2,922 research outputs found
Counterfactual Logic and the Necessity of Mathematics
This paper is concerned with counterfactual logic and its implications for the modal status of mathematical claims. It is most directly a response to an ambitious program by Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne (2018), who seek to establish that mathematics is committed to its own necessity. I claim that their argument fails to establish this result for two reasons. First, their assumptions force our hand on a controversial debate within counterfactual logic. In particular, they license counterfactual strengtheningâ the inference from âIf A were true then C would be trueâ to âIf A and B were true then C would be trueââwhich many reject. Second, the system they develop is provably equivalent to appending Deduction Theorem to a T modal logic. It is unsurprising that the combination of Deduction Theorem with T results in necessitation; indeed, it is precisely for this reason that many logicians reject Deduction Theorem in modal contexts. If Deduction Theorem is unacceptable for modal logic, it cannot be assumed to derive the necessity of mathematic
Dual-Context Calculi for Modal Logic
We present natural deduction systems and associated modal lambda calculi for
the necessity fragments of the normal modal logics K, T, K4, GL and S4. These
systems are in the dual-context style: they feature two distinct zones of
assumptions, one of which can be thought as modal, and the other as
intuitionistic. We show that these calculi have their roots in in sequent
calculi. We then investigate their metatheory, equip them with a confluent and
strongly normalizing notion of reduction, and show that they coincide with the
usual Hilbert systems up to provability. Finally, we investigate a categorical
semantics which interprets the modality as a product-preserving functor.Comment: Full version of article previously presented at LICS 2017 (see
arXiv:1602.04860v4 or doi: 10.1109/LICS.2017.8005089
Generic Modal Cut Elimination Applied to Conditional Logics
We develop a general criterion for cut elimination in sequent calculi for
propositional modal logics, which rests on absorption of cut, contraction,
weakening and inversion by the purely modal part of the rule system. Our
criterion applies also to a wide variety of logics outside the realm of normal
modal logic. We give extensive example instantiations of our framework to
various conditional logics. For these, we obtain fully internalised calculi
which are substantially simpler than those known in the literature, along with
leaner proofs of cut elimination and complexity. In one case, conditional logic
with modus ponens and conditional excluded middle, cut elimination and
complexity were explicitly stated as open in the literature
Propositional Logics Complexity and the Sub-Formula Property
In 1979 Richard Statman proved, using proof-theory, that the purely
implicational fragment of Intuitionistic Logic (M-imply) is PSPACE-complete. He
showed a polynomially bounded translation from full Intuitionistic
Propositional Logic into its implicational fragment. By the PSPACE-completeness
of S4, proved by Ladner, and the Goedel translation from S4 into Intuitionistic
Logic, the PSPACE- completeness of M-imply is drawn. The sub-formula principle
for a deductive system for a logic L states that whenever F1,...,Fk proves A,
there is a proof in which each formula occurrence is either a sub-formula of A
or of some of Fi. In this work we extend Statman result and show that any
propositional (possibly modal) structural logic satisfying a particular
formulation of the sub-formula principle is in PSPACE. If the logic includes
the minimal purely implicational logic then it is PSPACE-complete. As a
consequence, EXPTIME-complete propositional logics, such as PDL and the
common-knowledge epistemic logic with at least 2 agents satisfy this particular
sub-formula principle, if and only if, PSPACE=EXPTIME. We also show how our
technique can be used to prove that any finitely many-valued logic has the set
of its tautologies in PSPACE.Comment: In Proceedings DCM 2014, arXiv:1504.0192
Non-normal modalities in variants of Linear Logic
This article presents modal versions of resource-conscious logics. We
concentrate on extensions of variants of Linear Logic with one minimal
non-normal modality. In earlier work, where we investigated agency in
multi-agent systems, we have shown that the results scale up to logics with
multiple non-minimal modalities. Here, we start with the language of
propositional intuitionistic Linear Logic without the additive disjunction, to
which we add a modality. We provide an interpretation of this language on a
class of Kripke resource models extended with a neighbourhood function: modal
Kripke resource models. We propose a Hilbert-style axiomatization and a
Gentzen-style sequent calculus. We show that the proof theories are sound and
complete with respect to the class of modal Kripke resource models. We show
that the sequent calculus admits cut elimination and that proof-search is in
PSPACE. We then show how to extend the results when non-commutative connectives
are added to the language. Finally, we put the logical framework to use by
instantiating it as logics of agency. In particular, we propose a logic to
reason about the resource-sensitive use of artefacts and illustrate it with a
variety of examples
Reasoning about Knowledge in Linear Logic: Modalities and Complexity
In a recent paper, Jean-Yves Girard commented that âit has been a long time since philosophy has stopped intereacting with logicâ[17]. Actually, it has no
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