a neural network related to mentalizing, i.e. the ability to think about other’s thoughts and mental states. Moreover, brain data showed how complex cognitive processes subserve the higher level of reasoning about others. We describe how a cognitive hierarchy model fits both behavioural and brain data.Game theory, Bounded rationality, Neuroeconomics

A cognitive hierarchy model of learning in networks

This paper proposes a method for estimating a hierarchical model of bounded rationality in games of learning in networks. A cognitive hierarchy comprises a set of cognitive types whose behavior ranges from random to substantively rational. SpeciÖcally, each cognitive type in the model corresponds to the number of periods in which economic agents process new information. Using experimental data, we estimate type distributions in a variety of task environments and show how estimated distributions depend on the structural properties of the environments. The estimation results identify signiÖcant levels of behavioral hetero-geneity in the experimental data and overall conÖrm comparative static conjectures on type distributions across task environments. Surprisingly, the model replicates the aggregate pat-terns of the behavior in the data quite well. Finally, we found that the dominant type in the data is closely related to Bayes-rational behavior

Bounded Rationality

The observation of the actual behavior by economic decision makers in the lab and in the field justifies that bounded rationality has been a generally accepted assumption in many socio-economic models. The goal of this paper is to illustrate the difficulties involved in providing a correct definition of what a rational (or irrational) agent is. In this paper we describe two frameworks that employ different approaches for analyzing bounded rationality. The first is a spatial segregation set-up that encompasses two optimization methodologies: backward induction and forward induction. The main result is that, even under the same state of knowledge, rational and non-rational agents may match their actions. The second framework elaborates on the relationship between irrationality and informational restrictions. We use the beauty contest (Nagel, 1995) as a device to explain this relationship.Behavioral economics, bounded rationality, partial information

The minority game: An economics perspective

This paper gives a critical account of the minority game literature. The minority game is a simple congestion game: players need to choose between two options, and those who have selected the option chosen by the minority win. The learning model proposed in this literature seems to differ markedly from the learning models commonly used in economics. We relate the learning model from the minority game literature to standard game-theoretic learning models, and show that in fact it shares many features with these models. However, the predictions of the learning model differ considerably from the predictions of most other learning models. We discuss the main predictions of the learning model proposed in the minority game literature, and compare these to experimental findings on congestion games.Comment: 30 pages, 4 figure

Guessing Games and People Behaviours: What Can we Learn?

In this paper we address the topic of guessing games. By developing a generalised theory of naïveté, we show how Güth et al..s result (i.e. convergence toward interior equilibria is faster than convergence toward boundary equilibria) is compatible with Nagel.s theory of boundedly rational behaviour. However, we also show how, under new model parameterisation, neither Güth et al..s story of convergence towards interior equilibria, nor Nagel.s theory of boundedly rational behaviour are verified. We conclude that the results of Nagel (1995) and Güth et al. (2002), however interesting, are severely affected by the ad hoc parameterisation chosen for the game.game, p-beauty contest, individual behaviour

The Minority Game: An Economics Perspective

This paper gives a critical account of the minority game literature. The minority game is a simple congestion game: players need to choose between two options, and those who have selected the option chosen by the minority win. The learning model proposed in this literature seems to differ markedly from the learning models commonly used in economics. We relate the learning model from the minority game literature to standard game-theoretic learning models, and show that in fact it shares many features with these models. However, the predictions of the learning model differ considerably from the predictions of most other learning models. We discuss the main predictions of the learning model proposed in the minority game literature, and compare these to experimental findings on congestion games.Learning;congestion games;experiments.

A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results

Strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency (equilibrium) are three key modelling principles in noncooperative game theory. This paper relaxes mutual consistency to predict how players are likely to behave in in one-shot games before they can learn to equilibrate. We introduce a one-parameter cognitive hierarchy (CH) model to predict behavior in one-shot games, and initial conditions in repeated games. The CH approach assumes that players use k steps of reasoning with frequency f (k). Zero-step players randomize. Players using k (≥ 1) steps best respond given partially rational expectations about what players doing 0 through k - 1 steps actually choose. A simple axiom which expresses the intuition that steps of thinking are increasingly constrained by working memory, implies that f (k) has a Poisson distribution (characterized by a mean number of thinking steps τ ). The CH model converges to dominance-solvable equilibria when τ is large, predicts monotonic entry in binary entry games for τ < 1:25, and predicts effects of group size which are not predicted by Nash equilibrium. Best-fitting values of τ have an interquartile range of (.98,2.40) and a median of 1.65 across 80 experimental samples of matrix games, entry games, mixed-equilibrium games, and dominance-solvable p-beauty contests. The CH model also has economic value because subjects would have raised their earnings substantially if they had best-responded to model forecasts instead of making the choices they did

Iterated dominance and iterated best response in experimental "p-beauty contests"

Picture a thin country 1000 miles long, running north and south, like Chile. Several natural attractions are located at the northern tip of the country. Suppose each of n resort developers plans to locate a resort somewhere on the country's coast (and all spots are equally attractive). After all the resort locations are chosen, an airport will be built to serve tourists, at the average of all the locations including the natural attractions. Suppose most tourists visit all the resorts equally often, except for lazy tourists who visit only the resort closest to the airport; so the developer who locates closest to the airport gets a fixed bonus of extra visitors. Where should the developer locate to be nearest to the airport? The surprising game-theoretic answer is that all the developers should locate exactly where the natural attractions are. This answer requires at least one natural attraction at the northern tip, but does not depend on the fraction of lazy tourists or the number of developers (as long as there is more than one)