Socially-Tolerable Discrimination

History is replete with overt discrimination of various forms. However, these forms of discrimination are not equally tolerable. For example, discrimination based on immutable or prohibitively unalterable characteristics such as race or gender is much less acceptable. Why? I develop a simple model of conflict which is driven by either racial (gender) discrimination or generational discrimination (i.e., young versus old). I show that there exist parameters of the model where racial (gender) discrimination leads to conflict but generational discrimination does not.

The Measurement of Racial Discrimination in Pay between Job Categories: Theory and Test

The traditional model of taste discrimination in labor markets presumes perfect substitution, making it unsuitable for the measurement of discrimination across job assignments. We extend the model to explain cross-assignment discrimination and test it on data from Major League Baseball. A competitive firm with a Generalized Leontief production function fills each job assignment with whites and nonwhites in an environment of customer prejudice. According to the model, cross-assignment discrimination depends upon racial productivity differences, the productivity x prejudice interaction, technology, relative labor supply and racial integration. We find strong evidence of ceteris paribus racial salary differences between hitters and pitchers.wages, discrimination, imperfect substitutability, integration

Evidence of Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: Complaints Filed with State Enforcement Agencies, 1999-2007

To more accurately measure the effect of anti-discrimination laws, this report compares sex, race, and sexual orientation complaint rates through a population-adjusted model. Today, twenty states and the District of Columbia prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. Of those, thirteen also prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity. An aggregation of all available state level data reveals that sexual orientation discrimination laws are used at similar frequencies by Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual (LGB) workers as sex discrimination laws by female workers, both at 5 complaints per every 10,000 workers. Race complaints are filed at the higher rate of 7 per 10,000 workers

Customer Discrimination and Employment Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the French Labor Market

The paper investigates the link between the over-exposure of African immigrants to unemployment in France and their under-representation in jobs in contact with customers. We build a two-sector matching model with ethnic sector-specific preferences, economy-wide employer discrimination, and customer discrimination in jobs in contact with customers. The outcomes of the model allow us to build a test of ethnic discrimination in general and customer discrimination in particular. We run the test on French individual data in a cross-section of Employment Areas. Our results show that there is customer discrimination in the French labor market for contact jobs; a decrease in discrimination intensity by one standard deviation would reduce the raw unemployment rate of African immigrants by 4.3 percentage points.Customer Discrimination; Matching frictions; Jobs in contact; Ethnic Unemployment

A theoretical model of wage discrimination with inspection fines

In neoclassical models, workers are classified a priori into discrimination groups. We develop a probabilistic model of wage discrimination in which workers need not be classified a priori. Our model is a generalization of the standard framework, whereas Becker's model is an extreme case. A second implication is that the traditional approach to measuring discrimination (the Oaxaca–Blinder approach) must be modified to take into account this probabilistic framework.

Is Discrimination Due to a Coordination Failure?

Can groups with equal productive potential end up in equilibria in which they get different average wages? We consider a simple model of statistical discrimination that shows that this might happen. Discrimination in this model is possible for the existence of multiple equilibria. We study what determines multiplicity, what policies might be used to eliminate discrimination in this situation and, finally, we test the main hypothesis of this model, namely, that identical groups will be treated equally. Our empirical results suggest, however, that discrimination is more due to structural differences in the wage schedules faced by black and white males.

Responding to Discrimination as a Function of Meritocracy Beliefs and Personal Experiences: Testing the Model of Shattered Assumptions

We examined whether the model of shattered assumptions (Janoff-Bulman, 1992) could be applied to the reactions of victims of discrimination. Consistent with this model, it was hypothesized that those whose positive world assumptions are inconsistent with their negative experiences of discrimination would report more negative responses than those whose world assumptions match their experience. Disadvantaged group (both gender and ethnicity) members’ responses to discrimination (self-esteem, collective action, intergroup anxiety) were predicted from their meritocracy beliefs and personal experiences of discrimination. Regression analyses showed a significant interaction between meritocracy beliefs and personal discrimination such that among those who reported personal discrimination, stronger beliefs that the meritocracy exists predicted decreased self-esteem and collective action as well as increased intergroup anxiety. Among those who reported little personal discrimination, stronger beliefs that the meritocracy exists predicted increased self-esteem. Implications for promoting a critical view of the social system was discussed

Wholesale price discrimination with regulatory asymmetry

This paper studies the welfare effects of wholesale price discrimination between downstream firms operating under different regulatory systems. I model a monopolistic intermediate good market in which production cost differences between downstream firms may be due to regulatory or technological asymmetries. Price discrimination reduces regulatory distortions but may lower productive efficiency. Therefore, price discrimination increases welfare if regulation is the dominant source of cost differences. This provides a novel welfare rationale for exempting wholesale markets from the recent ban on geo-blocking in the EU