Matching Dynamics with Constraints

We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to another agent. Each agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it can be matched with. However, depending on the constraints and the current state of the game, not all possible partners are available for matching at all times. For correlated preferences, we propose and study a general class of hedonic coalition formation games that we call coalition formation games with constraints. This class includes and extends many recently studied variants of stable matching, such as locally stable matching, socially stable matching, or friendship matching. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that all these variants are encompassed in a class of "consistent" instances that always allow a polynomial improvement sequence to a stable state. In addition, we show that for consistent instances there always exists a polynomial sequence to every reachable state. Our characterization is tight in the sense that we provide exponential lower bounds when each of the requirements for consistency is violated. We also analyze matching with uncorrelated preferences, where we obtain a larger variety of results. While socially stable matching always allows a polynomial sequence to a stable state, for other classes different additional assumptions are sufficient to guarantee the same results. For the problem of reaching a given stable state, we show NP-hardness in almost all considered classes of matching games.Comment: Conference Version in WINE 201

Dominating Set Games

In this paper we study cooperative cost games arising from domination problems on graphs.We introduce three games to model the cost allocation problem and we derive a necessary and su cient condition for the balancedness of all three games.Furthermore we study concavity of these games.game theory;cost allocation;cooperative games

The Disjoint Domination Game

We introduce and study a Maker-Breaker type game in which the issue is to create or avoid two disjoint dominating sets in graphs without isolated vertices. We prove that the maker has a winning strategy on all connected graphs if the game is started by the breaker. This implies the same in the $(2:1)$ biased game also in the maker-start game. It remains open to characterize the maker-win graphs in the maker-start non-biased game, and to analyze the $(a:b)$ biased game for $(a:b)\neq (2:1)$. For a more restricted variant of the non-biased game we prove that the maker can win on every graph without isolated vertices.Comment: 18 page