Oxytocin promotes coordinated out-group attack during intergroup conflict in humans

Intergroup conflict contributes to human discrimination and violence, but persists because individuals make costly contributions to their group's fighting capacity. Yet, how group members effectively coordinate their contributions during intergroup conflict remains poorly understood. Here, we examine the role of oxytocin for (the coordination of) contributions to group attack or defense in multi-round, real-time feedback intergroup contests. In a double-blind placebo-controlled study with N = 480 males in Intergroup Attacker-Defender Contests, we found that oxytocin reduced contributions to attack and over time increased attacker's within-group coordination of contributions. However, rather than becoming peaceful, attackers given oxytocin better tracked their rival's historical defense and coordinated their contributions into well-timed and hence more profitable attacks. Our results reveal coordination of contributions as a critical component of successful attacks and subscribe to the possibility that oxytocin enables individuals to contribute to in-group efficiency and prosperity even when doing so implies outsiders are excluded or harmed. Editorial note: This article has been through an editorial process in which the authors decide how to respond to the issues raised during peer review. The Reviewing Editor's assessment is that all the issues have been addressed (see decision letter). Keywords: collective contribution; group coordination; human; intergroup conflict; neuroscience; out-group attack; oxytocin

Prevention of terrorism : an assessment of prior POM work and future potentials

© 2020 Production and Operations Management Society In this study, we review POM-based research related to prevention of terrorism. According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) terrorist attacks have the potential to be prevented. Consequently, the focus of this study is on security enhancement and improving the resiliency of a nation to prevent terrorist attacks. Accordingly, we review articles from the 25 top journals, [following procedures developed by Gupta et al. (2016)], in the fields of Production and Operations Management, Operations Research, Management Science, and Supply Chain Management. In addition, we searched some selected journals in the fields of Information Sciences, Political Science, and Economics. This literature is organized and reviewed under the following seven core capabilities defined by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS): (1) Intelligence and Information Sharing, (2) Planning, (3) Interdiction and Disruption, (4) Screening, Search, and Detection, (5) Forensics and Attribution, (6) Public Information and Warning, and (7) Operational Coordination. We found that POM research on terrorism is primarily driven by the type of information that a defending country and a terrorist have about each other. Game theory is the main technique that is used in most research papers. Possible directions for future research are discussed

APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY FOR ACTIVE CYBER DEFENSE AGAINST ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREATS

Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are determined, adaptive, and stealthy threat actors in cyber space. They are often hosted in, or sponsored by, adversary nation-states. As such, they are challenging opponents for both the U.S. military and the cyber-defense industry. Current defenses against APTs are largely reactive. This thesis used machine learning and game theory to test simulations of proactive defenses against APTs. We first applied machine learning to two benchmark APT datasets to classify APT network traffic by attack phase. This data was then used in a game model with reinforcement learning to learn the best tactics for both the APT attacker and the defender. The game model included security and resource levels, necessary conditions on actions, results of actions, success probabilities, and realistic costs and benefits for actions. The game model was run thousands of times with semi-random choices with reinforcement learning through a program created by NPS Professor Neil Rowe. Results showed that our methods could model active cyber defense strategies for defenders against both historical and hypothetical APT campaigns. Our game model is an extensible planning tool to recommend actions for defenders for active cyber defense planning against APTs.Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.Captain, United States Marine CorpsCaptain, United States Marine CorpsDISA, Arlington, VA, 2220

Modelling Telecommunications Operators and Adversaries using Game Theory

Telecommunications systems being inherently distributed and collaborative in nature present a plurality of attack surfaces to malicious entities and hence vulnerable to many potential attacks even indirectly demanding a need in prioritising security. The choice of security implementations depends upon the currently understood threats, future possible threat vectors, and the dependencies between systems. Executing these choices while contemplating the financial aspects is exceptionally difficult. It is thus critical to have a perceptible decision support framework for better security decision-making. This thesis studies the strategic nature of the interaction between the Telecoms operators and attackers utilising game theory to understand their strategic decision-making characteristics strengthening security decisions. To understand the security investment decision-making criteria of operators, this thesis utilises static security investment games. Through these games, we study the effects of security investment decision of an operator on other operators' behaviour. We determine conditions supporting the security investment decisions and propose strategic recommendations supplementing the dependency conditions. We then study attackers' behaviour considering them with strategic incentives in contrary to their strictly-bounded rationality in traditional game-theoretic modelling approaches. We utilise a behavioural approach and design a decision-flow model capturing the choices of attackers in the attack process. An outcome of this work is a generalised attack framework. Moreover, using this framework, we derive attack strategies optimising attackers' effort. Through this work, we are probing the foundations for drawing inferences about attackers' strategic characteristics from a cybersecurity perspective