1,724 research outputs found
Smart Grid Security: Threats, Challenges, and Solutions
The cyber-physical nature of the smart grid has rendered it vulnerable to a
multitude of attacks that can occur at its communication, networking, and
physical entry points. Such cyber-physical attacks can have detrimental effects
on the operation of the grid as exemplified by the recent attack which caused a
blackout of the Ukranian power grid. Thus, to properly secure the smart grid,
it is of utmost importance to: a) understand its underlying vulnerabilities and
associated threats, b) quantify their effects, and c) devise appropriate
security solutions. In this paper, the key threats targeting the smart grid are
first exposed while assessing their effects on the operation and stability of
the grid. Then, the challenges involved in understanding these attacks and
devising defense strategies against them are identified. Potential solution
approaches that can help mitigate these threats are then discussed. Last, a
number of mathematical tools that can help in analyzing and implementing
security solutions are introduced. As such, this paper will provide the first
comprehensive overview on smart grid security
A survey on power grid faults and their origins: A contribution to improving power grid resilience
UID/EEA/00066/2019One of the most critical infrastructures in the world is electrical power grids (EPGs). New threats affecting EPGs, and their different consequences, are analyzed in this survey along with different approaches that can be taken to prevent or minimize those consequences, thus improving EPG resilience. The necessity for electrical power systems to become resilient to such events is becoming compelling; indeed, it is important to understand the origins and consequences of faults. This survey provides an analysis of different types of faults and their respective causes, showing which ones are more reported in the literature. As a result of the analysis performed, it was possible to identify four clusters concerning mitigation approaches, as well as to correlate them with the four different states of the electrical power system resilience curve.publishe
Failure Analysis in Next-Generation Critical Cellular Communication Infrastructures
The advent of communication technologies marks a transformative phase in
critical infrastructure construction, where the meticulous analysis of failures
becomes paramount in achieving the fundamental objectives of continuity,
security, and availability. This survey enriches the discourse on failures,
failure analysis, and countermeasures in the context of the next-generation
critical communication infrastructures. Through an exhaustive examination of
existing literature, we discern and categorize prominent research orientations
with focuses on, namely resource depletion, security vulnerabilities, and
system availability concerns. We also analyze constructive countermeasures
tailored to address identified failure scenarios and their prevention.
Furthermore, the survey emphasizes the imperative for standardization in
addressing failures related to Artificial Intelligence (AI) within the ambit of
the sixth-generation (6G) networks, accounting for the forward-looking
perspective for the envisioned intelligence of 6G network architecture. By
identifying new challenges and delineating future research directions, this
survey can help guide stakeholders toward unexplored territories, fostering
innovation and resilience in critical communication infrastructure development
and failure prevention
Impact Assessment of Hypothesized Cyberattacks on Interconnected Bulk Power Systems
The first-ever Ukraine cyberattack on power grid has proven its devastation
by hacking into their critical cyber assets. With administrative privileges
accessing substation networks/local control centers, one intelligent way of
coordinated cyberattacks is to execute a series of disruptive switching
executions on multiple substations using compromised supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems. These actions can cause significant impacts
to an interconnected power grid. Unlike the previous power blackouts, such
high-impact initiating events can aggravate operating conditions, initiating
instability that may lead to system-wide cascading failure. A systemic
evaluation of "nightmare" scenarios is highly desirable for asset owners to
manage and prioritize the maintenance and investment in protecting their
cyberinfrastructure. This survey paper is a conceptual expansion of real-time
monitoring, anomaly detection, impact analyses, and mitigation (RAIM) framework
that emphasizes on the resulting impacts, both on steady-state and dynamic
aspects of power system stability. Hypothetically, we associate the
combinatorial analyses of steady state on substations/components outages and
dynamics of the sequential switching orders as part of the permutation. The
expanded framework includes (1) critical/noncritical combination verification,
(2) cascade confirmation, and (3) combination re-evaluation. This paper ends
with a discussion of the open issues for metrics and future design pertaining
the impact quantification of cyber-related contingencies
How to Think About Resilient Infrastructure Systems
abstract: Resilience is emerging as the preferred way to improve the protection of infrastructure systems beyond established risk management practices. Massive damages experienced during tragedies like Hurricane Katrina showed that risk analysis is incapable to prevent unforeseen infrastructure failures and shifted expert focus towards resilience to absorb and recover from adverse events. Recent, exponential growth in research is now producing consensus on how to think about infrastructure resilience centered on definitions and models from influential organizations like the US National Academy of Sciences. Despite widespread efforts, massive infrastructure failures in 2017 demonstrate that resilience is still not working, raising the question: Are the ways people think about resilience producing resilient infrastructure systems?
This dissertation argues that established thinking harbors misconceptions about infrastructure systems that diminish attempts to improve their resilience. Widespread efforts based on the current canon focus on improving data analytics, establishing resilience goals, reducing failure probabilities, and measuring cascading losses. Unfortunately, none of these pursuits change the resilience of an infrastructure system, because none of them result in knowledge about how data is used, goals are set, or failures occur. Through the examination of each misconception, this dissertation results in practical, new approaches for infrastructure systems to respond to unforeseen failures via sensing, adapting, and anticipating processes. Specifically, infrastructure resilience is improved by sensing when data analytics include the modeler-in-the-loop, adapting to stress contexts by switching between multiple resilience strategies, and anticipating crisis coordination activities prior to experiencing a failure.
Overall, results demonstrate that current resilience thinking needs to change because it does not differentiate resilience from risk. The majority of research thinks resilience is a property that a system has, like a noun, when resilience is really an action a system does, like a verb. Treating resilience as a noun only strengthens commitment to risk-based practices that do not protect infrastructure from unknown events. Instead, switching to thinking about resilience as a verb overcomes prevalent misconceptions about data, goals, systems, and failures, and may bring a necessary, radical change to the way infrastructure is protected in the future.Dissertation/ThesisDoctoral Dissertation Civil, Environmental and Sustainable Engineering 201
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