A Catering Theory of Dividends

We develop a theory in which the decision to pay dividends is driven by investor demand. Managers cater to investors by paying dividends when investors put a stock price premium on payers and not paying when investors prefer nonpayers. To test this prediction, we construct four time series measures of the investor demand for dividend payers. By each measure, nonpayers initiate dividends when demand for payers is high. By some measures, payers omit dividends when demand is low. Further analysis confirms that the results are better explained by the catering theory than other theories of dividends.

Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut

We test whether executive stock ownership affects firm payouts using the 2003 dividend tax cut to identify an exogenous change in the after-tax value of dividends. We find that executives with higher stock ownership were more likely to increase dividends after the tax cut in 2003, whereas no relation is found in previous periods when the dividend tax rate was higher. Relative to previous years, firms that initiated dividends in 2003 were more likely to reduce repurchases. The stock price reaction to the tax cut suggests that the substitution of dividends for repurchases may have been anticipated, consistent with agency conflicts.

POTENTIAL DIVIDENDS AND ACTUAL CASH FLOW. A REGIONAL LATIN AMERICAN ANALYSIS

We examine the value market assigns to components of the cash flow to equity including potential dividends. We study non financial publicly traded firms from five Latin American countries. The model includes four variables: market value of equity, dividends paid, change in equity investment and change in liquid assets (potential dividends) and are regressed with actual equity value as dependent variable. Tests applied give robust results. The main conclusions: Market assigns less than one dollar to a future dollar for any of the variables studied. Potential dividends destroy value. A dollar invested in liquid assets has a negative Net Present Value and it is not zero NPV investments. We confirm the agency costs of keeping undistributed cash flows.Cash flow to equity, potential dividends, equity value.

Why Individual Investors Want Dividends

The question of why individual investors want dividends is investigated by submitting a questionnaire to a Dutch investor panel. The respondents indicate that they want dividends partly because the cost of cashing in dividends is lower than the cost of selling shares. Their answers provide strong confirmation for the signaling theories of Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985). They are inconsistent with the uncertainty resolution theory of Gordon (1961, 1962) and the agency theories of Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1984). The behavioral finance theory of Shefrin and Statman (1984) is not confirmed for cash dividends but is confirmed for stock dividends. Finally, our results indicate that individual investors do not tend to consume a large part of their dividends. This raises some doubt as to whether a reduction or elimination of dividend taxes will stimulate the economy.Dividends, individual investors, survey

Higher payout

Dividends ; Committee on Interest and Dividends

Taxes and the valuation of dividends: a study of dividend announcements in Germany

This paper investigates the impact of the 2001 tax reform in Germany on dividend announcement returns. With this major tax reform, the full imputation system was replaced by the half-income system, which had a significant impact on the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains for most investor classes. In an event study framework, we separate the tax effect of dividends from their positive signaling and agency cost effects to offer a more comprehensive picture of the valuation implications of dividends in Germany. Controlling for signaling and agency cost effects of dividends we find that the market response to positive dividend surprises is more pronounced under the full imputation system, where dividends are generally more favorable to investors from a tax perspective, than under the half-income system. Our results suggest that the observed decline in the dividend response coefficient is synchronized with the 2001 tax reform and hence attributable to the 2001 tax reform. --Dividend Announcements,Taxation

Corporate Payout Policy in Japan

This paper examines cash dividends and share repurchases in Japan - discerning between keiretsu and non-keiretsu groupings of firms - during the period 1990 to 2008, a period of extensive Japanese corporate governance reform. As in the United States, share repurchases in Japan have grown strikingly across firm groupings even relative to cash dividends which have also increased. Unlike in the United States, cash dividends remain the dominant form of payout across the groupings of firms in Japan. Despite extensive corporate governance reform, the keiretsu grouping of firms exhibits a comparative reticence to alter its corporate payout policy. In particular, it remains the case that keiretsu firms disburse relatively large amounts of cash, they rely relatively heavily on cash dividends rather than share repurchases, they exhibit a greater tendency to discontinue cash dividend payouts, their payouts are relatively sensitive to earnings and these payouts respond relatively rapidly with respect to earnings. In addition, the cash dividend payouts in keiretsu firms have been relatively concentrated, while these payouts from non-keiretsu firms concentrate increasingly over time. The findings also suggest that larger firms in Japan are more likely to payout and if they decide to do so they tend to payout more. As the level of concentration of ownership in Japanese firms increases the amount of cash dividends disbursed decreases. Privatized firms are more likely to pay cash dividends and if they decide to do so and they are not keiretsu affiliated they tend to payout more.Payout policy, dividends, share repurchases, corporate governance

An efficient binomial approach to the pricing of options on stocks with cash dividends

In this contribution, we consider options written on stocks which pay cash dividends. Dividend payments have an effect on the value of options: high dividends imply lower call premia and higher put premia. While exact solutions to problems of evaluating both European and American call options and European put options are available in the literature, for American-style put options early exercise may be optimal at any time prior to expiration even in the absence of dividends. In this case numerical techniques, such as lattice approaches, are required. Discrete dividends produce a shift in the tree; as a result, the tree is no longer reconnecting beyond any dividend date. Methods based on non-recombining trees give consistent results, but they are computationally expensive. We analyze binomial algorithms and performed some empirical experiments.Options on stocks, discrete dividends, binomial lattices

New Evidence that Taxes Affect the Valuation of Dividends

This paper uses British data to examine the effects of dividend taxes on investors' relative valuation of dividends and capital gains. British data offer great potential to illuminate the dividends and taxes question, since there have been two radical changes and several minor reforms in British dividend tax policy during the last twenty-five years. Studying the relationship between dividends and stockprice movements during different tax regimes offers an ideal controlled experiment for assessing the effects of taxes on investors' valuation of dividends. Using daily data on a small sample of firms, and monthly data on a much broader sample, we find clear evidence that taxes change equilibrium relationships between dividend yields and market returns. These findings suggest that taxes are important determinants of security market equilibrium, and deepen the puzzle of why firms pay dividends.

Some New Variance Bounds for Asset Prices

When equity prices are determined as the discounted sum of current and expected future dividends, Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) derived a relationship between the variance of the price of equities, p(t), and the variance of the ex post realized discounted sum of current and future dividends: p*(t): Var(p*(t))>= Var(p(t)). The literature has long since recognized that this variance bound is valid only when dividends follow a stationary process. Others, notably West (1988), derive variance bounds that apply when dividends are nonstationary. West shows that the variance in innovations in p(t) must be less than the variance of innovations in a forecast of the discounted sum of current and future dividends constructed by the econometrician, p^(t). Here we derive a new variance bound when dividends are stationary or have a unit root, that sheds light on the discussion in the 1980s of the Shiller variance bound: Var(p(t)-p(t-1)) >= Var(p*(t)-p*(t-1))! We also derive a variance bound related to the West bound: Var(p^(t)-p^(t-1)) >= Var(p(t)-p(t-1)).