654,372 research outputs found
Minimal Disagreement
In the recent debate about the semantics of perspectival expressions, disagreement has played a crucial role. In a nutshell, what I call âthe challenge from disagreementâ is the objection that certain views on the market cannot account for the intuition of disagreement present in ordinary exchanges involving perspectival expressions like âLicorice is tasty./no, itâs not.â Various contextualist answers to this challenge have been proposed, and this has led to a proliferation of notions of disagreement. It is now accepted in the debate that there are many notions of disagreement and that the search for a common, basic notion is misguided. In this paper I attempt to find such a basic notion underneath this diversity. The main aim of the paper is to motivate, forge and defend a notion of âminimal disagreementâ that has beneficial effects for the debate over the semantics of perspectival expressions
Group peer disagreement
A popular view in mainstream social epistemology maintains that, in the face of a revealed peer disagreement over p, neither party should remain just as confident vis-a-vis p as she initially was. This âconciliatoryâ insight has been defended with regard to individual epistemic peers. However, to the extent that (non-summativist) groups are candidates for group knowledge and beliefs, we should expect groups (no less than individuals) to be in the market for disagreements. The aim here will be to carve out and explore an extension of the conciliatory insight from individual peer disagreement to group peer disagreement; in doing so, Iâll raise and address three key problems that face any plausible defence of such a constraint
Skepticism and Disagreement
Though ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism is apparently based on disagreement, this aspect of skepticism has been widely neglected in contemporary discussion on skepticism. The paper provides a rational reconstruction of the skeptical argument from disagreement that can be found in the books of Sextus Empiricus. It is argued that this argument forms a genuine skeptical paradox that has no fully satisfactory resolution. All attempts to resolve it make knowledge or justified belief either intuitively too easy or impossible
Disagreement and Interpretation
The question of what weight--if any--courts should give to elected government resistance to court decisions is examined. A principle is sought that explains why courts should not consider local resistance when deliberating on constitutional questions
Religious Disagreement
Many people with religious beliefs, pro or con, are aware that those beliefs are denied by a great number of others who are as reasonable, intelligent, fair-minded, and relatively unbiased as they are. Such a realization often leads people to wonder, âHow do I know Iâm right and theyâre wrong? How do I know that the basis for my belief is right and theirs is misleading?â In spite of that realization, most people stick with their admittedly controversial religious belief. This entry examines the epistemology of such belief retention, addressing issues of disagreement, agnosticism, skepticism, and the rationality of reflective religious belief
Epistemic Peer Disagreement
We offer a critical survey of the most discussed accounts of epistemic peer disagreement that are found in the recent literature. We also sketch an alternative approach in line with a pluralist understanding of epistemic rationality
Public Disagreement
Members of different social groups often hold widely divergent public beliefs regarding the nature of the world in which they live. We develop a model that can accommodate such public disagreement, and use it to explore questions concerning the aggregation of distributed information and the consequences of social integration. The model involves heterogeneous priors, private information, and repeated communication until beliefs become public information. We show that when priors are correlated, all private information is eventually aggregated and public beliefs are identical to those arising under observable priors. When priors are independently distributed, however, some private information is never revealed and the expected value of public disagreement is greater when priors are unobservable than when they are observable. If the number of individuals is large, communication breaks down entirely in the sense that disagreement in public beliefs is approximately equal to disagreement in prior beliefs. Interpreting integration in terms of the observability of priors, we show how increases in social integration can give rise to less divergent public beliefs on average. Communication in segregated societies can cause initial biases to be amplified and new biases to emerge where none previously existed. Even though all announcements are public and all signals equally precise, minority group members face a disadvantage in the interpretation of public information that results in medium run beliefs that are less closely aligned with the true state.
The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement
Arguments from disagreement against moral realism begin by calling attention to widespread, fundamental moral disagreement among a certain group of people. Then, some skeptical or anti-realist-friendly conclusion is drawn. Chapter 2 proposes that arguments from disagreement share a structure that makes them vulnerable to a single, powerful objection: they self-undermine. For each formulation of the argument from disagreement, at least one of its premises casts doubt either on itself or on one of the other premises. On reflection, this shouldnât be surprising. These arguments are intended to support very strong metaphysical or epistemological conclusions about morality. They must therefore employ very strong metaphysical or epistemological premises. But, given the pervasiveness of disagreement in philosophy, especially about metaphysics and epistemology, very strong premises are virtually certain to be the subject of widespread, intractable disagreementâprecisely the sort of disagreement that proponents of these arguments think undermine moral claims. Thus, these arguments undermine their own premises. If Chapter 2âs argument is sound, it provides realists with a single, unified strategy for responding to any existing or forthcoming arguments from disagreement
Disagreement and Philosophical Progress
In âBelief in the Face of Controversy,â Hilary Kornblith argues for a radical form of epistemic modesty: given that there has been no demonstrable cumulativeprogress in the history of philosophy â as there has been in formal logic, math, and science â Kornblith concludes that philosophers do not have the epistemic credibility to be trusted as authorities on the questions they attempt to answer. After reconstructing Kornblith's position, I will suggest that it requires us to adopt a different conception of philosophy's epistemic value. First, I will argue that âprogressâ has a different meaning in logic, science and philosophy, and that to judge one of these disciplines by the standards appropriate to one of the others obscures the unique epistemic functions of all. Second, I will argue that philosophy is epistemically unique in that it is a non-relativistic but historically determined excavation of foundations. Finally, drawing on Frank Herbert's Dune, I will suggest that Kornblith leaves us with a choice between two epistemic ideals: the hyper-logical âMentat,â or the historically informed âpre-born.
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