Dynamic modeling and mitigation of cascading failure in power systems

Recent blackout events consistently show that a variety of mechanisms are involved in cascading outages. These cascading mechanisms are irregularly modeled and validated within the existing literature and industry practices. Understanding the relative significance of these different mechanisms is important for choosing which one(s) needs to be modeled for specific applications. In this work, a cascading failure simulation model that captures fundamental dynamics of power networks and protection systems was developed in order to evaluate the usefulness of dynamic models for cascading outages. The results from a batch of N-2 contingency simulations revealed that the distributions of blackout sizes and event lengths from the proposed simulator correlate well with historical trends. In addition, the proposed model was compared against a quasi-steady state (QSS) model, and it was found that a wide set of dynamic cascading mechanisms are critical in the definition of later stages of the cascades. However, the early stages of cascades showed similar paths independently of the relative number of mechanisms implemented. This work also proposes a novel emergency control algorithm in the context of dynamic cascading outage simulations. It is a centralized, optimization-based control scheme that utilizes a dc power flow approximation to quickly provide load and generation adjustments when the system condition is compromised. Dynamic simulation results showed that cascading risk is considerably reduced with the assistance of successful emergency control actions. Lastly, several other significant elements in dynamic power system modeling were addressed in this study (for example, dynamic load models). They further demonstrate one of the advantages of using our proposed power system simulator: in-depth access to the model components within the simulator package, which is not feasible in commercial softwares

Modeling Fault Propagation Paths in Power Systems: A New Framework Based on Event SNP Systems With Neurotransmitter Concentration

To reveal fault propagation paths is one of the most critical studies for the analysis of power system security; however, it is rather dif cult. This paper proposes a new framework for the fault propagation path modeling method of power systems based on membrane computing.We rst model the fault propagation paths by proposing the event spiking neural P systems (Ev-SNP systems) with neurotransmitter concentration, which can intuitively reveal the fault propagation path due to the ability of its graphics models and parallel knowledge reasoning. The neurotransmitter concentration is used to represent the probability and gravity degree of fault propagation among synapses. Then, to reduce the dimension of the Ev-SNP system and make them suitable for large-scale power systems, we propose a model reduction method for the Ev-SNP system and devise its simpli ed model by constructing single-input and single-output neurons, called reduction-SNP system (RSNP system). Moreover, we apply the RSNP system to the IEEE 14- and 118-bus systems to study their fault propagation paths. The proposed approach rst extends the SNP systems to a large-scaled application in critical infrastructures from a single element to a system-wise investigation as well as from the post-ante fault diagnosis to a new ex-ante fault propagation path prediction, and the simulation results show a new success and promising approach to the engineering domain

Impact Assessment of Hypothesized Cyberattacks on Interconnected Bulk Power Systems

The first-ever Ukraine cyberattack on power grid has proven its devastation by hacking into their critical cyber assets. With administrative privileges accessing substation networks/local control centers, one intelligent way of coordinated cyberattacks is to execute a series of disruptive switching executions on multiple substations using compromised supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. These actions can cause significant impacts to an interconnected power grid. Unlike the previous power blackouts, such high-impact initiating events can aggravate operating conditions, initiating instability that may lead to system-wide cascading failure. A systemic evaluation of "nightmare" scenarios is highly desirable for asset owners to manage and prioritize the maintenance and investment in protecting their cyberinfrastructure. This survey paper is a conceptual expansion of real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, impact analyses, and mitigation (RAIM) framework that emphasizes on the resulting impacts, both on steady-state and dynamic aspects of power system stability. Hypothetically, we associate the combinatorial analyses of steady state on substations/components outages and dynamics of the sequential switching orders as part of the permutation. The expanded framework includes (1) critical/noncritical combination verification, (2) cascade confirmation, and (3) combination re-evaluation. This paper ends with a discussion of the open issues for metrics and future design pertaining the impact quantification of cyber-related contingencies

Stochastic Model for Power Grid Dynamics

We introduce a stochastic model that describes the quasi-static dynamics of an electric transmission network under perturbations introduced by random load fluctuations, random removing of system components from service, random repair times for the failed components, and random response times to implement optimal system corrections for removing line overloads in a damaged or stressed transmission network. We use a linear approximation to the network flow equations and apply linear programming techniques that optimize the dispatching of generators and loads in order to eliminate the network overloads associated with a damaged system. We also provide a simple model for the operator's response to various contingency events that is not always optimal due to either failure of the state estimation system or due to the incorrect subjective assessment of the severity associated with these events. This further allows us to use a game theoretic framework for casting the optimization of the operator's response into the choice of the optimal strategy which minimizes the operating cost. We use a simple strategy space which is the degree of tolerance to line overloads and which is an automatic control (optimization) parameter that can be adjusted to trade off automatic load shed without propagating cascades versus reduced load shed and an increased risk of propagating cascades. The tolerance parameter is chosen to describes a smooth transition from a risk averse to a risk taken strategy...Comment: framework for a system-level analysis of the power grid from the viewpoint of complex network