Dynamic Pricing with Finitely Many Unknown Valuations

Motivated by posted price auctions where buyers are grouped in an unknown number of latent types characterized by their private values for the good on sale, we investigate revenue maximization in stochastic dynamic pricing when the distribution of buyers' private values is supported on an unknown set of points in [0,1] of unknown cardinality $K$. This setting can be viewed as an instance of a stochastic $K$-armed bandit problem where the location of the arms (the $K$ unknown valuations) must be learned as well. In the distribution-free case, we prove that our setting is just as hard as $K$-armed stochastic bandits: no algorithm can achieve a regret significantly better than $\sqrt{KT}$, (where T is the time horizon); we present an efficient algorithm matching this lower bound up to logarithmic factors. In the distribution-dependent case, we show that for all $K>2$ our setting is strictly harder than $K$-armed stochastic bandits by proving that it is impossible to obtain regret bounds that grow logarithmically in time or slower. On the other hand, when a lower bound $\gamma>0$ on the smallest drop in the demand curve is known, we prove an upper bound on the regret of order $(1/\Delta+(\log \log T)/\gamma^2)(K\log T)$. This is a significant improvement on previously known regret bounds for discontinuous demand curves, that are at best of order $(K^{12}/\gamma^8)\sqrt{T}$. When $K=2$ in the distribution-dependent case, the hardness of our setting reduces to that of a stochastic $2$-armed bandit: we prove that an upper bound of order $(\log T)/\Delta$ (up to $\log\log$ factors) on the regret can be achieved with no information on the demand curve. Finally, we show a $O(\sqrt{T})$ upper bound on the regret for the setting in which the buyers' decisions are nonstochastic, and the regret is measured with respect to the best between two fixed valuations one of which is known to the seller

Dynamic Pricing with Finitely Many Unknown Valuations

Motivated by posted price auctions where buyers are grouped in an unknown number of latent types characterized by their private values for the good on sale, we investigate regret minimization in stochastic dynamic pricing when the distribution of buyers\u2019 private values is supported on an unknown set of points in [0, 1] of unknown cardinality K

Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions

We study online learning in repeated first-price auctions with censored feedback, where a bidder, only observing the winning bid at the end of each auction, learns to adaptively bid in order to maximize her cumulative payoff. To achieve this goal, the bidder faces a challenging dilemma: if she wins the bid--the only way to achieve positive payoffs--then she is not able to observe the highest bid of the other bidders, which we assume is iid drawn from an unknown distribution. This dilemma, despite being reminiscent of the exploration-exploitation trade-off in contextual bandits, cannot directly be addressed by the existing UCB or Thompson sampling algorithms in that literature, mainly because contrary to the standard bandits setting, when a positive reward is obtained here, nothing about the environment can be learned. In this paper, by exploiting the structural properties of first-price auctions, we develop the first learning algorithm that achieves $O(\sqrt{T}\log^2 T)$ regret bound when the bidder's private values are stochastically generated. We do so by providing an algorithm on a general class of problems, which we call monotone group contextual bandits, where the same regret bound is established under stochastically generated contexts. Further, by a novel lower bound argument, we characterize an $\Omega(T^{2/3})$ lower bound for the case where the contexts are adversarially generated, thus highlighting the impact of the contexts generation mechanism on the fundamental learning limit. Despite this, we further exploit the structure of first-price auctions and develop a learning algorithm that operates sample-efficiently (and computationally efficiently) in the presence of adversarially generated private values. We establish an $O(\sqrt{T}\log^3 T)$ regret bound for this algorithm, hence providing a complete characterization of optimal learning guarantees for this problem