11 research outputs found
Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information
We consider manipulation problems when the manipulator only has partial
information about the votes of the nonmanipulators. Such partial information is
described by an information set, which is the set of profiles of the
nonmanipulators that are indistinguishable to the manipulator. Given such an
information set, a dominating manipulation is a non-truthful vote that the
manipulator can cast which makes the winner at least as preferable (and
sometimes more preferable) as the winner when the manipulator votes truthfully.
When the manipulator has full information, computing whether or not there
exists a dominating manipulation is in P for many common voting rules (by known
results). We show that when the manipulator has no information, there is no
dominating manipulation for many common voting rules. When the manipulator's
information is represented by partial orders and only a small portion of the
preferences are unknown, computing a dominating manipulation is NP-hard for
many common voting rules. Our results thus throw light on whether we can
prevent strategic behavior by limiting information about the votes of other
voters.Comment: 7 pages by arxiv pdflatex, 1 figure. The 6-page version has the same
content and will be published in Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-11
Plurality Voting under Uncertainty
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social
choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational
approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of
voters.
In a recent paper, Meir et al.[EC'14] made another step in this direction, by
suggesting a behavioral game-theoretic model for voters under uncertainty. For
a specific variation of best-response heuristics, they proved initial existence
and convergence results in the Plurality voting system.
In this paper, we extend the model in multiple directions, considering voters
with different uncertainty levels, simultaneous strategic decisions, and a more
permissive notion of best-response. We prove that a voting equilibrium exists
even in the most general case. Further, any society voting in an iterative
setting is guaranteed to converge.
We also analyze an alternative behavior where voters try to minimize their
worst-case regret. We show that the two behaviors coincide in the simple
setting of Meir et al., but not in the general case.Comment: The full version of a paper from AAAI'15 (to appear
Acyclic Games and Iterative Voting
We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general
framework of acyclic games and game forms. More specifically, we classify
convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler
(the order of players) and the action scheduler (which better-reply is played).
Our main technical result is providing a complete picture of conditions for
acyclicity in several variations of Plurality voting. In particular, we show
that (a) under the traditional lexicographic tie-breaking, the game converges
for any order of players under a weak restriction on voters' actions; and (b)
Plurality with randomized tie-breaking is not guaranteed to converge under
arbitrary agent schedulers, but from any initial state there is \emph{some}
path of better-replies to a Nash equilibrium. We thus show a first separation
between restricted-acyclicity and weak-acyclicity of game forms, thereby
settling an open question from [Kukushkin, IJGT 2011]. In addition, we refute
another conjecture regarding strongly-acyclic voting rules.Comment: some of the results appeared in preliminary versions of this paper:
Convergence to Equilibrium of Plurality Voting, Meir et al., AAAI 2010;
Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting, Meir, COMSOC 201
PDL as a Multi-Agent Strategy Logic
Propositional Dynamic Logic or PDL was invented as a logic for reasoning
about regular programming constructs. We propose a new perspective on PDL as a
multi-agent strategic logic (MASL). This logic for strategic reasoning has
group strategies as first class citizens, and brings game logic closer to
standard modal logic. We demonstrate that MASL can express key notions of game
theory, social choice theory and voting theory in a natural way, we give a
sound and complete proof system for MASL, and we show that MASL encodes
coalition logic. Next, we extend the language to epistemic multi-agent
strategic logic (EMASL), we give examples of what it can express, we propose to
use it for posing new questions in epistemic social choice theory, and we give
a calculus for reasoning about a natural class of epistemic game models. We end
by listing avenues for future research and by tracing connections to a number
of other logics for reasoning about strategies.Comment: 10 pages, Poster presentation at TARK 2013 (arXiv:1310.6382)
http://www.tark.or
A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria
It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover,
the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the
voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in
practice. Multiple game-theoretic models have been proposed to better
understand and predict such behavior and the outcomes it induces. However,
these models often make unrealistic assumptions regarding voters' behavior and
the information on which they base their vote.
We suggest a new model for strategic voting that takes into account voters'
bounded rationality, as well as their limited access to reliable information.
We introduce a simple behavioral heuristic based on \emph{local dominance},
where each voter considers a set of possible world states without assigning
probabilities to them. This set is constructed based on prospective candidates'
scores (e.g., available from an inaccurate poll). In a \emph{voting
equilibrium}, all voters vote for candidates not dominated within the set of
possible states.
We prove that these voting equilibria exist in the Plurality rule for a broad
class of local dominance relations (that is, different ways to decide which
states are possible). Furthermore, we show that in an iterative setting where
voters may repeatedly change their vote, local dominance-based dynamics quickly
converge to an equilibrium if voters start from the truthful state. Weaker
convergence guarantees in more general settings are also provided.
Using extensive simulations of strategic voting on generated and real
preference profiles, we show that convergence is fast and robust, that emerging
equilibria are consistent across various starting conditions, and that they
replicate widely known patterns of human voting behavior such as Duverger's
law. Further, strategic voting generally improves the quality of the winner
compared to truthful voting