Compiler Design of a Policy Specification Language for Conditional Gradual Release

Securing the confidentiality and integrity of information manipulated by computer software is an old yet increasingly important problem. Current software permission systems present on Android or iOS provide inadequate support for developing applications with secure information flow policies. To be useful, information flow control policies need to specify declassifications and the conditions under which declassification must occur. Having these declassifications scattered all over the program makes policies hard to find, which makes auditing difficult. To overcome these challenges, a policy specification language, \u27Evidently\u27 is discussed that allows one to specify information flow control policies separately from the program and which supports conditional gradual releases that can be automatically enforced. I discuss the Evidently grammar and modular semantics in detail. Finally, I discuss the implementational details of Evidently compiler within the Xtext language development environment and the implementation\u27s enforcement of policies

Types for Location and Data Security in Cloud Environments

Cloud service providers are often trusted to be genuine, the damage caused by being discovered to be attacking their own customers outweighs any benefits such attacks could reap. On the other hand, it is expected that some cloud service users may be actively malicious. In such an open system, each location may run code which has been developed independently of other locations (and which may be secret). In this paper, we present a typed language which ensures that the access restrictions put on data on a particular device will be observed by all other devices running typed code. Untyped, compromised devices can still interact with typed devices without being able to violate the policies, except in the case when a policy directly places trust in untyped locations. Importantly, our type system does not need a middleware layer or all users to register with a preexisting PKI, and it allows for devices to dynamically create new identities. The confidentiality property guaranteed by the language is defined for any kind of intruder: we consider labeled bisimilarity i.e. an attacker cannot distinguish two scenarios that differ by the change of a protected value. This shows our main result that, for a device that runs well typed code and only places trust in other well typed devices, programming errors cannot cause a data leakage.Comment: Short version to appear in Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'17), August 201

Principles of Security and Trust

This open access book constitutes the proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Principles of Security and Trust, POST 2019, which took place in Prague, Czech Republic, in April 2019, held as part of the European Joint Conference on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2019. The 10 papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 27 submissions. They deal with theoretical and foundational aspects of security and trust, including on new theoretical results, practical applications of existing foundational ideas, and innovative approaches stimulated by pressing practical problems

Principles of Security and Trust: 7th International Conference, POST 2018, Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2018, Thessaloniki, Greece, April 14-20, 2018, Proceedings

authentication; computer science; computer software selection and evaluation; cryptography; data privacy; formal logic; formal methods; formal specification; internet; privacy; program compilers; programming languages; security analysis; security systems; semantics; separation logic; software engineering; specifications; verification; world wide we