A Survey on platoon-based vehicular cyber-physical systems

Vehicles on the road with some common interests can cooperatively form a platoon-based driving pattern, in which a vehicle follows another one and maintains a small and nearly constant distance to the preceding vehicle. It has been proved that, compared to driving individually, such a platoon-based driving pattern can significantly improve the road capacity and energy efficiency. Moreover, with the emerging vehicular adhoc network (VANET), the performance of platoon in terms of road capacity, safety and energy efficiency, etc., can be further improved. On the other hand, the physical dynamics of vehicles inside the platoon can also affect the performance of VANET. Such a complex system can be considered as a platoon-based vehicular cyber-physical system (VCPS), which has attracted significant attention recently. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey on platoon-based VCPS. We first review the related work of platoon-based VCPS. We then introduce two elementary techniques involved in platoon-based VCPS: the vehicular networking architecture and standards, and traffic dynamics, respectively. We further discuss the fundamental issues in platoon-based VCPS, including vehicle platooning/clustering, cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC), platoon-based vehicular communications, etc., and all of which are characterized by the tight coupled relationship between traffic dynamics and VANET behaviors. Since system verification is critical to VCPS development, we also give an overview of VCPS simulation tools. Finally, we share our view on some open issues that may lead to new research directions

Time, computational complexity, and probability in the analysis of distance-bounding protocols

Many security protocols rely on the assumptions on the physical properties in which its protocol sessions will be carried out. For instance, Distance Bounding Protocols take into account the round trip time of messages and the transmission velocity to infer an upper bound of the distance between two agents. We classify such security protocols as Cyber-Physical. Time plays a key role in design and analysis of many of these protocols. This paper investigates the foundational differences and the impacts on the analysis when using models with discrete time and models with dense time. We show that there are attacks that can be found by models using dense time, but not when using discrete time. We illustrate this with an attack that can be carried out on most Distance Bounding Protocols. In this attack, one exploits the execution delay of instructions during one clock cycle to convince a verifier that he is in a location different from his actual position. We additionally present a probabilistic analysis of this novel attack. As a formal model for representing and analyzing Cyber-Physical properties, we propose a Multiset Rewriting model with dense time suitable for specifying cyber-physical security protocols. We introduce Circle-Configurations and show that they can be used to symbolically solve the reachability problem for our model, and show that for the important class of balanced theories the reachability problem is PSPACE-complete. We also show how our model can be implemented using the computational rewriting tool Maude, the machinery that automatically searches for such attacks

Time, computational complexity, and probability in the analysis of distance-bounding protocols

Many security protocols rely on the assumptions on the physical properties in which its protocol sessions will be carried out. For instance, Distance Bounding Protocols take into account the round trip time of messages and the transmission velocity to infer an upper bound of the distance between two agents. We classify such security protocols as Cyber-Physical. Time plays a key role in design and analysis of many of these protocols. This paper investigates the foundational differences and the impacts on the analysis when using models with discrete time and models with dense time. We show that there are attacks that can be found by models using dense time, but not when using discrete time. We illustrate this with an attack that can be carried out on most Distance Bounding Protocols. In this attack, one exploits the execution delay of instructions during one clock cycle to convince a verifier that he is in a location different from his actual position. We additionally present a probabilistic analysis of this novel attack. As a formal model for representing and analyzing Cyber-Physical properties, we propose a Multiset Rewriting model with dense time suitable for specifying cyber-physical security protocols. We introduce Circle-Configurations and show that they can be used to symbolically solve the reachability problem for our model, and show that for the important class of balanced theories the reachability problem is PSPACE-complete. We also show how our model can be implemented using the computational rewriting tool Maude, the machinery that automatically searches for such attacks