26 research outputs found
Expected loss analysis of thresholded authentication protocols in noisy conditions
A number of authentication protocols have been proposed recently, where at
least some part of the authentication is performed during a phase, lasting
rounds, with no error correction. This requires assigning an acceptable
threshold for the number of detected errors. This paper describes a framework
enabling an expected loss analysis for all the protocols in this family.
Furthermore, computationally simple methods to obtain nearly optimal value of
the threshold, as well as for the number of rounds is suggested. Finally, a
method to adaptively select both the number of rounds and the threshold is
proposed.Comment: 17 pages, 2 figures; draf
Optimal security limits of RFID distance bounding protocols
In this paper, we classify the RFID distance bounding protocols having bitwise fast phases and no final signature. We also give the theoretical security bounds for two specific classes, leaving the security bounds for the general case as an open problem. As for the classification, we introduce the notion of k-previous challenge dependent (k-PCD) protocols where each response bit depends on the current and k-previous challenges and there is no final signature. We treat the case k = 0, which means each response bit depends only on the current challenge, as a special case and define such protocols as current challenge dependent (CCD) protocols. In general, we construct a trade-off curve between the security levels of mafia and distance frauds by introducing two generic attack algorithms. This leads to the conclusion that CCD protocols cannot attain the ideal security against distance fraud, i.e. 1/2, for each challenge-response bit, without totally losing the security against mafia fraud. We extend the generic attacks to 1-PCD protocols and obtain a trade-off curve for 1-PCD protocols pointing out that 1-PCD protocols can provide better security than CCD protocols. Thereby, we propose a natural extension of a CCD protocol to a 1-PCD protocol in order to improve its security. As a study case, we give two natural extensions of Hancke and Kuhn protocol to show how to enhance the security against either mafia fraud or distance fraud without extra cost
A framework for analyzing RFID distance bounding protocols
Many distance bounding protocols appropriate for the RFID technology have been proposed recently. Unfortunately, they are commonly designed without any formal approach, which leads to inaccurate analyzes and unfair comparisons. Motivated by this need, we introduce a unied framework that aims to improve analysis and design of distance bounding protocols. Our framework includes a thorough terminology about the frauds, adversary, and prover, thus disambiguating many misleading terms. It also explores the adversary's capabilities and strategies, and addresses the impact of the prover's ability to tamper with his device. It thus introduces some new concepts in the distance bounding domain as the black-box and white-box models, and the relation between the frauds with respect to these models. The relevancy and impact of the framework is nally demonstrated on a study case: Munilla-Peinado distance bounding protocol
Optimal security limits of RFID distance bounding protocols
The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.In this paper, we classify the RFID distance bounding protocols having bitwise fast phases and no final signature. We also give the theoretical security bounds for two specific classes, leaving the security bounds for the general case as an open problem. As for the classification, we introduce the notion of k-previous challenge dependent (k-PCD) protocols where each response bit depends on the current and k-previous challenges and there is no final signature. We treat the case k = 0, which means each response bit depends only on the current challenge, as a special case and define such protocols as current challenge dependent (CCD) protocols. In general, we construct a trade-off curve between the security levels of mafia and distance frauds by introducing two generic attack algorithms. This leads to the conclusion that CCD protocols cannot attain the ideal security against distance fraud, i.e. 1/2, for each challenge-response bit, without totally losing the security against mafia fraud. We extend the generic attacks to 1-PCD protocols and obtain a trade-off curve for 1-PCD protocols pointing out that 1-PCD protocols can provide better security than CCD protocols. Thereby, we propose a natural extension of a CCD protocol to a 1-PCD protocol in order to improve its security. As a study case, we give two natural extensions of Hancke and Kuhn protocol to show how to enhance the security against either mafia fraud or distance fraud without extra cost
On selecting the nonce length in distance bounding protocols
Distance-bounding protocols form a family of challenge–response authentication protocols that have
been introduced to thwart relay attacks. They enable a verifier to authenticate and to establish an
upper bound on the physical distance to an untrusted prover.We provide a detailed security analysis
of a family of such protocols. More precisely, we show that the secret key shared between the verifier
and the prover can be leaked after a number of nonce repetitions. The leakage probability, while
exponentially decreasing with the nonce length, is only weakly dependent on the key length. Our
main contribution is a high probability bound on the number of sessions required for the attacker to
discover the secret, and an experimental analysis of the attack under noisy conditions. Both of these
show that the attack’s success probability mainly depends on the length of the used nonces rather
than the length of the shared secret key. The theoretical bound could be used by practitioners to
appropriately select their security parameters. While longer nonces can guard against this type of
attack, we provide a possible countermeasure which successfully combats these attacks even when
short nonces are use
Towards Secure Distance Bounding
Relay attacks (and, more generally, man-in-the-middle attacks) are a serious threat against many access control and payment schemes.
In this work, we present distance-bounding protocols, how these can deter relay attacks, and the security models formalizing these protocols. We show several pitfalls making existing protocols insecure (or at least, vulnerable, in some cases). Then, we introduce the SKI protocol which enjoys resistance to all popular attack-models and features provable security. As far as we know, this is the first protocol with such all-encompassing security guarantees
A framework for analyzing RFID distance bounding protocols
The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.Many distance bounding protocols appropriate for the RFID technology have been proposed recently. Unfortunately, they are commonly designed without any formal approach, which leads to inaccurate analyzes and unfair comparisons. Motivated by this need, we introduce a unified framework that aims to improve analysis and design of distance bounding protocols. Our framework includes a thorough terminology about the frauds, adversary and prover, thus disambiguating many misleading terms. It also explores the adversary's capabilities and strategies, and addresses the impact of the prover's ability to tamper with his device. It thus introduces some new concepts in the distance bounding domain as the black-box and white-box models, and the relation between the frauds with respect to these models. The relevancy and impact of the framework is finally demonstrated on a study case: Munilla–Peinado distance bounding protocol
Providing a Distance Bounding Protocol Named Pasargad in order to Defend against Relay Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting System
ABSTRACT The most important characteristic of RFID-base