Logics for modelling collective attitudes

We introduce a number of logics to reason about collective propositional attitudes that are defined by means of the majority rule. It is well known that majoritarian aggregation is subject to irrationality, as the results in social choice theory and judgment aggregation show. The proposed logics for modelling collective attitudes are based on a substructural propositional logic that allows for circumventing inconsistent outcomes. Individual and collective propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, obligations, are then modelled by means of minimal modalities to ensure a number of basic principles. In this way, a viable consistent modelling of collective attitudes is obtained

A Logic for Reasoning about Group Norms

We present a number of modal logics to reason about group norms. As a preliminary step, we discuss the ontological status of the group to which the norms are applied, by adapting the classification made by Christian List of collective attitudes into aggregated, common, and corporate attitudes. Accordingly, we shall introduce modality to capture aggregated, common, and corporate group norms. We investigate then the principles for reasoning about those types of modalities. Finally, we discuss the relationship between group norms and types of collective responsibility

The Economics of Knowledge Regulation: An Empirical Analysis of Knowledge Flows

Successful innovation depends on the management of a firm’s knowledge base. This paper empirically investigates the determinants of knowledge regulation. Using a unique survey dataset, the analysis suggests that R&D managers do not leak knowledge randomly, but rather regulate knowledge consciously. We find that the source and the channel of knowledge inflows impact knowledge regulation. The findings reveal that the more a firm profits from knowledge inflows from competitors, the fewer actions it takes to regulate outgoing knowledge. We do not find that the extent of knowledge inflows from collaborating firms impacts knowledge regulation. However, the type of channel being used to acquire knowledge matters. Compared to public channels, the different types of private channels used to access knowledge inflow and the type of the competitive relationship influence the firms’ decision to regulate knowledge outflow in the following way: concerning relationships with competitors, firms regulate knowledge outflow more when using formal channels, but less when using informal channels (although a significant difference is not found with the latter); concerning collaborative relationships, firms regulate knowledge outflow less regardless of whether they are using formal or informal private channels compared to using public channels. Presumably firms that acquire knowledge from competing firms through formal private channels compared to public channels, try to establish opaque and soundproof fences to surround them, whereas firms that acquire knowledge from collaborating firms through formal or informal private channels do not want to restrict circulation, but rather facilitate inter-firm knowledge exchange. Our results have important implications for academics and R&D managers alike

How can economic sociology help business relationship management?

Purpose – By analyzing organizations as social actors and business relationships as social relationships, sociology can improve business relationship management. This paper aims to explore the issues involved. Design/methodology/approach – A business relationship is an interactive exchange between two organizations embedded in a network of business connections. The paper reviews theories of social actions and social actors and the concepts of economic field and embeddedness to illustrate some social dimensions of business relationships. Findings – Social action and social actor theories emphasize that co-operation is always encumbered with conflicts, that consciousness about the relationship is fundamental for both strongly and weakly structured actors, and that actors (people involved in a business relationship) always have some freedom of manoeuvre. The concept of economic field underscores the specificity of each business relationship and the critical need for concrete analysis. The concept of embeddedness highlights that no business relationship is possible without personal bonds. Research limitations/implications – These are the first results of a deeper and broader research directed towards a conceptual model of business relationship management. Practical implications – The paper can help managers to analyze more deeply the social dimensions of business relations with both suppliers and buyers. Consciousness, the ongoing presence of conflicts, the unavoidable role of personal bonds, and interactivity are always relevant in business relationship management. Originality/value – The paper integrates sociological and business marketing approaches. It applies essential sociological theories and concepts to business relationship management

The Ontology of Group Agency

We present an ontological analysis of the notion of group agency developed by Christian List and Philip Pettit. We focus on this notion as it allows us to neatly distinguish groups, organizations, corporations – to which we may ascribe agency – from mere aggregates of individuals. We develop a module for group agency within a foundational ontology and we apply it to organizations

A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Norms and Normative Expectations within a Corporate Hierarchy: Evidence from the Financial Services Industry

This paper presents the results of a field study at a large financial services firm that combines multiple methods, including two economic experiments, to measure ethical norms and their behavioral correlates. Standard survey questions eliciting ethical evaluations of actions in on-the-job ethical dilemmas are transformed into a series of incentivized coordination games in the first experiment. We use the results of this experiment to identify the actual ethical norms for financial adviser behavior held by key personnel – financial advisers and their corporate leaders – in three settings: a clash of incentives between serving the client and earning commissions, a dilemma about fiduciary responsibility to a client, and a dilemma about whistle-blowing on a peer. We also measure the beliefs of financial advisers about the ethical expectations of their corporate leaders and the beliefs of corporate leaders about financial adviser norms. In addition, we ask financial advisers about their personal normative opinions, matching a common methodology in the literature. We find, first, systematic agreements in the normative evaluations across the corporate hierarchy that are consistent with ex ante expectations, but second, we also find some measurable differences between the normative expectations of corporate leaders about on-the-job behavior and the actual norms shared among financial advisers. When there is a normative mismatch across the hierarchy we are able to distinguish miscommunication from ethical disagreement between leaders and employees. Our subjects also report their job satisfaction and take part in a second incentivized experiment in which it is costly to report private information honestly. A last finding is that a mismatch between advisers’ personal ethical opinions and corporate norms – especially those of peers – strongly correlates with job dissatisfaction, and less strongly but significantly with the willingness to be dishonest.field experiment, financial services, corporate leader, financial adviser, ethics, norms, coordination game

A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention

In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose can explain why it is not a mere accident that both (I) and (II) are true of shared intention, while psychological and normative views cannot. The basic idea is that shared intention involves a structure of attitudes of individuals –including, most importantly, attitudes of reliance – which normally plays the relevant motivating roles and creates the relevant obligations

Opening the 'black box' of efficiency measurement: input allocation in multi-output settings.

We develop a new Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)-based methodology for measuring the efficiency of Decision Making Units (DMUs) characterized by multiple inputs and multiple outputs. The distinguishing feature of our method is that it explicitly includes information about output-specific inputs and joint inputs in the efficiency evaluation. This contributes to opening the „black box‟ of efficiency measurement in two different ways. First, including information on the input allocation substantially increases the discriminatory power of the efficiency measurement. Second, it allows to decompose the efficiency value of a DMU into output-specific efficiency values which facilitates the identification of the outputs the manager should focus on to remedy the observed inefficiency. We demonstrate the usefulness and managerial implications of our methodology by means of a unique dataset collected from the Activity Based Costing (ABC) system of a large service company with 290 DMUs.